From May 2003 to June 28, 2004 (when it handed over authority to the Iraqi Interim Government), the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) worked to field Iraqi security forces and to develop security sector institutions. This book-all of whose authors were advisors to the CPA-breaks out the various elements of Iraq's security sector, including the defense, interior, and justice sectors, and assesses the CPA's successes and failures.
"Security sector reform (SSR) is widely recognised as key to conflict prevention, peace-building, sustainable development and democratisation. SSR has gained most practical relevance in the context of post-conflict reconstruction of so-called failed states' and states emerging from violent internal or inter-state conflict. As this volume shows, almost all states need to reform their security sectors to a greater or lesser extent, according to the specific security, political and socio-economic contexts, as well as in response to the new security challenges resulting from globalisation and post-9/11 developments. Contributions from academics and practitioners elaborate on both the conceptual underpinnings and the practical realities of security sector reform and - a crucial aspect of post-conflict peace-building - security sector reconstruction. "
If Iraq and the United States are to win the war in any meaningful and lasting sense, they must translate the Strategic Agreement they signed in November 2008 into a lasting and functional strategic partnership. In the process, the United States must put Iraq firmly in the lead, but sustain the kind of aid and advice that will help Iraq make further progress in political accommodation, the quality of governance, economic development, and security. The CSIS Burke Chair in Strategy conducted a detailed analysis of the current situation in Iraq, the challenges Iraq faces, and the actions the United States needs to take to help Iraq meet those challenges. Its report provides a detailed risk assessment of current and potential levels of violence in Iraq. It addresses the levels of political accommodation and stability and the problems Iraq still faces in the aftermath of the national election. It also addresses the opportunities and problems in developing Iraq's petroleum sector; investment and development issues in other sectors, the problems in the Iraqi budget forecasts, and progress in Iraqi reconstruction. It evaluates the need for continued economic aid and advice and describes U.S. options for extending such assistance. The concluding section examines progress in creating Iraqi military and police forces. It examines the role the United States can play in helping Iraq further develop such forces and analyzes what a strategic partnership, based on the Strategic Agreement, should mean.
Securing Development: Public Finance and the Security Sector highlights the role of public finance in the delivery of security and criminal justice services. This book offers a framework for analyzing public financial management, financial transparency, and oversight, as well as expenditure policy issues that determine how to most appropriately manage security and justice services. The interplay among security, justice, and public finance is still a relatively unexplored area of development. Such a perspective can help security actors provide more professional, effective, and efficient security and justice services for citizens, while also strengthening systems for accountability. The book is the result of a project undertaken jointly by staff from the World Bank and the United Nations, integrating the disciplines where each institution holds a comparative advantage and a core mandate. The primary audience includes government officials bearing both security and financial responsibilities, staff of international organizations working on public expenditure management and security sector issues, academics, and development practitioners working in an advisory capacity.
Effective peacebuilding in the aftermath of civil war usually requires the deep reform of security institutions, a process frequently known as security sector reform. Nearly every major donor, as well as a growing number of international organizations, supports the reform of security organizations in countries emerging from conflict and suffering high levels of violence. But how are reform strategies implemented? This collection of nine case studies examines the strategies, methods, and practices of the policy makers and practitioners engaged in security sector reform, uncovering the profound conceptual and practical challenges encountered in transforming policy aspiration into practice. This book was previously published as a special issue of Civil Wars.
Presents the findings of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group, which was formed in 2006 to examine the situation in Iraq and offer suggestions for the American military's future involvement in the region.
The post-World War II occupations of Germany and Japan set standards for postconflict nation-building that have not since been matched. Only in recent years has the United States has felt the need to participate in similar transformations, but it is now facing one of the most challenging prospects since the 1940s: Iraq. The authors review seven case studies--Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan--and seek lessons about what worked well and what did not. Then, they examine the Iraq situation in light of these lessons. Success in Iraq will require an extensive commitment of financial, military, and political resources for a long time. The United States cannot afford to contemplate early exit strategies and cannot afford to leave the job half completed.
This book examines the evolution, impact, and future prospects of the Security Sector Reform (SSR) model in conflict-affected countries in the context of the wider debate over the liberal peace project. Since its emergence as a concept in the late 1990s, SSR has represented a paradigm shift in security assistance, from the realist, regime-centric, train-and-equip approach of the Cold War to a new liberal, holistic and people-centred model. The rapid rise of this model, however, belied its rather meagre impact on the ground. This book critically examines the concept and its record of achievement over the past two decades, putting it into the broader context of peace-building and state-building theory and practice. It focuses attention on the most common, celebrated and complex setting for SSR, conflict-affected environments, and comparatively examines the application and impacts of donor-supported SSR programing in a series of conflict-affected countries over the past two decades, including Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo, East Timor and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The broader aim of the book is to better understand how the contemporary SSR model has coalesced over the past two decades and become mainstreamed in international development and security policy and practice. This provides a solid foundation to investigate the reasons for the poor performance of the model and to assess its prospects for the future. This book will be of much interest to students of international security, peacebuilding, statebuilding, development studies and IR in general.
After a decade of popular uprisings and civil wars, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region experiences a deep governance crisis. The transformation, weakening or even the collapse of state institutions has changed the security framework, with direct implications for the safety and security of civilian populations across the region. Security Sector Governance and Reform (SSG/R) has to cope with hybridity and institutional fatigue. This report explores the MENA region's governance crises, providing case studies on Libya, Iraq, Tunisia, and Yemen. How can we effectively bring about meaningful SSG/R in hybrid security orders? In which way is "institutionalised insecurity" challenging traditional patterns of governance in vulnerable settings?
Examines the deleterious effects of the U.S. failure to focus on protecting the Iraqi population for most of the military campaign in Iraq and analyzes the failure of a technologically driven counterinsurgency (COIN) approach. It outlines strategic considerations relative to COIN; presents an overview of the conflict in Iraq; describes implications for future operations; and offers recommendations to improve the U.S. capability to conduct COIN.
