Despite the rising salience of missile threats, current air and missile defense forces are far too susceptible to suppression. Today’s U.S. air and missile defense (AMD) force lacks the depth, capacity, and operational flexibility to simultaneously perform both missions. Discussions about improving AMD usually revolve around improvements to the capability and capacity of interceptors or sensors. Rather than simply doing more of the same, the joint integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) efforts might be well served by new or reinvigorated operational concepts, here discussed collectively as “Distributed Defense.” By leveraging networked integration, Distributed Defense envisions a more flexible and more dispersible air and missile defense force capable of imposing costs and dilemmas on an adversary, complicating the suppression of U.S. air and missile defenses. Although capability and capacity improvements remain essential to the high-end threats, the Distributed Defense concept focuses on creating a new architecture for today’s fielded or soon-to-be fielded IAMD force to boost flexibility and resilience.
"In the years following 9/11, the U.S. military has predominantly fought low-tech adversaries. In these conflicts, aerial threats to U.S. assets and forces have been rudimentary. To maximize efficiency for the counterinsurgency mission, the U.S. military has had to deprioritize air defense units' personnel, training and equipment, allowing air defense capabilities to atrophy. Meanwhile, America's rivals have been pursuing capabilities that threaten to deny U.S. forces the ability to deploy and maneuver. The U.S. Army aims to overcome this through the concept of multi-domain operations (MDO). Guided by the 2018 National Defense Strategy, the Army intends to field an MDO-ready force by 2028. To support MDO through force protection, the Army must grow, reorganize, modernize and integrate its air and missile defense (AMD) in close coordination with the other services. The Army can lead the joint force in developing new AMD doctrine, training, technology and force structure. If properly funded, integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) can enable rapid ground force deployment from the United States and employment into the theater to defend against an array of aerial threats. The AMD enterprise must find equilibrium between readiness and modernization. Modernization requires a balance among near-, mid- and far-term technology to ensure overmatch against great-power adversaries, rogue states and violent extremist organizations through tiered, layered and integrated AMD" -- Publisher's web site.
The National Defense Authorization Act of 2016 mandates a review of missile defeat policy, strategy, and capability to be completed by January 2018. This upcoming Missile Defeat Review (MDR) represents an opportunity for the Trump administration to articulate a vision for the future of air and missile defense. This collection of expert essays explores how the strategic environment for missile defense and defeat has evolved since 2010 and offers recommendations to help guide and inform the MDR’s development.
In policy pronouncements over the last two administrations, the protection of the American homeland was regularly identified as the first priority of U.S. missile defense efforts. Homeland missile defense today is provided by the Ground-based Midcourse Defense program and other elements of the larger Ballistic Missile Defense System. The limited defenses fielded today have advanced considerably since limited defensive operations began in late 2004, but nevertheless they remain too limited and too modest relative to emerging threats. The Missile Defense Agency’s path to improve the system may require additional effort to stay ahead of even limited missile threats. This report explains how the current system works, as well as current and potential plans to modernize the system, and the authors offer recommendations for future evolution of the system.
The authors address how DoD could take advantage of mature technologies to develop higher capacity and more cost-effective air and missile defenses for its overseas bases. It assesses the potential for a layered, distributed defense that integrates multiple new non-kinetic and kinetic systems to defeat salvo attacks.
This publication, “Countering Air and Missile Threats (Joint Publication 3-01),” provides doctrine for joint counterair operations and protection against air and missile threats across the range of military operations. Counterair integrates offensive and defensive operations to attain and maintain a desired degree of air superiority and protection by neutralizing or destroying enemy aircraft and missiles, both before and after launch. Integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) is an evolving approach that uses the counterair framework at the theater level. IAMD emphasizes the integration of offensive counterair (OCA) attack operations, defensive counterair (DCA) operations, and other capabilities as required to create the joint force commander's (JFC's) desired effects. The IAMD approach also encompasses global strike and global missile defense beyond the theater level. The counterair mission integrates both offensive and defensive operations, by all capable joint force components, and counters the air and missile threat by attaining and maintaining the degree of air superiority and protection desired by the JFC. Generally, OCA operations seek to dominate enemy airspace and prevent the launch of threats, while DCA operations defeat enemy air and missile threats attempting to penetrate or attack through friendly airspace. Integrating a mixture of capabilities from components bolsters the friendly force potential and likely will frustrate the enemy's ability to defend itself. Synchronization of OCA and DCA operations is vital to avoid duplication of effort and help prevent fratricide. Expanded technology and proliferation of missiles, including cruise missiles (CMs), ballistic missiles (BMs), and air-to-surface missiles (ASMs), expand the scope and complexity of protecting friendly forces and vital interests. The detection capabilities, engagement ranges, mobility, and lethality of surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems and fighter aircraft have significantly increased the air and missile defenses (AMDs) of US adversaries. CMs and unmanned aircraft also present elusive targets and are difficult to detect, identify, and engage. Proliferation of advanced technologies for missiles, guidance systems, and weapons of mass destruction warheads has increased the potential missile threat to the homeland. Although this publication primarily focuses on countering theater air and missile threats (i.e., those affecting an overseas geographic combatant commander's (GCC's) AOR/a subordinate JFC's joint operations area [JOA]), those forces and capabilities employed by overseas GCCs also may support a layered defense beginning in the forward areas against strategic air and missile threats to the homeland. Strategic planning documents task each GCC with some form of missile defense and the employment of appropriate force should deterrence fail. Commander, United States Strategic Command is responsible for synchronizing planning for global missile defense and coordinating global missile defense operations support. Global ballistic missile defense is the overarching characterization of the cumulative (worldwide) planning and coordination for those defensive capabilities designed to neutralize, destroy, or reduce the effectiveness of enemy BM attacks whether within or across the boundaries of any GCC's AOR. This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations, education, and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans.
Providing an assessment of evolving air and missile threats confronting the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, this volume highlights the impact of trends involving missiles and weapons of mass destruction on the balance of power in the Arabian Gulf region. It also reviews US concepts of operation for air/missile-defence co-ordination, and proposes policies for future UAE and GCC security planning. The authors argue for shared early-warning and integrated air-defence systems, the need for political commitment from the United States and all the GCC governments to install improved defences, the need for improved understanding and communication as an essential precondition for increased air/missile-defence co-operation, and the long-term advantages of pursuing such co-operation both on a US-GCC basis and among the GCC member states themselves. The range of benefits associated with a regional approach to air and missile defence are explored, together with the question of how expanded air/missile-defence co-operation in the region fits into a broader geopolitical framework.
FM 3-01 is the Army-specific air and missile defense (AMD) publication outlining doctrinal AMD principles and guidelines. It describes how air defense artillery (ADA), the Army's dedicated component for AMD, and its organizations prepare for and conduct operations. It presents the AMD roles in support of joint unified action operations and Army unified land operations, addressing offensive and defensive, stability, and defense support of civil authorities tasks. The strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war are discussed, and AMD operations are defined in terms of their contributions to Army operations, as expressed in FM 3-0, the Army operational concept of unified land operations, and the joint counterair mission as presented in JP 3-01. FM 3-01 provides doctrinal guidance for commanders, staffs, leaders, and trainers at all levels in the operational and institutional forces, and is the basis for curricula development in the U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery School.
Joint operations will call for ever greater levels of interoperability. The need for improved interoperability to counter theater level air and missile threats will be especially acute. Cooperation between air and missile defense organizations and weapons systems features separate engagement zones and depends on coordination and procedures to reduce conflicts between systems. However, future conflicts will necessitate rapid and effective interaction among system components as well as integrated information generated by them. They will also demand that these systems operate within a coherent framework to produce capabilities for joint warfighters while capitalizing on the synergy inherent within a class of air and missile defense systems. Even though the Persian Gulf War established clear technical and tactical superiority by the United States over enemy aircraft, the need for a new approach to integrated air and missile defense that embraces improved interoperability and addresses emerging threats became increasingly clear in the last decade.
2019 Missile Defense Review - January 2019 According to a senior administration official, a number of new technologies are highlighted in the report. The review looks at "the comprehensive environment the United States faces, and our allies and partners face. It does posture forces to be prepared for capabilities that currently exist and that we anticipate in the future." The report calls for major investments from both new technologies and existing systems. This is a very important and insightful report because many of the cost assessments for these technologies in the past, which concluded they were too expensive, are no longer applicable. Why buy a book you can download for free? We print this book so you don't have to. First you gotta find a good clean (legible) copy and make sure it's the latest version (not always easy). Some documents found on the web are missing some pages or the image quality is so poor, they are difficult to read. We look over each document carefully and replace poor quality images by going back to the original source document. We proof each document to make sure it's all there - including all changes. If you find a good copy, you could print it using a network printer you share with 100 other people (typically its either out of paper or toner). If it's just a 10-page document, no problem, but if it's 250-pages, you will need to punch 3 holes in all those pages and put it in a 3-ring binder. Takes at least an hour. It's much more cost-effective to just order the latest version from Amazon.com This book includes original commentary which is copyright material. Note that government documents are in the public domain. We print these large documents as a service so you don't have to. The books are compact, tightly-bound, full-size (8 1/2 by 11 inches), with large text and glossy covers. 4th Watch Publishing Co. is a HUBZONE SDVOSB. https: //usgovpub.com
