Twenty papers are devoted to the treatment of a wide spectrum of problems in the theory and applications of dynamic games with the emphasis on pursuit-evasion differential games. The problem of capturability is thoroughly investigated, also the problem of noise-corrupted (state) measurements. Attention is given to aerial combat problems and their attendant modelling issues, such as variable speed of the combatants, the three-dimensionality of physical space, and the combat problem, i.e. problems related to 'role determination'.
Graduate-level text surveys games of fixed duration, games of pursuit and evasion, the computation of saddle points, games of survival, games with restricted phase coordinates, and N-person games. 1971 edition.
The classical optimal control theory deals with the determination of an optimal control that optimizes the criterion subjects to the dynamic constraint expressing the evolution of the system state under the influence of control variables. If this is extended to the case of multiple controllers (also called players) with different and sometimes conflicting optimization criteria (payoff function) it is possible to begin to explore differential games. Zero-sum differential games, also called differential games of pursuit, constitute the most developed part of differential games and are rigorously investigated. In this book, the full theory of differential games of pursuit with complete and partial information is developed. Numerous concrete pursuit-evasion games are solved (?life-line? games, simple pursuit games, etc.), and new time-consistent optimality principles in the n-person differential game theory are introduced and investigated.
Definitive work draws on game theory, calculus of variations, and control theory to solve an array of problems: military, pursuit and evasion, athletic contests, many more. Detailed examples, formal calculations. 1965 edition.
This volume contains fifteen articles on the topic of differential and dynamic games, focusing on both theory and applications. It covers a variety of areas and presents recent developments on topics of current interest. It should be useful to researchers in differential and dynamic games, systems and control, operations research and mathematical economics.
A comprehensive, self-contained survey of the theory and applications of differential games, one of the most commonly used tools for modelling and analysing economics and management problems which are characterised by both multiperiod and strategic decision making. Although no prior knowledge of game theory is required, a basic knowledge of linear algebra, ordinary differential equations, mathematical programming and probability theory is necessary. Part One presents the theory of differential games, starting with the basic concepts of game theory and going on to cover control theoretic models, Markovian equilibria with simultaneous play, differential games with hierarchical play, trigger strategy equilibria, differential games with special structures, and stochastic differential games. Part Two offers applications to capital accumulation games, industrial organization and oligopoly games, marketing, resources and environmental economics.
Résumé : "This will be a two-part handbook on Dynamic Game Theory and part of the Springer Reference program. Part I will be on the fundamentals and theory of dynamic games. It will serve as a quick reference and a source of detailed exposure to topics in dynamic games for a broad community of researchers, educators, practitioners, and students. Each topic will be covered in 2-3 chapters with one introducing basic theory and the other one or two covering recent advances and/or special topics. Part II will be on applications in fields such as economics, management science, engineering, biology, and the social sciences."
The theory of two-person, zero-sum differential games started at the be ginning of the 1960s with the works of R. Isaacs in the United States and L. S. Pontryagin and his school in the former Soviet Union. Isaacs based his work on the Dynamic Programming method. He analyzed many special cases of the partial differential equation now called Hamilton Jacobi-Isaacs-briefiy HJI-trying to solve them explicitly and synthe sizing optimal feedbacks from the solution. He began a study of singular surfaces that was continued mainly by J. Breakwell and P. Bernhard and led to the explicit solution of some low-dimensional but highly nontriv ial games; a recent survey of this theory can be found in the book by J. Lewin entitled Differential Games (Springer, 1994). Since the early stages of the theory, several authors worked on making the notion of value of a differential game precise and providing a rigorous derivation of the HJI equation, which does not have a classical solution in most cases; we mention here the works of W. Fleming, A. Friedman (see his book, Differential Games, Wiley, 1971), P. P. Varaiya, E. Roxin, R. J. Elliott and N. J. Kalton, N. N. Krasovskii, and A. I. Subbotin (see their book Po sitional Differential Games, Nauka, 1974, and Springer, 1988), and L. D. Berkovitz. A major breakthrough was the introduction in the 1980s of two new notions of generalized solution for Hamilton-Jacobi equations, namely, viscosity solutions, by M. G. Crandall and P. -L.
This book uses a small volume to present the most basic results for deterministic two-person differential games. The presentation begins with optimization of a single function, followed by a basic theory for two-person games. For dynamic situations, the author first recalls control theory which is treated as single-person differential games. Then a systematic theory of two-person differential games is concisely presented, including evasion and pursuit problems, zero-sum problems and LQ differential games.The book is intended to be self-contained, assuming that the readers have basic knowledge of calculus, linear algebra, and elementary ordinary differential equations. The readership of the book could be junior/senior undergraduate and graduate students with majors related to applied mathematics, who are interested in differential games. Researchers in some other related areas, such as engineering, social science, etc. will also find the book useful.
Game theory is the theory of social situations, and the majority of research into the topic focuses on how groups of people interact by developing formulas and algorithms to identify optimal strategies and to predict the outcome of interactions. Only fifty years old, it has already revolutionized economics and finance, and is spreading rapidly to a wide variety of fields. LQ Dynamic Optimization and Differential Games is an assessment of the state of the art in its field and the first modern book on linear-quadratic game theory, one of the most commonly used tools for modelling and analysing strategic decision making problems in economics and management. Linear quadratic dynamic models have a long tradition in economics, operations research and control engineering; and the author begins by describing the one-decision maker LQ dynamic optimization problem before introducing LQ differential games. Covers cooperative and non-cooperative scenarios, and treats the standard information structures (open-loop and feedback). Includes real-life economic examples to illustrate theoretical concepts and results. Presents problem formulations and sound mathematical problem analysis. Includes exercises and solutions, enabling use for self-study or as a course text. Supported by a website featuring solutions to exercises, further examples and computer code for numerical examples. LQ Dynamic Optimization and Differential Games offers a comprehensive introduction to the theory and practice of this extensively used class of economic models, and will appeal to applied mathematicians and econometricians as well as researchers and senior undergraduate/graduate students in economics, mathematics, engineering and management science.
