Contents: (1) Intro.; (2) Background: Services Provided by Private Security Contractors (PSC); Number and Profile of PSCs Working in Iraq and Afghanistan; Congressional Focus on PSCs; (3) Private Security Co. Working for the U.S. Gov¿t.: Why the U.S. Gov¿t. Uses PSCs; DoD PSCs; Iraq; Afghanistan; Can the Use of PSCs Undermine U.S. Efforts?; DoD Mgmt. and Oversight of PSCs; (4) Options for Congress: Define the Role that Private Security Contractors Can Play in Support of Mil. Operations in Unsecure Environments; Prohibit armed security contractors from being deployed in combat zones; Restrict armed security contractors to performing static security; Restrict armed security contractors to static security, with an exception for local nationals.
Contents: (1) Background; (2) Managing Contractors during Contingency Contracting; (3) Number and Roles of Contractors in CENTCOM, in Iraq, in Afghanistan; (4) Efforts to Improve Contractor Management and Oversight; (5) Contractors in DoD Strategy and Doctrines: (a) Can Contractors Undermine U.S. Efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan?; (b) DoD Strategy and Doctrine: The National Defense Strategy and Quadrennial Defense Review; Field Manual on Operations; Field Manual on Counterinsurgency; New Doctrine, DoD Instructions, and Other Efforts; (6) Selected Congressional Hearings and Legislation; (7) Contract Management, Oversight, and Coordination: Training Contractors and the Military in Contingency Contracting. Illus.
This book explores the use of deadly force by private security companies during the Iraq War. The work focuses on and compares the activities of the US companies Blackwater and Dyncorp. Despite sharing several important characteristics, such as working for the same client (the US State Department) during the same time period, the employees of Blackwater fired their weapons far more often, and killed and seriously injured far more people in Iraq than their counterparts in DynCorp. In order to explain this disparity, the book undertakes the most comprehensive analysis ever attempted on the use of violence by the employees of these firms. Based on extensive empirical research, it offers a credible explanation for this difference: Blackwater maintained a relatively bellicose military culture that placed strong emphasis on norms encouraging its personnel to exercise personal initiative, proactive use of force, and an exclusive approach to security, which, together, motivated its personnel to use violence quite freely against anyone they suspected of posing a threat. Specifically, Blackwater’s military culture motivated its personnel to fire upon suspected threats more quickly, at greater distances, and with a greater quantity of bullets, and to more readily abandon the people they shot at when compared to DynCorp’s personnel, who maintained a military culture that encouraged far less violent behaviour. Utilizing the Private Security Company Violent Incident Dataset (PSCVID), created by the author in 2012, the book draws upon data on hundreds of violent incidents involving private security personnel in Iraq to identify trends in the behaviour exhibited by the employees of different firms. Based on this rich and original empirical data, the book provides the definitive study of contemporary private security personnel in the Iraq War. This book will be of much interest to students of the Iraq War, Private Security Companies, Military Studies, War and Conflict Studies and IR in general.
Sean McFate lays bare the opaque world of private military contractors, explaining the economic structure of the industry and showing in detail how firms operate on the ground. As a former paratrooper and private military contractor, McFate provides an unparalleled perspective into the nuts and bolts of the industry, as well as a sobering prognosis for the future of war.
The private military industry has been growing rapidly since the end of the Cold War. The Morality of Private War uses normative political theory to assess the leading moral arguments for and against the use of private military and security companies.
Mercenaries are more powerful than experts realize, a grave oversight. Those who assume they are cheap imitations of national armed forces invite disaster because for-profit warriors are a wholly different genus and species of fighter. Private military companies such as the Wagner Group are more like heavily armed multinational corporations than the Marine Corps. Their employees are recruited from different countries, and profitability is everything. Patriotism is unimportant, and sometimes a liability. Unsurprisingly, mercenaries do not fight conventionally, and traditional war strategies used against them may backfire.
The use of private security contractors (PSCs) to protect personnel and property in Iraq and Afghanistan has been a subject of debate. While PSCs are viewed as being vital to U.S. efforts in the region, many are concerned about transparency, accountability, and legal issues raised by the use of armed civilians to perform security tasks formerly performed by the mil. Contents of this report: Legal Status and Authorities: (a) Internat. Law: Can Contractors be Combatants?; Are They Mercenaries?; (b) Iraqi Law, and Afghan Law, and Status of U.S. Forces; (c) U.S. Law; ¿Inherently Gov¿t. Functions¿ and Other Restrictions on Gov¿t. Contracts; Prosecution of Contractor Personnel in U.S. Fed. or Mil. Courts; Uniform Code of Mil. Justice.
In Private Military and Security Contractors (PMSCs) a multinational team of scholars and experts address a developing phenomenon: controlling the use of privatized force by states in international politics. Robust analyses of the evolving, multi-layered tapestry of formal and informal mechanisms of control address the microfoundations of the market, such as the social and role identities of contract employees, their acceptance by military personnel, and potential tensions between them. The extent and willingness of key states—South Africa, the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Israel—to monitor and enforce discipline to structure their contractual relations with PMSCs on land and at sea is examined, as is the ability of the industry to regulate itself. Also discussed is the nascent international legal regime to reinforce state and industry efforts to encourage effective practices, punish inappropriate behavior, and shape the market to minimize the hazards of loosening states’ oligopolistic control over the means of legitimate organized violence. The volume presents a theoretically-informed synthesis of micro- and macro-levels of analysis, offering new insights into the challenges of controlling the agents of organized violence used by states for scholars and practitioners alike.
Faced with a decreasing supply of national troops, dwindling defense budgets, and the ever-rising demand for boots on the ground in global conflicts and humanitarian emergencies, decision makers are left with little choice but to legalize and legitimize the use of private military contractors (PMCs). Outsourcing Security examines the impact that bureaucratic controls and the increasing permissiveness of security environments have had on the U.S. military’s growing use of PMCs during the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Bruce E. Stanley examines the relationship between the rise of the private security industry and five potential explanatory variables tied to supply-and-demand theory in six historical cases, including Operation Desert Storm in 1991, the U.S. intervention in Bosnia in 1995, and Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. Outsourcing Security is the only work that moves beyond a descriptive account of the rise of PMCs to lay out a precise theory explaining the phenomenon and providing a framework for those considering PMCs in future global interaction.
This book explores different aspects of the regulation of private security contractors working for governments. The author specifically examines the US, identifying the obstacles that have hindered US regulatory outcomes. Theoretical discussions, supported by conceptual analysis of Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice, are applied to analysis based on interviews with current and former employees of key stakeholders. By analyzing the political, bureaucratic, and organizational obstacles to the implementation of consistent and enforceable regulations, Jovana Jezdimirovic Ranito points to creative possibilities for future use of her conceptual framework.
