Incentives and Political Economy

Incentives and Political Economy

Author: Jean-Jacques Laffont

Publisher: Oxford University Press

Published: 2000-03-30

Total Pages: 270

ISBN-13: 0198294247

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Mainstream economics has recognized only recently the necessity to incorporate political constraints into economic analysis intended for policy advisors. Incentives and Political Economy uses recent advances in contract theory to build a normative approach to constitutional design in economic environments.The first part of the book remains in the tradition of benevolent constitutional design with complete contracting. It treats politicians as informed supervisors and studies how the Constitution should control them, in particular to avoid capture by interest groups. Incentive theories for the separation of powers or systems of checks and balances are developed.The second part of the book recognises the incompleteness of the constitutional contract which leaves discretion to the politicans selected by the electoral process. Asymmetric information associates information rents with economic policies and the political game becomes a game of costly redistribution of those rents. Professor Laffont investigates the trade-offs between an inflexible constitution which leaves little discretion to politicians but sacrifices ex post efficiency and a constitutionweighted towards ex post efficiency but also giving considerable discretion to politicians to pursue private agendas.The final part of the book reconsiders the modeling of collusion given asymmetric information. It proposes a new approach to characterizing incentives constraints for group behaviour when asymmetric information is non-verifiable. This provides a methodology to characterise the optimal constitutional response to activities of interest groups and to study the design of any institution in which group behavior is important.


Incentives to Pander

Incentives to Pander

Author: Nathan M. Jensen

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Published: 2018-03-15

Total Pages: 271

ISBN-13: 1108311423

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Policies targeting individual companies for economic development incentives, such as tax holidays and abatements, are generally seen as inefficient, economically costly, and distortionary. Despite this evidence, politicians still choose to use these policies to claim credit for attracting investment. Thus, while fiscal incentives are economically inefficient, they pose an effective pandering strategy for politicians. Using original surveys of voters in the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom, as well as data on incentive use by politicians in the US, Vietnam and Russia, this book provides compelling evidence for the use of fiscal incentives for political gain and shows how such pandering appears to be associated with growing economic inequality. As national and subnational governments surrender valuable tax revenue to attract businesses in the vain hope of long-term economic growth, they are left with fiscal shortfalls that have been filled through regressive sales taxes, police fines and penalties, and cuts to public education.


Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance

Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance

Author: Douglass C. North

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Published: 1990-10-26

Total Pages: 164

ISBN-13: 9780521397346

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An analytical framework for explaining the ways in which institutions and institutional change affect the performance of economies is developed in this analysis of economic structures.


Democracy, Public Expenditures, and the Poor

Democracy, Public Expenditures, and the Poor

Author: Philip Keefer

Publisher: World Bank Publications

Published: 2003

Total Pages: 36

ISBN-13: 0031210104

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Countries vary systematically with respect to the incentives of politicians to provide broad public goods, and to reduce poverty. Even in developing countries that are democracies, politicians often have incentives to divert resources to political rents, and to private transfers that benefit a few citizens at the expense of many. These distortions can be traced to imperfections in political markets, that are greater in some countries than in others. The authors review the theory, and evidence on the impact of incomplete information of voters, the lack of credibility of political promises, and social polarization on political incentives. They argue that the effects of these imperfections are large, but that their implications are insufficiently integrated into the design of policy reforms aimed at improving the provision of public goods, and reducing poverty.


Making Sense of Incentives

Making Sense of Incentives

Author: Timothy J. Bartik

Publisher: W.E. Upjohn Institute

Published: 2019-10-15

Total Pages: 180

ISBN-13: 0880996684

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Bartik provides a clear and concise overview of how state and local governments employ economic development incentives in order to lure companies to set up shop—and provide new jobs—in needy local labor markets. He shows that many such incentive offers are wasteful and he provides guidance, based on decades of research, on how to improve these programs.


Why Nations Fail

Why Nations Fail

Author: Daron Acemoglu

Publisher: Currency

Published: 2013-09-17

Total Pages: 546

ISBN-13: 0307719227

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Brilliant and engagingly written, Why Nations Fail answers the question that has stumped the experts for centuries: Why are some nations rich and others poor, divided by wealth and poverty, health and sickness, food and famine? Is it culture, the weather, geography? Perhaps ignorance of what the right policies are? Simply, no. None of these factors is either definitive or destiny. Otherwise, how to explain why Botswana has become one of the fastest growing countries in the world, while other African nations, such as Zimbabwe, the Congo, and Sierra Leone, are mired in poverty and violence? Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson conclusively show that it is man-made political and economic institutions that underlie economic success (or lack of it). Korea, to take just one of their fascinating examples, is a remarkably homogeneous nation, yet the people of North Korea are among the poorest on earth while their brothers and sisters in South Korea are among the richest. The south forged a society that created incentives, rewarded innovation, and allowed everyone to participate in economic opportunities. The economic success thus spurred was sustained because the government became accountable and responsive to citizens and the great mass of people. Sadly, the people of the north have endured decades of famine, political repression, and very different economic institutions—with no end in sight. The differences between the Koreas is due to the politics that created these completely different institutional trajectories. Based on fifteen years of original research Acemoglu and Robinson marshall extraordinary historical evidence from the Roman Empire, the Mayan city-states, medieval Venice, the Soviet Union, Latin America, England, Europe, the United States, and Africa to build a new theory of political economy with great relevance for the big questions of today, including: - China has built an authoritarian growth machine. Will it continue to grow at such high speed and overwhelm the West? - Are America’s best days behind it? Are we moving from a virtuous circle in which efforts by elites to aggrandize power are resisted to a vicious one that enriches and empowers a small minority? - What is the most effective way to help move billions of people from the rut of poverty to prosperity? More philanthropy from the wealthy nations of the West? Or learning the hard-won lessons of Acemoglu and Robinson’s breakthrough ideas on the interplay between inclusive political and economic institutions? Why Nations Fail will change the way you look at—and understand—the world.


Making Politics Work for Development

Making Politics Work for Development

Author: World Bank

Publisher: World Bank Publications

Published: 2016-07-14

Total Pages: 350

ISBN-13: 1464807744

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Governments fail to provide the public goods needed for development when its leaders knowingly and deliberately ignore sound technical advice or are unable to follow it, despite the best of intentions, because of political constraints. This report focuses on two forces—citizen engagement and transparency—that hold the key to solving government failures by shaping how political markets function. Citizens are not only queueing at voting booths, but are also taking to the streets and using diverse media to pressure, sanction and select the leaders who wield power within government, including by entering as contenders for leadership. This political engagement can function in highly nuanced ways within the same formal institutional context and across the political spectrum, from autocracies to democracies. Unhealthy political engagement, when leaders are selected and sanctioned on the basis of their provision of private benefits rather than public goods, gives rise to government failures. The solutions to these failures lie in fostering healthy political engagement within any institutional context, and not in circumventing or suppressing it. Transparency, which is citizen access to publicly available information about the actions of those in government, and the consequences of these actions, can play a crucial role by nourishing political engagement.


Innovation and Public Policy

Innovation and Public Policy

Author: Austan Goolsbee

Publisher: University of Chicago Press

Published: 2022-03-25

Total Pages: 259

ISBN-13: 022680545X

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A calculation of the social returns to innovation /Benjamin F. Jones and Lawrence H. Summers --Innovation and human capital policy /John Van Reenen --Immigration policy levers for US innovation and start-ups /Sari Pekkala Kerr and William R. Kerr --Scientific grant funding /Pierre Azoulay and Danielle Li --Tax policy for innovation /Bronwyn H. Hall --Taxation and innovation: what do we know? /Ufuk Akcigit and Stefanie Stantcheva --Government incentives for entrepreneurship /Josh Lerner.


The Organization of Interests

The Organization of Interests

Author: Terry M. Moe

Publisher: University of Chicago Press

Published: 1988-09-15

Total Pages: 296

ISBN-13: 9780226533537

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"Criticisms of Mancur Olson's theory of group membership and organizational behavior and discussions of the limits of his formulations are not new, but Terry Moe has set them forth in thoroughgoing fashion, has elaborated and extended them, and has made positive new contributions. The result is a book that is valuable and constructive, one that may well revive interest in the systematic study of political groups."—David B. Truman, American Political Science Review "The Organization of Interests is a valuable addition to the literature. It reminds us that the interior life of groups has political significance and gives us a conceptual framework for exploring that life. It balances nicely between the pluralists—who tend to interpret interest group behaviour entirely in political terms—and Olson—who has no satisfactory explanation for behaviour that is not attributable to economic self-interest. In the concept of the entrepreneur Moe gives us a useful analytical device which deserves operationalization. The book is well worth study."—A. Paul Pross, Canadian Journal of Political Science