The "Red Book", jointly prepared by the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency and the International Atomic Energy Agency, is a recognised world reference source on the uranium industry. This publication collates and analyses key information drawn from the twenty editions of the Red Book published between 1965 and 2004, in order to set out a comprehensive review of developments in the world uranium industry from the birth of civilian nuclear energy through to the beginning of the 21st century. It summarises developments in the major uranium-producing countries and topics covered include: installed nuclear capacity, reactor-related uranium requirements, market price, exploration, resources, production, natural and enriched uranium inventories, thorium, mine start-up and closure histories, environmental aspects of uranium mining and processing.
Originally published in 1983, this book presents both the technical and political information necessary to evaluate the emerging threat to world security posed by recent advances in uranium enrichment technology. Uranium enrichment has played a relatively quiet but important role in the history of efforts by a number of nations to acquire nuclear weapons and by a number of others to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. For many years the uranium enrichment industry was dominated by a single method, gaseous diffusion, which was technically complex, extremely capital-intensive, and highly inefficient in its use of energy. As long as this remained true, only the richest and most technically advanced nations could afford to pursue the enrichment route to weapon acquisition. But during the 1970s this situation changed dramatically. Several new and far more accessible enrichment techniques were developed, stimulated largely by the anticipation of a rapidly growing demand for enrichment services by the world-wide nuclear power industry. This proliferation of new techniques, coupled with the subsequent contraction of the commercial market for enriched uranium, has created a situation in which uranium enrichment technology might well become the most important contributor to further nuclear weapon proliferation. Some of the issues addressed in this book are: A technical analysis of the most important enrichment techniques in a form that is relevant to analysis of proliferation risks; A detailed projection of the world demand for uranium enrichment services; A summary and critique of present institutional non-proliferation arrangements in the world enrichment industry, and An identification of the states most likely to pursue the enrichment route to acquisition of nuclear weapons.
This book is the product of a congressionally mandated study to examine the feasibility of eliminating the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU2) in reactor fuel, reactor targets, and medical isotope production facilities. The book focuses primarily on the use of HEU for the production of the medical isotope molybdenum-99 (Mo-99), whose decay product, technetium-99m3 (Tc-99m), is used in the majority of medical diagnostic imaging procedures in the United States, and secondarily on the use of HEU for research and test reactor fuel. The supply of Mo-99 in the U.S. is likely to be unreliable until newer production sources come online. The reliability of the current supply system is an important medical isotope concern; this book concludes that achieving a cost difference of less than 10 percent in facilities that will need to convert from HEU- to LEU-based Mo-99 production is much less important than is reliability of supply.
The U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration (EIA) joined with the U.S. Department of the Interior, U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) to analyze the world uranium supply and demand balance. To evaluate short- term primary supply (0-15 years), the analysis focused on Reasonably Assured Resources (RAR), which are resources pro- jected with a high degree of geologic assurance and considered to be economically feasible to mine. Such resources include uranium resources from mines currently in production as well as resources that are in the stages of feasibility or of being permit- ted. Sources of secondary supply for uranium, such as stockpiles and reprocessed fuel, were also examined. To evaluate long- term primary supply, estimates of uranium from unconventional and from undiscovered resources were analyzed.
The continued presence of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in civilian installations such as research reactors poses a threat to national and international security. Minimization, and ultimately elimination, of HEU in civilian research reactors worldwide has been a goal of U.S. policy and programs since 1978. Today, 74 civilian research reactors around the world, including 8 in the United States, use or are planning to use HEU fuel. Since the last National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine report on this topic in 2009, 28 reactors have been either shut down or converted from HEU to low enriched uranium fuel. Despite this progress, the large number of remaining HEU-fueled reactors demonstrates that an HEU minimization program continues to be needed on a worldwide scale. Reducing the Use of Highly Enriched Uranium in Civilian Research Reactors assesses the status of and progress toward eliminating the worldwide use of HEU fuel in civilian research and test reactors.