This book addresses the US-West German alliance in the 1950s, during which time Dwight Eisenhower was in the White House and Konrad Adenauer in the Federal Chancery. This is a unique multi-lateral, multi-archival work that analyzes the dilemmas and ultimate successes of the Cold War alliance that was most crucial for Western Europe during the early years of the Cold War.
In observance of Dwight David Eisenhower's one-hundredth birthday in 1990, the Eisenhower Center at the University of New Orleans sponsored a series of lectures by distinguished American and European scholars who espouse an exciting breadth of interpretation regarding the man and his times. In Eisenhower: A Centenary Assessment, Günter Bischof and Stephen E. Ambrose have assembled thirteen of those lectures, revised and updated, thus providing an important contribution to scholarship on the thirty-fourth United States president.The collection is truly balanced in the interpretive sense, with essays by leading revisionist and postrevisionist scholars on Eisenhower. Four of the essays address Eisenhower historiography and his role as military commander, two concern his presidential domestic policies, and the remainder represent an assortment of ongoing research into select areas of his foreign policy by a younger generation of scholars, demonstrating how much the evaluation of Eisenhower's handling of foreign affairs remains in ferment. Ambrose concludes the volume with a broad summary of Eisenhower's achievements and legacies.As Bischof and Ambrose state in their Introduction, Eisenhower played a central role for so long and so crucial a period in twentieth-century history that his impact, contributions, successes, and failures will be subject to reinterpretation and debate for as long as Western civilization lasts. His reputation has already undergone ups and downs -- from the negative opinions of his contemporaries to the enthusiasm of revisionists in the late seventies and early eighties to the more critical assessments of postrevisionist scholars in the late eighties and the nineties. Such is the inevitable cycle of scholarship, to look at old problems with new perspectives, using new documentation or innovative methods, to arrive at new conclusions. This centennial reexamination of Eisenhower's place in history will remain a milestone in years to come.
President Dwight D. Eisenhower and his secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, deployed a tactic Chris Tudda calls “rhetorical diplomacy”— sounding a belligerent note of anti-Communism in speeches, addresses, press conferences, and private meetings with allies and with Moscow. Yet all the while, Tudda discloses, the two were confidentially committed to a contradictory course—the establishment of a strong system of collective security in Western Europe, peaceful accommodation of the Soviet Union, and the maintenance of a new, albeit divided Germany. Tudda explores the Eisenhower administration’s pursuit of these two mutually exclusive diplomatic strategies and reveals how failure to reconcile them endangered the fragile peace of the 1950s. He builds his argument through three case studies: of the administration’s badgering the French and their allies to ratify the European Defense Community, of its threat to liberate Eastern Europe from Moscow’s rule, and of its forcing the issue of German reunification. By emphasizing the threat from the Soviet Union, Eisenhower and Dulles were trying to promote an activist rather than an isolationist foreign policy. But their rhetorical diplomacy intensified Cold War tensions with European allies as well as with Moscow and effectively overwhelmed the administration’s true diplomatic aims. Based on American, British, Eastern European, and Soviet primary sources—many only recently unearthed—The Truth Is Our Weapon is a major contribution to the historiography of Eisenhower’s diplomacy and an important statement about the implications of public and private policy making.
Dwight D. Eisenhower and Nikita Khrushchev presided over a pivotal period in Soviet-American relations. The ongoing Korean War and the lack of an American ambassador in Moscow illustrate the strain in Soviet-American relations at the start of Eisenhower's presidency, but things changed after Stalin died only 44 days later. Stalin's successors began to liberalize both domestic and foreign policy in what became known as the Thaw. There was an increase in diplomatic exchanges, including the first modern summit conferences. Of even greater importance, the Soviet leaders began to reestablish the scientific, cultural, and tourist contacts that had been broken under Stalin. Because political and ideological tensions remained and there were still restrictions on contacts, the Soviet overtures can best be described as a half-offered hand of friendship, and perhaps it was less of a thaw than the end of a blizzard. Nevertheless, these contacts began a process which would help end the Cold War three decades later. This history of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States during the Eisenhower and Khrushchev administrations explores political, social and cultural exchanges, and assesses their impact upon the two countries. Besides diplomatic documents, memoirs from Americans and Soviets, and works of history, it relies upon eyewitness accounts by journalists, tourists and others to paint a detailed picture of the era. Notes are included for each chapter, and there is a bibliography and an index.
''These essays offer diverse opinions . . . and provocative insights. . . . They are a welcome reflection of current scholarly assessments of Eisenhower-Dulles foreign policies.'' -- Journal of American History''Probably the most balanced analysis of Eisenhower's handling of foreign and national security policy that has yet appeared, this book deserves to be widely read. Highly recommended.'' -- Choice
The final set of volumes (Vol 18-21 sold separately) of The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower contain 1,783 documents drawn from Eisenhower's second term as president from 20 January 1957 to 20 January 1961. Completing a monumental project that began with publication of The War Years in 1970, this final set of volumes of The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower contains 1,783 documents drawn from Eisenhower's second term as president from 20 January 1957 to 20 January 1961. In these years Eisenhower worked hard to hold the focus of American national politics on the two major objectives he had set for his presidency in 1952: to sustain the policy of containment without precipitating a war with the Soviet Union and to reduce the role of the federal government in U.S. domestic affairs. In both cases, events at home and abroad intruded—diverting attention to immediate problems, endangering the peace, and forcing the White House to devote most of its leadership to the crises of the day. As president during this tense period, Eisenhower maintained an extensive and revealing correspondence with prominent individuals as well as with personal friends. These letters, together with the occasional entries made in his diary, shed considerable light upon the major national concerns of the 1950s. The volumes also include private and secret correspondence previously unavailable to scholars. Some of these items have been only recently declassified, and many appear here in print for the first time. Taken as a whole, the Eisenhower papers from 1957-61 provide firm documentary evidence of the manner in which Eisenhower dealt with the complex internal and external problems faced by all of our modern political leaders.
More than half a century after Eisenhower left office, the history of his presidency is so clouded by myth, partisanship, and outright fraud that most people have little understanding of how Ike's administration worked or what it accomplished. We know—or think we know—that Eisenhower distrusted his vice president, Richard Nixon, and kept him at arm's length; that he did little to advance civil rights; that he sat by as Joseph McCarthy's reckless anticommunist campaign threatened to wreck his administration; and that he planned the disastrous 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. None of this is true. The President and the Apprentice reveals a different Eisenhower, and a different Nixon. Ike trusted and relied on Nixon, sending him on many sensitive overseas missions. Eisenhower, not Truman, desegregated the military. Eisenhower and Nixon, not Lyndon Johnson, pushed the Civil Rights Act of 1957 through the Senate. Eisenhower was determined to bring down McCarthy and did so. Nixon never, contrary to recent accounts, saw a psychotherapist; but while Ike was recovering from his heart attack in 1955, Nixon was overworked, overanxious, overmedicated, and at the limits of his ability to function.
