With the costs of war dominating our economic news and discussions, Paul Poast’s new text is a needed, relevant and thought-provoking new offering. Written in an extremely accessible manner, the book is an interesting addition to a course at any level. The book’s low price makes it a perfect complement to a Principles text, a Social Issues book, or any upper-level course on war or international security into which an instructor would like to add some economic data or theory.
Wartime is not just about military success. Economists at War tells a different story - about a group of remarkable economists who used their skills to help their countries fight their battles during the Chinese-Japanese War, Second World War, and the Cold War. 1935-55 was a time of conflict, confrontation, and destruction. It was also a time when the skills of economists were called upon to finance the military, to identify economic vulnerabilities, and to help reconstruction. Economists at War: How a Handful of Economists Helped Win and Lose the World Wars focuses on the achievements of seven finance ministers, advisors, and central bankers from Japan, China, Germany, the UK, the USSR, and the US. It is a story of good and bad economic thinking, good and bad policy, and good and bad moral positions. The economists suffered threats, imprisonment, trial, and assassination. They all believed in the power of economics to make a difference, and their contributions had a significant impact on political outcomes and military ends. Economists at War shows the history of this turbulent period through a unique lens. It details the tension between civilian resources and military requirements; the desperate attempts to control economies wracked with inflation, depression, political argument, and fighting; and the clever schemes used to evade sanctions, develop barter trade, and use economic espionage. Politicians and generals cannot win wars if they do not have the resources. This book tells the human stories behind the economics of wartime.
War and economic power have been interwoven in the thought of scholars since the beginnings of economic science, and views on the role of war in the economy have shifted dramatically as the world order has changed. The centenary of World War I has offered the opportunity for increased reflection on this topic, particularly as the war itself stimulated new directions for both research and the development of theory. Economists and War brings together expert contributors who are united in their commitment to exploring this classic subject from innovative and heterodox points of view. The chapters presented in the book delve into a wide range of perspectives from Japan in the Second World War and Italy in the First; the debate on State intervention among German-speaking authors to the debate on the economic bases of perpetual peace; and from Keynes, who wrote on the ‘irrationality of war’, to Sismondi, who saw war as an opportunity for economic development, and not only for nation-states. This volume is essential reading for scholars of the history of economic thought, international political economy and intellectual history. It is also of great interest to those studying military and naval history.
This collection of essays questions the adequacy of explaining today's internal armed conflicts purely in terms of economic factors and re-establishes the importance of identity and grievances in creating and sustaining such wars. Countries studied include Lebanon, Angola, Colombia and Afghanistan.
Bad things occur and persist because of the presence of powerful beneficiaries. In this provocative and illuminating book, Imad Moosa illustrates the economic motivations behind the last 100 years of international conflict, citing the numerous powerful individual and corporate war profiteers that benefit from war.
Even after the experience of WWII and despite the existence of various institutions such as United Nations to avoid conflict between nations, we have not succeeded in making a world free from war. The Cold War, the Vietnam War, the intervention of the superpowers in local conflicts and the spread of terrorism have made this all too clear. This volume brings together contributions by leading international scholars of various countries and reconstructs how economists have dealt with issues that have been puzzling them for nearly three centuries: Can a war be 'rational'? Does international commerce complement or substitute war? Who are the real winners and losers of wars? How are military expenses to be funded? The book offers a refreshing approach to the subject and how we think about the relations between economics and war.
Military and defense-related procurement has been an important source of technology development across a broad spectrum of industries that account for an important share of United States industrial production. In this book, the author focuses on six general-purpose technologies: interchangeable parts and mass production; military and commercial aircraft; nuclear energy and electric power; computers and semiconductors; the INTERNET; and the space industries. In each of these industries, technology development would have occurred more slowly, and in some case much more slowly or not at all, in the absence of military and defense-related procurement. The book addresses three questions that have significant implications for the future growth of the United States economy. One is whether changes in the structure of the United States economy and of the defense-industrial base preclude military and defense-related procurement from playing the role in the development of advanced technology in the future, comparable to the role it has played in the past. A second question is whether public support for commercially oriented research and development will become an important source of new general-purpose technologies. A third and more disturbing question is whether a major war, or the threat of major war, will be necessary to mobilize the scientific, technical, and financial resources necessary to induce the development of new general-purpose technologies. When the history of United States technology development in the next half century is written, it will focus on incremental rather than revolutionary changes in both military and commercial technology. It will also be written within the context of slower productivity growth than of the relatively high rates that prevailed in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s or during the information technology bubble that began in the early 1990s. These will impose severe constraints on the capacity of the United States to sustain a global-class military posture and a position of leadership in the global economy.
This unique volume offers a definitive new history of European economies at war from 1914 to 1918. It studies how European economies mobilised for war, how existing economic institutions stood up under the strain, how economic development influenced outcomes and how wartime experience influenced post-war economic growth. Leading international experts provide the first systematic comparison of economies at war between 1914 and 1918 based on the best available data for Britain, Germany, France, Russia, the USA, Italy, Turkey, Austria-Hungary and the Netherlands. The editors' overview draws some stark lessons about the role of economic development, the importance of markets and the damage done by nationalism and protectionism. A companion volume to the acclaimed The Economics of World War II, this is a major contribution to our understanding of total war.
Does growing economic interdependence among great powers increase or decrease the chance of conflict and war? Liberals argue that the benefits of trade give states an incentive to stay peaceful. Realists contend that trade compels states to struggle for vital raw materials and markets. Moving beyond the stale liberal-realist debate, Economic Interdependence and War lays out a dynamic theory of expectations that shows under what specific conditions interstate commerce will reduce or heighten the risk of conflict between nations. Taking a broad look at cases spanning two centuries, from the Napoleonic and Crimean wars to the more recent Cold War crises, Dale Copeland demonstrates that when leaders have positive expectations of the future trade environment, they want to remain at peace in order to secure the economic benefits that enhance long-term power. When, however, these expectations turn negative, leaders are likely to fear a loss of access to raw materials and markets, giving them more incentive to initiate crises to protect their commercial interests. The theory of trade expectations holds important implications for the understanding of Sino-American relations since 1985 and for the direction these relations will likely take over the next two decades. Economic Interdependence and War offers sweeping new insights into historical and contemporary global politics and the actual nature of democratic versus economic peace.
Argues that: Lieutenant General Wedemeyer's Victory Program report was not the foundation for strategic planning and munitions production, General George C. Marshall knew that no invasion of Europe was possible in 1943 at the time of the Casablanca conference, President Roosevelt's production goals for US industry were so unrealistic as to be destructive rather than constructive, civilian spending did not represent significant sacrifices by American consumers.
