Deterrence and Terrorism: Can Global Terrorism be deterred?

Deterrence and Terrorism: Can Global Terrorism be deterred?

Author: Patrick Wagner

Publisher: GRIN Verlag

Published: 2004-06-22

Total Pages: 12

ISBN-13: 3638284921

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Essay from the year 2004 in the subject Politics - Topic: Peace and Conflict, Security, grade: 2+ (B+), University of Kent (Brussels School of International Studies), language: English, abstract: For more than four decades during the Cold War, deterrence has been a key element of US defence policy and it can even be argued that the strategy of nuclear deterrence thwarted a major military confrontation between the Soviet Union and the USA. With the end of superpower tensions and the end of the Cold War itself, the deterrence system became obsolete. However, the terrorist attacks of September 11 brought deterrence back on the political agenda. In its National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction the USA calls for “new methods of deterrence” in order to meet the threats of global terrorism. The question arises whether deterrence, which seems to have worked in a traditional setting, where one state deters military action of another state, can work in a non-traditional confrontation between a state and an abstract opponent like terrorism? In order to establish whether deterrence can work against terrorism, this essay will firstly look at the theory of deterrence. What are the criteria that must be fulfilled for deterrence to be successful and why does it not work in all situations? Secondly, this essay identifies the main characteristics of the terrorist threat and establishes what the difficulties of deterrence in this specific asymmetric confrontation might be. The main difficulty seems to be the problem to execute appropriate action should deterrence fail, since the target is often unclear and the perpetrator of the terrorist action most likely dead. Special attention is given to the moral dilemma that derives from suggestions to execute retaliation actions against the families of suicide bombers in order to deter others from becoming suicide bombers as suggested by Steinberg. He argues that terrorism can indeed be deterred, if the concept was applied correctly, that is against terrorist leaders, who are “not so quick to give up their own lives” . Finally, this essay will conclude that although it might be possible to deter individual terrorist actions , terrorism itself cannot be deterred by military means. And if the aim is indeed to eradicate terrorism completely, like the rhetoric used in the war on terrorism seems to suggest, deterrence is certainly not the most effective strategy.


Deterring Terrorism

Deterring Terrorism

Author: Andreas Wenger

Publisher: Stanford University Press

Published: 2012-09-19

Total Pages: 353

ISBN-13: 0804783470

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During the Cold War, deterrence theory was the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, however, popular wisdom dictated that terrorist organizations and radical fanatics could not be deterred—and governments shifted their attention to combating terrorism rather than deterring it. This book challenges that prevailing assumption and offers insight as to when and where terrorism can be deterred. It first identifies how and where theories of deterrence apply to counterterrorism, highlighting how traditional and less-traditional notions of deterrence can be applied to evolving terrorist threats. It then applies these theoretical propositions to real-world threats to establish the role deterrence has within a dynamic counterterrorism strategy—and to identify how metrics can be created for measuring the success of terrorism deterrence strategies. In sum, it provides a foundation for developing effective counterterrorism policies to help states contain or curtail the terrorism challenges they face.


Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism

Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism

Author: Paul K. Davis

Publisher: Rand Corporation

Published: 2002-11-27

Total Pages: 107

ISBN-13: 0833034065

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It may not be possible to deter fanatical terrorists, but members of terrorist systems may be amenable to influence. The U.S. counterterrorism strategy should therefore include political warfare, placing at risk things the terrorists hold dear, a credible threat of force against states or groups that support acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, and maintaining cooperation with other nations engaged in the war on terror, while also preserving core American values.


Understanding the Role of Deterrence in Counterterrorism Security

Understanding the Role of Deterrence in Counterterrorism Security

Author: Andrew R. Morral

Publisher: Rand Corporation

Published: 2014-05-20

Total Pages: 78

ISBN-13: 0833052918

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Deterrence--a central feature of counterterrorism security systems and a major factor in the cost-effectiveness of many security programs--is not well understood or measured. This paper offers a framework for understanding how security systems may deter or displace attacks and how to measure the relative deterrent value of alternative systems. This framework may aid in attempts to achieve increased security benefits with limited resources.


Deterring International Terrorism and Rogue States

Deterring International Terrorism and Rogue States

Author: James H. Lebovic

Publisher: Routledge

Published: 2007-01-24

Total Pages: 400

ISBN-13: 1135983585

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This new study challenges the widely held view that many current US adversaries cannot be deterred, maintaining that deterrence is not a relic of the Cold War period and that it should shape US policies toward so-called ‘rogue states’ and terror groups. James Lebovic argues that deterrence principles continue to apply, and focuses upon the ‘three pillars’ of the Bush administration’s national security policy: missile defence, which preoccupied the administration until September 11, 2001 pre-emption, which became the US focus with the September 11 attacks and US success in overthrowing the Taliban regime in Afghanistan homeland security, which the administration has portrayed as more a natural response to threat than an aspect of policy that must be reconciled with the other pillars. Deterring International Terrorism and Rogue States asserts that bad offences and defences have been endemic to the current US policy approach, leading US policy makers to pursue policies that require them to do everything without adequate concern for resource trade-offs, overreach, and unintended consequences. This book will be of great interest to students of US foreign policy, national and international security, terrorism and international relations in general.


Deterring Terrorism

Deterring Terrorism

Author: Elli Lieberman

Publisher: Routledge

Published: 2018-07-04

Total Pages: 384

ISBN-13: 1351999656

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This book examines the question of how to deter a non-state terrorist actor. Can terrorism be deterred? This book argues that current research is unable to find strong cases of deterrence success, because it uses a flawed research design which does not capture the longitudinal dynamics of the process. So far, the focus of inquiry has been on the tactical elements of a state’s counterterrorism strategy, instead of the non-state actor’s grand strategies. By studying the campaigns of Hezbollah, the Palestinians, the Irish Republican Army, Chechens, the Kurdistan Workers' Party, and Al-Qaeda/Taliban and ISIS over time, we can see that deterrence strategies that target the cost-benefit calculus of terrorist organizations lead to wars of attrition – which is the non-state organization’s strategy for victory. To escape the attrition trap, the state must undermine the attrition strategy of terrorist organizations by using offensive campaigns that become critical educational moments. The case studies presented here uncover an evolutionary process of learning, leading to strategic deterrence successes. Some terrorist organizations abandoned the use of force altogether, while others abandoned their aspirational goals or resorted to lower levels of violence. These findings should enable policymakers to transition from the failed policy that sought to defeat the Taliban and al-Qaeda in the unending war in Afghanistan to a policy that successfully applies deterrence. This book will be of much interest to students of deterrence theory, terrorism studies, war and conflict studies, and security studies.


Dealing with Terrorism

Dealing with Terrorism

Author: Bruno S. Frey

Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing

Published: 2004-01-01

Total Pages: 202

ISBN-13: 9781845421465

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Emphasizing a positive approach to dealing with terrorism (the carrot), this book provides a critique of deterrence policy (the stick) which can be ineffective and even counterproductive, and proposes three alternative and effective anti-terrorist policies: Decentralization reduces vulnerability to terrorist attacks. A system with many different centers is more stable due to its diversity, enabling one part to substitute for another. Positive incentives can be offered to actual and prospective terrorists not to engage in violent acts. Incentives include: reintegrating terrorists into society, welcoming repentents and offering them valued opportunities. Diverting attention by naming several terrorist groups potentially responsible for a particular terrorist act. The government thus supplies more information than the terrorist responsible would wish.


Deterring Rational Fanatics

Deterring Rational Fanatics

Author: Alex S. Wilner

Publisher: University of Pennsylvania Press

Published: 2015-01-21

Total Pages: 265

ISBN-13: 0812292049

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Cold War-era strategic thinking was driven by the belief that individuals, organizations, and foreign states could be deterred from offensive action by the threat of reprisal. That assurance was shaken with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001; suddenly, it seemed that no threat was powerful enough to deter individuals or organizations that valued political objectives over their own lives and the lives of their members. More than a decade later, new research and theory are bringing deterrence back into currency as a viable counterterrorism strategy. Alex S. Wilner updates deterrence theory for conflict in the twenty-first century, arguing for its value against challengers such as rogue states, cyber warriors, and transnational terrorist organizations. Deterring Rational Fanatics provides a full-scale discussion of deterrence theory concepts and controversies, assessing the utility of relying on the logic of deterrence and coercion to counter contemporary terrorism. In particular, targeted killings directed against the Taliban of Afghanistan provide a vivid illustration of the impact deterrence can have on militant behavior: precision strikes that eliminate militant leaders represent a significant cost to planning and participating in political violence, a cost that can coerce, manipulate, and alter behavior. Though deterrence theory is not a panacea for terrorism, insurgency, or militancy, it can serve as a strategic guide for state responses; as Wilner shows, terrorist violence can indeed be deterred.


Dying to Win

Dying to Win

Author: Robert Pape

Publisher: Random House Trade Paperbacks

Published: 2006-07-25

Total Pages: 370

ISBN-13: 0812973380

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Includes a new Afterword Finalist for the Council on Foreign Relations Arthur Ross Book Award One of the world’s foremost authorities on the subject of suicide terrorism, the esteemed political scientist Robert Pape has created the first comprehensive database of every suicide terrorist attack in the world from 1980 until today. In Dying to Win, Pape provides a groundbreaking demographic profile of modern suicide terrorist attackers–and his findings offer a powerful counterpoint to what we now accept as conventional wisdom on the topic. He also examines the early practitioners of this guerrilla tactic, including the ancient Jewish Zealots, who in A.D. 66 wished to liberate themselves from Roman occupation; the Ismaili Assassins, a Shi’ite Muslim sect in northern Iran in the eleventh and twelfth centuries; World War II’s Japanese kamikaze pilots, three thousand of whom crashed into U.S. naval vessels; and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, a secular, Marxist-Leninist organization responsible for more suicide terrorist attacks than any other group in history. Dying to Win is a startling work of analysis grounded in fact, not politics, that recommends concrete ways for states to fight and prevent terrorist attacks now. Transcending speculation with systematic scholarship, this is one of the most important studies of the terrorist threat to the United States and its allies since 9/11. “Invaluable . . . gives Americans an urgently needed basis for devising a strategy to defeat Osama bin Laden and other Islamist militants.” –Michael Scheuer, author of Imperial Hubris “Provocative . . . Pape wants to change the way you think about suicide bombings and explain why they are on the rise.” –Henry Schuster, CNN.com “Enlightening . . . sheds interesting light on a phenomenon often mistakenly believed to be restricted to the Middle East.” –The Washington Post Book World “Brilliant.” –Peter Bergen, author of Holy War, Inc.


Maintaining Effective Deterrence

Maintaining Effective Deterrence

Author: Colin S. Gray

Publisher:

Published: 2003

Total Pages: 72

ISBN-13:

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While deterrence is as old as human conflict itself, it became particularly important with the advent of nuclear weapons when armed conflict between the superpowers had the potential to end civilization. Today there is a sense that terrorism has rendered deterrence obsolete and forced the United States to substitute preemption for it. The author illustrates that strategic reality is not simple. He provides both a conceptual framework for understanding deterrence or, more accurately, the psychology of deterrence and policy guidance on how the United States can most effectively use it. The author concludes that an adaptable and flexible military with robust landpower is the only tool that can maintain deterrence.