The techniques and methods that form the basis of military and combat defensive training are detailed in this insightful guide from a personal protection expert. Chapters provide instruction on knife defense, unarmed fighting, weapon retention, and arrest and control techniques. Police and military personnel as well as self-defense instructors and students at all levels will benefit from simple instructions and step-by-step exercises.
Volume 8 of the Army University Large Scale Combat Operations series. The Competitive Advantage: Special Operations Forces in Large Scale Combat Operations presents twelve historical case studies of special operations forces from World War I through Operation Iraqi Freedom. This volume sheds light upon the emerging roles, missions, and unique capabilities that have forged a path for Army Special Operations Forces today. These case studies set Large Scale Combat Operations in the center and place ARSOF's role in the forefront. If a reader were to take one piece from this volume, it would be the clear understanding of the close synergy that occurs between the Conventional Force and SOF in Large Scale Combat Operations for major wars in the 20th and early 21st century. That synergy should provide a broad azimuth for military planners and practitioners to follow as the Army, SOF, and the Joint Force combine to preserve the peace, defend the Nation, and defeat any adversary.
Vice Adm. William H. McRaven helped to devise the strategy for how to bring down Osama bin Laden, and commanded the courageous U.S. military unit that carried it out on May 1, 2011, ending one of the greatest manhunts in history. In Spec Ops, a well-organized and deeply researched study, McRaven analyzes eight classic special operations. Six are from WWII: the German commando raid on the Belgian fort Eben Emael (1940); the Italian torpedo attack on the Alexandria harbor (1941); the British commando raid on Nazaire, France (1942); the German glider rescue of Benito Mussolini (1943); the British midget-submarine attack on the Tirpitz (1943); and the U.S. Ranger rescue mission at the Cabanatuan POW camp in the Philippines (1945). The two post-WWII examples are the U.S. Army raid on the Son Tay POW camp in North Vietnam (1970) and the Israeli rescue of the skyjacked hostages in Entebbe, Uganda (1976). McRaven—who commands a U.S. Navy SEAL team—pinpoints six essential principles of “spec ops” success: simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed and purpose. For each of the case studies, he provides political and military context, a meticulous reconstruction of the mission itself and an analysis of the operation in relation to his six principles. McRaven deems the Son Tay raid “the best modern example of a successful spec op [which] should be considered textbook material for future missions.” His own book is an instructive textbook that will be closely studied by students of the military arts. Maps, photos.
Special Forces forward operational bases (FOB) are essential for mission and contingency planning as well as for the preparation, infiltration and exfiltration of Operational Detachment Alphas (ODA). Therefore, the defense of this command and control headquarters is critical for preserving combat power and synchronizing military actions in a theater of operations. Because the enemy has the capability of projecting forces with the objective of disrupting US military operations, FOBs have become likely targets. According to SF doctrine, FOBs should be located in secure areas with MP or host-nation personnel providing the bulk of the security force. Although this situation is preferable, it is by no means assured. FOBs should be able to provide their own security in the event other forces are not available or when rapid deployment restricts the flow of conventional forces into a theater of operations. After-action review results from the Joint Readiness Training Center demonstrate that many SF battalions are not prepared to execute base defense tasks without the assistance of other forces. Many SF commanders do not consider base defense a mission essential task and the result is a lack of training by many of their personnel. This study analyzes joint and SF doctrine, observations from the field, and the effects of the contemporary operating environment to identify weaknesses in the readiness of SF battalions.
This paper focuses on the formulation of doctrine since World War II. In no comparable period in history have the dimensions of the battlefield been so altered by rapid technological changes. The need for the tactical doctrines of the Army to remain correspondingly abreast of these changes is thus more pressing than ever before. Future conflicts are not likely to develop in the leisurely fashions of the past where tactical doctrines could be refined on the battlefield itself. It is, therefore, imperative that we apprehend future problems with as much accuracy as possible. One means of doing so is to pay particular attention to the business of how the Army's doctrine has developed historically, with a view to improving methods of future development.
This publication outlines the planning process as it relates to a Special Forces (SF) operational detachment-alpha (ODA) conducting deliberate planning for special operations. Planning is an essential task common to all aspects of SF operations. More content available at: doguedebordeauxsurvival.com
