In 1991, a small group of Russians emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union and enjoyed one of the greatest transfers of wealth ever seen, claiming ownership of some of the most valuable petroleum, natural gas and metal deposits in the world. By 1997, five of those individuals were on Forbes Magazine's list of the world's richest billionaires.
The functioning of the gold standard has recently been at the heart of explanations of the interwar depression, particularly as a result of the research of Professors Barry Eichengreen and Peter Temin. In The World Economy and National Economies in the Interwar Slump the interaction between the gold standard and the Great Depression in seven countries is examined by an international team of economists and economic historians. The editor's introduction critically evaluates the Eichengreen-Temin thesis and Eichengreen and Temin themselves contribute an Afterword.
Comparison of the service sector in the USSR and abroad - maintains that the small share of the service sector in the soviet economy is due chiefly to the socialist economic system and to its economic growth strategy, covers theoretical aspects, industrial aspects, the industrial structure, service labour force, the service gap in commerce, etc., and relies primarily on data for the period up to 1968. Bibliography, references and statistical tables.
Study in historical perspective of developments in economic policy in the USSR - covers economic structures and economic administration prior to and during the 1st world war, the position during the 50 years of the communist regime, political leadership of the country, the collective economy, industrialization, political problems, economic growth, etc. Bibliography pp. 389 to 391, and statistical tables.
Leading scholars in the field analyse the Soviet economy sector by sector to make available, in textbook form, the results of the latest research on Soviet industrialisation.
Why did the Soviet economic system fall apart? Did the economy simply overreach itself through military spending? Was it the centrally-planned character of Soviet socialism that was at fault? Or did a potentially viable mechanism come apart in Gorbachev's clumsy hands? Does its failure mean that true socialism is never economically viable? The economic dimension is at the very heart of the Russian story in the twentieth century. Economic issues were the cornerstone of soviet ideology and the soviet system, and economic issues brought the whole system crashing down in 1989-91. This book is a record of what happened, and it is also an analysis of the failure of Soviet economics as a concept.
Economic Trends in Soviet Russia (1930) examines the economic position of the USSR a decade after the Revolution. It displayed the contradictions evident in an economy that had been isolated from the world economy while undergoing great changes, and where the government was taking control over all aspects of economic life. Huge factories had been established, yet the countryside remained pre-industrial; and while the economy was in theory entirely under State control, in practice currency crises, crises of production, gluts, crises of demand, pressed hard on one another’s heels, and were renewed again and again by the spontaneous play of economic forces.
This Handbook is the most comprehensive up-to-date study of the Russian economy available. Russian and western authors analyze the current economic situation, trace the impact of Soviet legacies and of post-Soviet transition policies, examine the main social challenges, and propose directions for reforms.
This book presents, above all, a study of the establishment and development of the Soviet organization and system of fashion industry and design as it gradually evolved in the years after the Second World War in the Soviet Union, which was, in the understanding of its leaders, reaching the mature or last stage of socialism when the country was firmly set on the straight trajectory to its final goal, Communism. What was typical of this complex and extensive system of fashion was that it was always loyally subservient to the principles of the planned socialist economy. This did not by any means indicate that everything the designers and other fashion professionals did was dictated entirely from above by the central planning agencies. Neither did it mean that their professional judgment would have been only secondary to ideological and political standards set by the Communist Party and the government of the Soviet Union. On the contrary, as our study shows, the Soviet fashion professionals had a lot of autonomy. They were eager and willing to exercise their own judgment in matters of taste and to set the agenda of beauty and style for Soviet citizens. The present book is the first comprehensive and systematic history of the development of fashion and fashion institutions in the Soviet Union after the Second World War. Our study makes use of rich empirical and historical material that has been made available for the first time for scientific analysis and discussion. The main sources for our study came from the state, party and departmental archives of the former Soviet Union. We also make extensive use of oral history and the writings published in Soviet popular and professional press.
