In the early twentieth century, the United States set out to guarantee economic and political stability in the Caribbean without intrusive and controversial military interventions—and ended up achieving exactly the opposite. Using military and government records from the United States and the Dominican Republic, this work investigates the extent to which early twentieth-century U.S. involvement in the Dominican Republic fundamentally changed both Dominican history and the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. Successive U.S. interventions based on a policy of "dollar diplomacy" led to military occupation and contributed to a drastic shifting of the Dominican social order, as well as centralized state military power, which Rafael Trujillo leveraged in his 1920s rise to dictatorship. Ultimately, this book demonstrates that the overthrow of the social order resulted not from military planning but from the interplay between uncoordinated interventions in Dominican society and Dominican responses. Telling a neglected story of occupation and resistance, Ellen D. Tillman documents the troubled efforts of the U.S. government to break down the Dominican Republic and remake it from the ground up, providing fresh insight into the motivations and limitations of occupation.
After the Spanish-American War the United States, both by design and by accident, became involved in the Caribbean and the Far East on a scale that would have seemed highly improbable before 1898. As an "emerging" world power, the United States had to grapple with new issues, among them the role of military men and military power in protecting and advancing America's position in the world. Richard D. Challener has examined civil-military relationships in the period 1898-1914 to answer the following questions: To what extent did army and navy officers develop opinions on foreign policy issues? Were the admirals and generals consulted by the civilian officials of government, and did they participate in decision-making? How did the President and State Department use the military services in execution of foreign policy? Were military and diplomatic policy co-ordinated? Does an examination of these relationships help to assess either the interpretations of Kennan and the "realists" or Williams and the "New Left"? And ultimately, how effectively did the United States manage to reconcile force and diplomacy? This book sustains the case for interpreting 1898 and its aftermath as a deliberate search for an "informal" or "insular" empire and shows that American leaders, both civil and military, accepted an interventionist ethic. Originally published in 1973. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
American response to foreign revolution is the theme of this carefully documented diplomatic history of the attitudes and policies of Presidents Taft and Wilson toward revolt in Mexico. Professor Haley's detailed examination is based on extensive research in the papers of members of both administrations and in State Department records. Part One of his book describes the setting of the Mexican conflict and investigates the Taft administration's response toward protecting American lives and property in Mexico (1910 to 1913). Part Two takes up the outbreak of revolutionary civil war and the Wilson administration's attempt to control the course of events (1913 to 1917). This study of the Mexican experience points up problems presented to the U.S. government by uprisings in any country where there are considerable American interests, and in an epilogue the author suggests ways in which the United States might fashion a new response to revolution abroad. The diplomacy of Taft and Wilson in fact reflected two Americas, "the one fleshy, corporate, and pragmatic, the other ascetic, religious, and idealistic." Economic expansion and the acquisition of foreign markets and investments called into being Taft's "Dollar Diplomacy," which was reflected in Mexico by his emphasis on nonintervention during a relatively tranquil period but tempered by his willingness to place order above reform when it came to protecting and stabilizing American interests there. On the other hand, the "New Diplomacy" of Woodrow Wilson reflected his desire to lead other nations to transcend traditional patterns of action and to conform to the American and British model of political development. When war broke out in Mexico, Wilson tried but failed to persuade the two sides to accept an armistice and a neutral provisional government until national elections could be held to establish a new constitutional government. The author seeks to explain the paradox of Wilson's diplomacy-his constant meddling with unrealistic proposals for mediation and his outright support of the Constitutionalist revolutionaries. These diplomacies, Professor Haley points out, offer lessons with contemporary applicability. The Mexican revolution is linked to other twentieth-century uprisings in several ways: in fierce regulation of private property and of foreign investment, and in emphasis on social welfare rather than on political freedom. Lack of anti-communist sentiment makes the experience particularly useful for those who are interested in determining the influence of communism on America's response to later revolutions. The author concludes that in responding to revolution, foreign governments must choose between intervention by overwhelming force at an early stage (Russia in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, America in the Dominican Republic), and the frustrating pursuit of influence through diplomacy with a smaller range of possibilities and lower priorities. Attempts like Wilson's to find a middle ground of limited intervention in a social revolution invite entanglement and failure. Meanwhile, he adds, Mexican diplomatic skill in exploiting the inconsistencies of Wilson's administration demonstrated a deep understanding of American politics and should provide a model that countries in Latin America would do well to look toward.
Conservatives and liberals alike are currently debating the probable future of the Republican Party. What direction will conservatives and republicans take on foreign policy in the age of Obama? This book tackles this question.
In a challenging, provocative book, Andrew Bacevich reconsiders the assumptions and purposes governing the exercise of American global power. Examining the presidencies of George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton--as well as George W. Bush's first year in office--he demolishes the view that the United States has failed to devise a replacement for containment as a basis for foreign policy. He finds instead that successive post-Cold War administrations have adhered to a well-defined "strategy of openness." Motivated by the imperative of economic expansionism, that strategy aims to foster an open and integrated international order, thereby perpetuating the undisputed primacy of the world's sole remaining superpower. Moreover, openness is not a new strategy, but has been an abiding preoccupation of policymakers as far back as Woodrow Wilson. Although based on expectations that eliminating barriers to the movement of trade, capital, and ideas nurtures not only affluence but also democracy, the aggressive pursuit of openness has met considerable resistance. To overcome that resistance, U.S. policymakers have with increasing frequency resorted to force, and military power has emerged as never before as the preferred instrument of American statecraft, resulting in the progressive militarization of U.S. foreign policy. Neither indictment nor celebration, American Empire sees the drive for openness for what it is--a breathtakingly ambitious project aimed at erecting a global imperium. Large questions remain about that project's feasibility and about the human, financial, and moral costs that it will entail. By penetrating the illusions obscuring the reality of U.S. policy, this book marks an essential first step toward finding the answers. Table of Contents: Preface Introduction 1. The Myth of the Reluctant Superpower 2. Globalization and Its Conceits 3. Policy by Default 4. Strategy of Openness 5. Full Spectrum Dominance 6. Gunboats and Gurkhas 7. Rise of the Proconsuls 8. Different Drummers, Same Drum 9. War for the Imperium Notes Acknowledgments Index Reviews of this book: [A] straightforward "critical interpretation of American statecraft in the 1990s"...he is straightforward, too, in establishing where he stands on the political spectrum about US foreign policy...Bacevich insists that there are no differences in the key assumptions governing the foreign policy of the administrations of Bush I, Clinton, and Bush II--and this will certainly be the subject of passionate debate...Bacevich's argument persuades...by means of engaging prose as well as the compelling and relentless accumulation of detail...Bring[s] badly needed [perspective] to troubled times. --James A. Miller, Boston Globe Reviews of this book: For everyone there's Andrew Bacevich's American Empire, an intelligent, elegantly written, highly convincing polemic that demonstrates how the motor of US foreign policy since independence has been the need to guarantee economic growth. --Dominick Donald, The Guardian Reviews of this book: Andrew Bacevich's remarkably clear, cool-headed, and enlightening book is an expression of the United States' unadmitted imperial primacy. It's as bracing as a plunge into a clear mountain lake after exposure to the soporific internationalist conventional wisdom...Bacevich performs an invaluable service by restoring missing historical context and perspective to today's shallow, hand-wringing discussion of Sept. 11...Bacevich's brave, intelligent book restores our vocabulary to debate anew the United States' purpose in the world. --Richard J. Whalen, Across the Board Reviews of this book: To say that Andrew Bacevich's American Empire is a truly realistic work of realism is therefore to declare it not only a very good book, but also a pretty rare one. The author, a distinguished former soldier, combines a tough-minded approach to the uses of military force with a grasp of American history that is both extremely knowledgeable and exceptionally clear-sighted. This book is indispensable for anyone who wants to understand the background to U.S. world hegemony at the start of the 21st century; and it is also a most valuable warning about the dangers into which the pursuit and maintenance of this hegemony may lead America. --Anatol Levin, Washington Monthly Reviews of this book: American Empire is an immensely thoughtful book. Its reflections go beyond the narrow realm of U.S. security policy and demonstrate a deep understanding of American history and culture. --David Hastings Dunn, Political Studies Review I have long suspected our nation's triumphs and trials owed much to the American genius for solipsism and self-deception. Bacevich has convinced me of it by holding up a mirror to self-styled idealists and realists alike. Read all the books you want about the post-Cold War, post-9/11 world, just be sure American Empire is one of them. --Walter A. McDougall, Pulitzer Prize-winning historian, University of Pennsylvania This deeply informed, impressive polemical book is precisely what Americans, in and outside of the academy, needed before 9/11 and need now even more. Crisp, lively, biting prose will help them enjoy it. Among its many themes are hubris, hegemony, and the fatuousness of claims by the American military that they can now achieve 'transparency' in war-making. --Michael S. Sherry, Northwestern University The United States could not possibly have an empire, Americans think. But we do. And with verve and telling insight Andrew Bacevich shows how it works and what it means. --Ronald Steel, author of Temptations of a Superpower: America's Foreign Policy after the Cold War
A journalist and former congressional staffer exposes the inherent contradictions and internal conflicts that hamper the State Department and could stymie the war on terrorism.
'Kissinger's absorbing book tackles head-on some of the toughest questions of our time . . . Its pages sparkle with insight' Simon Schama in the NEW YORKER Spanning more than three centuries, from Cardinal Richelieu to the fragility of the 'New World Order', DIPLOMACY is the now-classic history of international relations by the former Secretary of State and winner of the Nobel Peace Prize. Kissinger's intimate portraits of world leaders, many from personal experience, provide the reader with a unique insight into what really goes on -- and why -- behind the closed doors of the corridors of power. 'Budding diplomats and politicians should read it as avidly as their predecessors read Machiavelli' Douglas Hurd in the DAILY TELEGRAPH 'If you want to pay someone a compliment, give them Henry Kissinger's DIPLOMACY ... It is certainly one of the best, and most enjoyable [books] on international relations past and present ... DIPLOMACY should be read for the sheer historical sweep, the characterisations, the story-telling, the ability to look at large parts of the world as a whole' Malcolm Rutherford in the FINANCIAL TIMES
This award-winning book provides a unique window on how America began to intervene in world affairs. In exploring what might be called the prehistory of Dollar Diplomacy, Cyrus Veeser brings together developments in New York, Washington, Santo Domingo, Brussels, and London. Theodore Roosevelt plays a leading role in the story as do State Department officials, Caribbean rulers, Democratic party leaders, bankers, economists, international lawyers, sugar planters, and European bondholders, among others. The book recounts a little-known incident: the takeover by the Santo Domingo Improvement Company (SDIC) of the foreign debt, national railroad, and national bank of the Dominican Republic. The inevitable conflict between private interest and public policy led President Roosevelt to launch a sweeping new policy that became known as the Roosevelt corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. The corollary gave the U. S. the right to intervene anywhere in Latin American that "wrongdoing or impotence" (in T. R.'s words) threatened "civilized society." The "wrongdoer" in this case was the SDIC. Imposing government control over corporations was launched and became a hallmark of domestic policy. By proposing an economic remedy to a political problem, the book anticipates policies embodied in the Marshall Plan, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank.
