Gilles Favarel-Garrigues explores the management of economic crime in Russia, from the time of Leonid Brezhnev to Boris Yeltsin, recasting the history of the "criminal problem" that has tainted Russian politics since the late 1980s.In the closing decades of the Soviet regime, shortages of goods and services precipitated a rapid increase in black market and underground practices, visible to all yet wholly illegal. Favarel-Garrigues explains why certain cases were selected for prosecution and why particular funds and manpower were deployed to combat "economic crime." Law enforcement agencies were also charged with stemming the fallout from Mikhail Gorbachev's liberal economic reforms. Russia's judicial framework proved too obsolete to deal with far-reaching economic change, tempting many in law enforcement to privatize their professional know-how. Drawing on firsthand research with both criminals and policemen, Favarel-Garrigues scrupulously investigates the changing face of criminal law and its practice before and after the fall of the Soviet state.
“The Russia that Satter depicts in this brave, engaging book cannot be ignored . . . Required reading for anyone interested in the post-Soviet state” (Newsweek). Anticipating a new dawn of freedom after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russians could hardly have foreseen the reality of their future a decade later: A country impoverished and controlled at every level by organized crime. This riveting book views the 1990s reform period through the experiences of individual citizens, revealing the changes that have swept Russia and their effect on Russia’s age-old ways of thinking. “With a reporter’s eye for vivid detail and a novelist’s ability to capture emotion, he conveys the drama of Russia’s rocky road for the average victimized Russian . . . This is only half the story of what is happening in Russia these days, but it is the shattering half, and Satter renders it all the more poignant by making it so human.” —Foreign Affairs “[Satter] tells engrossing tales of brazen chicanery, official greed and unbearable suffering . . . Satter manages to bring the events to life with excruciating accounts of real Russians whose lives were shattered.” —The Baltimore Sun “Satter must be commended for saying what a great many people only dare to think.” —The Globe and Mail (Toronto) “Humane and articulate.” —The Spectator “Vivid, impeccably researched and truly frightening . . . Western policy-makers would do well to study these pages.” —National Post
This book is distinctive in at least three ways. Firstly, the authors approach economic crime in Russia without its a priori stigmatization as part of the general `criminalization' of the economy. Rather they view it as a generic response to and integral part of the post-Soviet transition, and analyze the role of economic crime in the functioning/subverting of state, market and civil society institutions in the new Russia. Secondly, the book reveals the latent constituents of economic crime andndash; the customary practices which are so widespread that they become commonly accepted or tolerated in society, but at the same time constitute and nurture an environment for economic crime. Thirdly, it offers clues for solving some of Russia's paradoxes: How do people survive if wages are not paid on time or in full, and even when paid, are still inadequate for basic living standards? If the rule of law does not rule, then what does? What are the rules of the alleged Russian disorder? How is it possible to combat corruption in a society where supposedly no agency or institution is free from it? Most forms of Russian economic crime in the 1990s are examined in this book. The authors demonstrate how change and continuity are both factors which are crucial to an understanding of the post-Soviet order and to account for the difficulties of democratization and marketization in Russia. This work challenges the supposed transparency of the post-Soviet Russian economy for the outside world and shows how the Russian economy really works. The idea for this book arose out of the East European Regional Programme at the 16th International Symposium on Economic Crime, held at Jesus College in Cambridge in September 1998. It includes papers presented at the Symposium together with new papers commissioned especially for this volume.
The first English-language book to document the men who emerged from the gulags to become Russia's much-feared crime class: the vory v zakone Mark Galeotti is the go-to expert on organized crime in Russia, consulted by governments and police around the world. Now, Western readers can explore the fascinating history of the vory v zakone, a group that has survived and thrived amid the changes brought on by Stalinism, the Cold War, the Afghan War, and the end of the Soviet experiment. The vory--as the Russian mafia is also known--was born early in the twentieth century, largely in the Gulags and criminal camps, where they developed their unique culture. Identified by their signature tattoos, members abided by the thieves' code, a strict system that forbade all paid employment and cooperation with law enforcement and the state. Based on two decades of on-the-ground research, Galeotti's captivating study details the vory's journey to power from their early days to their adaptation to modern-day Russia's free-wheeling oligarchy and global opportunities beyond.
The first book to describe Russia's massive economic transformation for an American audience, Kremlin Capitalism provides a wealth of data and analyses not previously available in this country. The authors articulate the political and economic goals of Russian privatization, examine the current ownership of the largest enterprises in Russia, and chart the serious problem of corporate governance in the new private businesses. Kremlin Capitalism is based on the only continuous study of Russian privatization throughout the Russian Federation from 1992 to the present. The authors tracked down the story of the transition in the cities, towns, and villages of fifty of Russia's eighty-nine provinces, updating their findings after the June 1996 election. The result is an up-to-the-minute report of the largest property transfer in history and an analysis of one of this century's most significant economic transformations. The volume also characterizes the position of workers in terms of unemployment, wages, union power, and their changing role as employee shareholders.What really happened when Russia privatized its economy? The Kremlin brokered the initial struggle among different interest groups eager to claim a portion of Russian property: workers, managers, the Mafia, the old Soviet bureaucracy, regular citizens, entrepreneurs, Russian banks, and foreigners. While competing with one another, all struggled to free themselves from seventy years of Communist economic culture. Four years after the process began, have large companies learned to offer goods and services profitably and pay dividends to shareholders? Individual stories come alive as the book explores problems Russians face in structuring a new economic system, defining the ownership and governance of thousands of corporations one by one. Russian economic practices are being forged in the heat of fierce political struggles between resurgent Communists and nationalists and old Soviet managers, on the one hand, and more liberal elements of its infant democratic system on the other. Whether a few big conglomerates and the powerful banks and holding companies from Soviet days will dominate the new Russian economy to the exclusion of most citizens remains to be seen.Many questions persist. How will billions of dollars of capital be raised to retool, restructure, and reorient the heart and soul of Russia's economy? Will open stock markets stimulate a new economic order or will that new order be imposed through strong state supports and subsidies? What role will be played by shadowy conglomerates that are trying to shape a disorganized economy into something resembling the old Soviet system? The authors note the paradox of a capitalism conceived, designed, implemented, and evaluated by the Kremlin when one aim of reform is to allow market forces to play freely. Kremlin Capitalism asks whether rapid privatization has catalyzed or complicated the transition to a more liberal political and economic system, a question that will reverberate for decades.
Entering the shady world of what he calls "violent entrepreneurship," Vadim Volkov explores the economic uses of violence and coercion in Russia in the 1990s. Violence has played, he shows, a crucial role in creating the institutions of a new market economy. The core of his work is competition among so-called violence-managing agencies—criminal groups, private security services, private protection companies, and informal protective agencies associated with the state—which multiplied with the liberal reforms of the early 1990s. This competition provides an unusual window on the dynamics of state formation.Violent Entrepreneurs is remarkable for its research. Volkov conducted numerous interviews with members of criminal groups, heads of protection companies, law enforcement employees, and businesspeople. He bases his findings on journalistic and anecdotal evidence as well as on his own personal observation. Volkov investigates the making of violence-prone groups in sports clubs (particularly martial arts clubs), associations for veterans of the Soviet—Afghan war, ethnic gangs, and regionally based social groups, and he traces the changes in their activities across the decade. Some groups wore state uniforms and others did not, but all of their members spoke and acted essentially the same and were engaged in the same activities: intimidation, protection, information gathering, dispute management, contract enforcement, and taxation. Each group controlled the same resource—organized violence.
A penetrating look into the extreme plutocracy Vladimir Putin has created and its implications for Russia’s future This insightful study explores how the economic system Vladimir Putin has developed in Russia works to consolidate control over the country. By appointing his close associates as heads of state enterprises and by giving control of the FSB and the judiciary to his friends from the KGB, he has enriched his business friends from Saint Petersburg with preferential government deals. Thus, Putin has created a super wealthy and loyal plutocracy that owes its existence to authoritarianism. Much of this wealth has been hidden in offshore havens in the United States and the United Kingdom, where companies with anonymous owners and black money transfers are allowed to thrive. Though beneficial to a select few, this system has left Russia’s economy in untenable stagnation, which Putin has tried to mask through military might.
It also provides a comparative study, making references to other Mafia (the Japanese Yakuza, the Sicilian Cosa Nostra, American-Italian Mafia, and the Hong Kong Triads)."--BOOK JACKET.
