Text of and reflection on the 1981 encounter between Hans-Georg Gadamer and Jacques Derrida, which featured a dialogue between hermeneutics in Germany and post-structuralism in France.
Before the encounter in 1981 between Hans-Georg Gadamer and Jacques Derrida, there had been virtually no confrontation or dialogue between hermeneutics in Germany and post-structuralism in France, nor has there been since then. Part I of this book makes available for the first time in English the complete texts of the encounter at the Goethe Institute in Paris. This exchange raised such issues as Gadamer's relation to psychoanalytic interpretation, the questionability of texts, Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche, and the dialogical aspect of language. Part II offers further reflections by Gadamer on the encounter itself and its relation of hermeneutics to deconstruction. Among the issues covered are Derrida's interpretation of "Destruktion" in Heidegger, Derrida's attack on logocentrism in Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche, and the relation of Heidegger, hermeneutics, and deconstruction to dialectic. Part III offers commentaries on the encounter from a variety of perspectives. The authors assess the original encounter as well as Gadamer's subsequent reflections on it.
Cumming also shows that conversion is not merely a personal predisposition of Sartre's--further manifest in his later conversions to Heidegger and to a version of Marxism. Conversion is also philosophical preoccupation, illustrated by the "conversion to the imaginary" whereby Sartre explains how he himself, as well as Genet and Flaubert, became writers. Finally, Cumming details how Husserl's phenomenological method contributed both to the shaping of Sartre's style as a literary writer and to his theory of style.
Deconstruction is so labyrinthine (and rumored to be fatal) that it’s become the monster that murdered philosophy. When Jacques Derrida, the father of deconstruction, uses buzz-words such as “phallogocentrism” and “transcendental signified,” humanities students and aspiring philosophers may get weak in the knees. Following up on the success of Derrida For Beginners, Jim Powell’s Deconstruction For Beginners is an irreverent romp through deconstructive domains. Though Powell offers lucid explanations of the most important deconstructive ideas and texts, he also dive into lesser known works. One of these, The Right to Look, finds Derrida offering his thoughts on a photo-novella consisting of images of women making love with each other. Powell then goes on to explore how deconstruction, like an unruly mistress, has escaped Derrida, especially in the realm of architecture. Then, based on Derrida’s assertion that deconstruction happens differently in different cultures, Powell examines how – through Buddhism and Taoism – deconstruction took place in ancient India, Japan, and China.
In Unquiet Understanding, Nicholas Davey reappropriates the radical content of Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics to reveal that it offers a powerful critique of Nietzsche's philosophy of language, nihilism, and post-structuralist deconstructions of meaning. By critically engaging with the practical and ethical implications of philosophical hermeneutics, Davey asserts that the importance of philosophical hermeneutics resides in a formidable double claim that strikes at the heart of both traditional philosophy and deconstruction. He shows that to seek control over the fluid nature of linguistic meaning with rigid conceptual regimes or to despair of such fluidity because it frustrates hope for stable meaning is to succumb to nihilism. Both are indicative of a failure to appreciate that understanding depends upon the vital instability of the "word." This innovative book demonstrates that Gadamer's thought merits a radical reappraisal and that it is more provocative than commonly supposed.
Raoul Moati intervenes in the critical debate that divided two prominent philosophers in the mid-twentieth century. In the 1950s, the British philosopher J. L. Austin advanced a theory of speech acts, or the "performative," that Jacques Derrida and John R. Searle interpreted in fundamentally different ways. Their disagreement centered on the issue of intentionality, which Derrida understood phenomenologically and Searle read pragmatically. The controversy had profound implications for the development of contemporary philosophy, which, Moati argues, can profit greatly by returning to this classic debate. In this book, Moati systematically replays the historical encounter between Austin, Derrida, and Searle and the disruption that caused the lasting break between Anglo-American language philosophy and continental traditions of phenomenology and its deconstruction. The key issue, Moati argues, is not whether "intentionality," a concept derived from Husserl's phenomenology, can or cannot be linked to Austin's speech-acts as defined in his groundbreaking How to Do Things with Words, but rather the emphasis Searle placed on the performativity and determined pragmatic values of Austin's speech-acts, whereas Derrida insisted on the trace of writing behind every act of speech and the iterability of signs in different contexts.
This dialogue, proposed to Derrida by the historian Elisabeth Roudinesco, brings together two longtime friends who share a common history and an intellectual heritage. While their perspectives are often different, they have many common reference points: psychoanalysis, above all, but also the authors and works that have come to be known outside France as "post-structuralist."
"The focus of any genuinely new piece of criticism or interpretation must be on the creative act of finding the new, but deconstruction puts the matter the other way around: its emphasis is on debunking the old. But aside from the fact that this program is inherently uninteresting, it is, in fact, not at all clear that it is possible. . . . [T]he naïvetê of the crowd is deconstruction's very starting point, and its subsequent move is as much an emotional as an intellectual leap to a position that feels different as much in the one way as the other. . . ." --From the book