One of the alleged benefits of the recent global movement to strengthen intellectual property rights (IPRs) is that such reforms accelerate transfers of technology between countries. Branstetter, Fisman, and Foley examine how technology transfer among U.S. multinational firms changes in response to a series of IPR reforms undertaken by 12 countries over the 1982-99 period. Their analysis of detailed firm-level data reveal that royalty payments for intangibles transferred to affiliates increase at the time of reforms, as do affiliate research and development (R & D) expenditures and total levels of foreign patent applications. Increases in royalty payments and R & D expenditures are more than 20 percent larger among affiliates of parent companies that use U.S. patents more extensively prior to reform and therefore are expected to value IPR reform most. This paper--a product of Trade, Development Research Group--is part of a larger effort in the group to understand the global impact of stronger intellectual property rights.
One of the alleged benefits of the recent global movement to strengthen intellectual property rights (IPRs) is that such reforms accelerate transfers of technology between countries. Branstetter, Fisman, and Foley examine how technology transfer among U.S. multinational firms changes in response to a series of IPR reforms undertaken by 12 countries over the 1982-99 period. Their analysis of detailed firm-level data reveal that royalty payments for intangibles transferred to affiliates increase at the time of reforms, as do affiliate research and development (Ramp;D) expenditures and total levels of foreign patent applications. Increases in royalty payments and Ramp;D expenditures are more than 20 percent larger among affiliates of parent companies that use U.S. patents more extensively prior to reform and therefore are expected to value IPR reform most. This paper - a product of Trade, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to understand the global impact of stronger intellectual property rights.
One of the alleged benefits of the recent global movement to strengthen intellectual property rights (IPRs) is that such reforms accelerate transfers of technology between countries. The paper examines how technology transfer among U.S. multinational firms changes in response to a series of IPR reforms undertaken by 12 countries over the 1982-99 period. The analysis of detailed firm-level data reveal that royalty payments for intangibles transferred to affiliates increase at the time of reforms, as do affiliate research and development (R&D) expenditures and total levels of foreign patent applications. Increases in royalty payments and R&D expenditures are more than 20 percent larger among affiliates of parent companies that use U.S. patents more extensively prior to reform and therefore are expected to value IPR reform most.
As technological developments multiply around the globeâ€"even as the patenting of human genes comes under serious discussionâ€"nations, companies, and researchers find themselves in conflict over intellectual property rights (IPRs). Now, an international group of experts presents the first multidisciplinary look at IPRs in an age of explosive growth in science and technology. This thought-provoking volume offers an update on current international IPR negotiations and includes case studies on software, computer chips, optoelectronics, and biotechnologyâ€"areas characterized by high development cost and easy reproducibility. The volume covers these and other issues: Modern economic theory as a basis for approaching international IPRs. U.S. intellectual property practices versus those in Japan, India, the European Community, and the developing and newly industrializing countries. Trends in science and technology and how they affect IPRs. Pros and cons of a uniform international IPRs regime versus a system reflecting national differences.
There is considerable debate in economics literature on whether a decision by developing countries to strengthen their protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs) will increase or reduce their access to modern technologies invented by industrial countries. This access can be achieved through technology transfer of various kinds, including foreign direct investment and licensing. Licensing is the focus of this paper. To the extent that inventing firms choose to act more monopolistically and offer fewer technologies on the market, stronger IPRs could reduce international technology flows. However, to the extent that IPRs raise the returns to innovation and licensing, these flows would expand. In theory, the outcome depends on how IPRs affect several variables--the costs of, and returns to, international licensing; the wage advantage of workers in poor countries; the innovation process in industrial countries; and the amount of labor available for innovation and production. Yang and Maskus develop a theoretical model in which firms in the North (industrial countries) innovate products of higher quality levels and decide whether to produce in the North or transfer production rights to the South (developing countries) through licensing. Different quality levels of each product are sold in equilibrium because of differences in consumers' willingness-to-pay for quality improvements. Contracting problems exist because the inventors in the North must indicate to licensees in the South whether their product is of higher or lower quality and also prevent the licensees from copying the technology. So, constraints in the model ensure that the equilibrium flow of licensing higher-quality goods meets these objectives. When the South strengthens its patent rights, copying by licensees is made costlier but the returns to licensing are increased. This change affects the dynamic decisions regarding innovation and technology transfer, which could rise or fall depending on market parameters, including the labor available for research and production. Results from the model show that the net effects depend on the balance between profits made by the Northern licensor and lower labor costs in the South. If the size of the labor force used in Northern innovation compared with that used in producing goods in both the North and South is sufficiently small (a condition that accords with reality), stronger IPRs in the South would lead to more licensing and innovation. This change would also increase the Southern wage relative to the Northern wage. So, in this model a decision by developing countries to increase their patent rights would expand global innovation and increase technology transfer. This result is consistent with recent empirical evidence. It should be noted that while the results suggest that international agreements to strengthen IPRs should expand global innovation and technology transfer through licensing, the model cannot be used for welfare analysis. Thus, while the developing countries enjoy more inward licensing, the cost per license could be higher, and prices could also rise, with an unclear overall effect on economic well-being. This paper--a product of Trade, Development Research Group--is part of a larger effort in the group to assess the impact of intellectual property rights on economic development.
The series of papers in this publication were commissioned from renowned international economists from all regions. They review the existing empirical literature on six selected themes relating to the economics of intellectual property, identify the key research questions, point out research gaps and explore possible avenues for future research.
Offers comprehensive and analytical literature surveys of the central questions regarding the linkages between intellectual property protection, international trade and investment, and economic growth. This book covers such questions as policy coordination in IPR, dispute resolution, and markets for technology and technology transfer.
Technology transfer has expanded rapidly over the past 20 years in Western Europe, North America and the Pacific Rim. It has been estimated that some 50% of new products and processes will originate outside the primary developer; academic and other research institutions are obvious sources of much of this new technology. In the NATO Co-operating countries, however, technology transfer is in its infancy; it is crucial for wealth creation and improvement in the quality of life that this mechanism is developed. The papers selected for inclusion in this book discuss issues related to the development of technology transfer in NATO Co-operating countries. The book identifies crucial research issues for science and technology policy researchers and, as a conclusion, offers some policy recommendations. The authors are drawn from NATO and Co-operating partner countries, from other parts of the world, and from international organisations. The focus of the book is on the institutional framework of knowledge and technology transfer; intellectual property rights as sources of information and tools for co-operation; international, national and regional aspects of knowledge and technology dissemination and diffusion; and networking. Audience: Academic institutions, research institutes, intellectual property practitioners, science and technology policy makers, technology transfer managers, high-tech industries.
