Do Banks Provision for Bad Loans in Good Times?

Do Banks Provision for Bad Loans in Good Times?

Author: Michèle Cavallo

Publisher: World Bank Publications

Published: 2001

Total Pages: 40

ISBN-13:

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Recent debate about the pro-cyclical effects of bank capital requirements, has ignored the important role that bank loan loss provisions play in the overall framework of minimum capital regulation. It is frequently observed that under-provisioning, due to inadequate assessment of expected credit losses, aggravates the negative effect of minimum capital requirements during recessions, because capital must absorb both expected, and unexpected losses. Moreover, when expected losses are properly reflected in lending rates, but not in provisioning practices, fluctuations in bank earnings magnify true oscillations in bank profitability. The relative agency problems faced by different stakeholders, may help explain the prevailing, and often unsatisfactory institutional arrangements. The authors test their hypotheses with a sample of 1,176 large commercial banks - 372 of them in non-G10 countries - for the period 1988-99. After controlling for different country-specific macroeconomic, and institutional features, they find robust evidence among G10 banks, of a positive association between loan loss provisions, and banks' pre-provision income. Such evidence is not confirmed for non-G10 banks, which on average, provision too little in good times, and are forced to increase provisions in bad times. The econometric evidence shows that the protection of outsiders' claims - the claims of minority shareholders in common law countries, and of fiscal authorities in countries with high public debt - on bank income, has negative effects on the level of bank provisions.


Do Banks Provision for Bad Loans in Good Times? Empirical Evidence and Policy Implications

Do Banks Provision for Bad Loans in Good Times? Empirical Evidence and Policy Implications

Author: Michele Cavallo

Publisher:

Published: 2016

Total Pages: 34

ISBN-13:

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The general recognition that bank capital should provide a buffer for unexpected losses assumes that expected losses are considered in setting loan loss provisions. Failure to provide coherent and internationally accepted regulation of provisions for loan losses reduces the usefulness of minimum capital regulations, especially in emerging economies.Recent debate about the pro-cyclical effects of bank capital requirements has ignored the important role that bank loan loss provisions play in the overall framework of minimum capital regulation. It is frequently observed that underprovisioning, due to inadequate assessment of expected credit losses, aggravates the negative effect of minimum capital requirements during recessions because capital must absorb both expected and unexpected losses. Moreover, when expected losses are properly reflected in lending rates but not in provisioning practices, fluctuations in bank earnings magnify true oscillations in bank profitability.The relative agency problems faced by different stakeholders may help explain the prevailing and often unsatisfactory institutional arrangements. Cavallo and Majnoni test their hypotheses with a sample of 1,176 large commercial banks - 372 of them in non-G10 countries - for the period 1988-99. After controlling for different country-specific macroeconomic and institutional features, they find robust evidence among G10 banks of a positive association between loan loss provisions and banks' pre-provision income. Such evidence is not confirmed for non-G10 banks, which on average provision too little in good times and are forced to increase provisions in bad times.The econometric evidence shows that the protection of outsiders' claims - the claims of minority shareholders in common law countries and of fiscal authorities in countries with high public debt - on bank income has negative effects on the level of bank provisions.This paper - a product of the Financial Sector Strategy and Policy Department - is part of a larger effort in the department to study the impact of financial regulation on economic development.


Ratings, Rating Agencies and the Global Financial System

Ratings, Rating Agencies and the Global Financial System

Author: Richard M. Levich

Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media

Published: 2012-12-06

Total Pages: 380

ISBN-13: 1461509998

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Ratings, Rating Agencies and the Global Financial System brings together the research of economists at New York University and the University of Maryland, along with those from the private sector, government bodies, and other universities. The first section of the volume focuses on the historical origins of the credit rating business and its present day industrial organization structure. The second section presents several empirical studies crafted largely around individual firm-level or bank-level data. These studies examine (a) the relationship between ratings and the default and recovery experience of corporate borrowers, (b) the comparability of credit ratings made by domestic and foreign rating agencies, and (c) the usefulness of financial market indicators for rating banks, among other topics. In the third section, the record of sovereign credit ratings in predicting financial crises and the reaction of financial markets to changes in credit ratings is examined. The final section of the volume emphasizes policy issues now facing regulators and credit rating agencies.


Accounting discretion of banks during a financial crisis

Accounting discretion of banks during a financial crisis

Author: Mr.Luc Laeven

Publisher: International Monetary Fund

Published: 2009-09-01

Total Pages: 43

ISBN-13: 1451873549

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This paper shows that banks use accounting discretion to overstate the value of distressed assets. Banks' balance sheets overvalue real estate-related assets compared to the market value of these assets, especially during the U.S. mortgage crisis. Share prices of banks with large exposure to mortgage-backed securities also react favorably to recent changes in accounting rules that relax fair-value accounting, and these banks provision less for bad loans. Furthermore, distressed banks use discretion in the classification of mortgage-backed securities to inflate their books. Our results indicate that banks' balance sheets offer a distorted view of the financial health of the banks.


Staff Guidance Note on Macroprudential Policy

Staff Guidance Note on Macroprudential Policy

Author: International Monetary Fund

Publisher: International Monetary Fund

Published: 2014-06-11

Total Pages: 45

ISBN-13: 1498342620

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This note provides guidance to facilitate the staff’s advice on macroprudential policy in Fund surveillance. It elaborates on the principles set out in the “Key Aspects of Macroprudential Policy,” taking into account the work of international standard setters as well as the evolving country experience with macroprudential policy. The main note is accompanied by supplements offering Detailed Guidance on Instruments and Considerations for Low Income Countries


Bank Profitability and Risk-Taking

Bank Profitability and Risk-Taking

Author: Natalya Martynova

Publisher: International Monetary Fund

Published: 2015-11-25

Total Pages: 44

ISBN-13: 1513565818

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Traditional theory suggests that more profitable banks should have lower risk-taking incentives. Then why did many profitable banks choose to invest in untested financial instruments before the crisis, realizing significant losses? We attempt to reconcile theory and evidence. In our setup, banks are endowed with a fixed core business. They take risk by levering up to engage in risky ‘side activities’(such as market-based investments) alongside the core business. A more profitable core business allows a bank to borrow more and take side risks on a larger scale, offsetting lower incentives to take risk of given size. Consequently, more profitable banks may have higher risk-taking incentives. The framework is consistent with cross-sectional patterns of bank risk-taking in the run up to the recent financial crisis.


Effects of Bank Capital on Lending

Effects of Bank Capital on Lending

Author: Joseph M. Berrospide

Publisher: DIANE Publishing

Published: 2011-04

Total Pages: 50

ISBN-13: 1437939864

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The effect of bank capital on lending is a critical determinant of the linkage between financial conditions and real activity, and has received especial attention in the recent financial crisis. The authors use panel-regression techniques to study the lending of large bank holding companies (BHCs) and find small effects of capital on lending. They then consider the effect of capital ratios on lending using a variant of Lown and Morgan's VAR model, and again find modest effects of bank capital ratio changes on lending. The authors¿ estimated models are then used to understand recent developments in bank lending and, in particular, to consider the role of TARP-related capital injections in affecting these developments. Illus. A print on demand pub.