Efficiency Wages and Local Versus Central Bargaining
Author: Asbjørn Rødseth
Publisher:
Published: 1991
Total Pages: 28
ISBN-13:
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Author: Asbjørn Rødseth
Publisher:
Published: 1991
Total Pages: 28
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: Steinar Holden
Publisher:
Published: 1988
Total Pages: 14
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: Jon Strand
Publisher:
Published: 2003
Total Pages: 0
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKWe construct a model integrating the efficiency wage model of Shapiro-Stiglitz (1984) (SS), with an individual wage bargaining model in the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides (DMP) tradition where firms and workers form pairwise matches. We show that when workers may threaten to shirk on the job and there is individual wage bargaining, the wage is always higher and employment lower than in either the SS model, or the (appropriately modified) DMP model. When firms determine workers' efforts unilaterally, efforts are set inefficiently low in the SS model. In the bargaining model, effort is higher, and is first best when the worker non-shirking constraint does not bind. The overall equilibrium allocation may then be more or less efficient than in the SS model, but is always less efficient than in a pure bargaining model with no moral hazard.
Author: Frank Walsh
Publisher:
Published: 2005
Total Pages: 10
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: Mr.Ramana Ramaswamy
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
Published: 1993-03
Total Pages: 38
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThe main focus of the “wage bargaining” literature has been on the factors promoting real wage flexibility at the macro level. This paper, in contrast, examines the microeconomic issues of wage bargaining. More specifically, this paper appraises the following questions: (a) what are the conditions under which a firm prefers decentralized to centralized bargaining?, (b) what are the characteristic features of firms which prefer decentralized to centralized bargaining?, and (c) has the proportion of firms which prefer decentralized bargaining increased over time? These questions are examined in an efficiency wage model with insider-outsider features. This paper provides useful theoretical insights for understanding the issues involved in shifting from centralized to decentralized wage bargaining.
Author: Laszlo Goerke
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Published: 2012-12-06
Total Pages: 308
ISBN-13: 1461507871
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThis chapter has set out in detail the models which are employed below in order to analyse the labour market effects of changes in tax rates and in alterations in the tax structure. The fundamental mechanisms underlying the different approaches have been pointed out. Moreover, vital assumptions have been emphasised. By delineating the models which are used for the subsequent analyses, implicitly statements have also been made about topics or aspects which this study does not cover. For example, all workers and firms are identical ex ante. However, ex-post differences are allowed for, inter alia, if unemploy ment occurs or if some firms have to close down. These restrictions indicate areas of future research insofar as that the findings for homogeneous workers or firms yield an unambiguous proposal for changes in tax rates or the tax structure in order to promote employment. This is because it would be desir able for tax policy to know whether the predicted effects also hold in a world with ex-ante heterogeneity. Furthermore, the product market has not played a role. Therefore, repercussions from labour markets outcomes on product demand - and vice versa - are absent. 55 Moreover, neither the process of capital accumulation, be it physical or human capital, nor substitution pos sibilities between labour and capital in the firms' production function are taken into account. Finally, international competition is not modelled.
Author: George A. Akerlof
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Published: 1986-11-28
Total Pages: 196
ISBN-13: 9780521312844
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThe contributors explore the reasons why involuntary unemployment happens when supply equals demand.
Author: Jon Strand
Publisher:
Published: 1998
Total Pages:
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: John Wayne Straka
Publisher:
Published: 1989
Total Pages: 520
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: Ramana Ramaswamy
Publisher:
Published: 2006
Total Pages: 32
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThe main focus of the quot;wage bargainingquot; literature has been on the factors promoting real wage flexibility at the macro level. This paper, in contrast, examines the microeconomic issues of wage bargaining. More specifically, this paper appraises the following questions: (a) what are the conditions under which a firm prefers decentralized to centralized bargaining?, (b) what are the characteristic features of firms which prefer decentralized to centralized bargaining?, and (c) has the proportion of firms which prefer decentralized bargaining increased over time? These questions are examined in an efficiency wage model with insider-outsider features. This paper provides useful theoretical insights for understanding the issues involved in shifting from centralized to decentralized wage bargaining.