Escalation is a natural tendency in any form of human competition, and today's security environment demands that the United States be prepared for a host of escalatory threats. This analysis of escalation dynamics and approaches to escalation management draws on a range of historical examples from World War I to the struggle against global Jihad to inform escalation-related decisionmaking.
The subject of escalation has received little attention in U.S. strategic thought since the end of the Cold War. With prospects of conflict between nuclear-armed superpowers receding in memory, few policymakers, security analysts, or military leaders have worried about the danger of wars spinning out of control or considered how to manage these risks. Yet there are important reasons to examine the dynamics of escalation in the current security environment. Although the United States retains its nuclear superiority and has demonstrated the ability to pro- project overwhelming force in most conventional conflicts, strategic conditions have changed considerably in the past 15 years, and new adversaries have emerged. These developments could find the United States in escalatory situations that its leaders, schooled in ideas developed during the Cold War, are ill equipped to anticipate or manage. Understanding escalation is particularly important to the U.S. Air Force because of its unique ability to strike deep within enemy territory and the emphasis in Air Force doctrine on rapid strategic attack to achieve shock, paralysis, and escalation dominance. The Air Force recognizes the importance of understanding and managing the risks of escalation. In 2004, Director of Air Force Strategic Planning Major General Ronald J. Bath sponsored a war game in which uncontrolled escalation occurred, surprising players and controllers alike. Because this experience was just one in a series of escalatory events occurring in major war games over the past several years, General Bath recommended to Air Force Chief of Staff General John P. Jumper that the RAND Corporation be tasked to examine the risks of escalation in the current security environment and offer recommendations on how the Air Force can best anticipate and manage those risks.
Escalation is a natural tendency in any form of human competition, and today's security environment demands that the United States be prepared for a host of escalatory threats. This analysis of escalation dynamics and approaches to escalation management draws on a range of historical examples from World War I to the struggle against global Jihad to inform escalation-related decisionmaking.
While the United States and its allies put their military focus on the post-9/11 challenges of counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, Russia and China put their military focus onto the United States and the risks of regional wars that they came to believe they might have to fight against the United States. Their first priority was to put their intellectual houses in order-that is, to adapt military thought and strategic planning to the new problem. The result is a set of ideas about how to bring the United States and its allies to a "culminating point" where they choose to no longer run the costs and risks of continued war. This is the "red theory of victory." Beginning in the second presidential term of Obama administration, the U.S. military focus began to shift, driven by rising Russian and Chinese military assertiveness and outspoken opposition to the regional security orders on their peripheries. But U.S. military thought has been slow to catch up. As a recent bipartisan congressional commission concluded, the U.S. intellectual house is dangerously out of order for this new strategic problem. There is no Blue theory of victory. Such a theory should explain how the United States and its allies can strip away the confidence of leaders in Moscow and Beijing (and Pyongyang) in their "escalation calculus"-that is, that they will judge the costs too high, the benefits to low, and the risks incalculable. To develop, improve, and implement the needed new concepts requires a broad campaign of activities by the United States and full partnership with its allies.
“An excellent contribution to the debate on the future role of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence in American foreign policy.” ―Contemporary Security Policy This book is a counter to the conventional wisdom that the United States can and should do more to reduce both the role of nuclear weapons in its security strategies and the number of weapons in its arsenal. The case against nuclear weapons has been made on many grounds—including historical, political, and moral. But, Brad Roberts argues, it has not so far been informed by the experience of the United States since the Cold War in trying to adapt deterrence to a changed world, and to create the conditions that would allow further significant changes to U.S. nuclear policy and posture. Drawing on the author’s experience in the making and implementation of U.S. policy in the Obama administration, this book examines that real-world experience and finds important lessons for the disarmament enterprise. Central conclusions of the work are that other nuclear-armed states are not prepared to join the United States in making reductions, and that unilateral steps by the United States to disarm further would be harmful to its interests and those of its allies. The book ultimately argues in favor of patience and persistence in the implementation of a balanced approach to nuclear strategy that encompasses political efforts to reduce nuclear dangers along with military efforts to deter them. “Well-researched and carefully argued.” ―Foreign Affairs
This book is written to be a comprehensive guide to cybersecurity and cyberwar policy and strategy, developed for a one- or two-semester class for students of public policy (including political science, law, business, etc.). Although written from a U.S. perspective, most of its contents are globally relevant. It is written essentially in four sections. The first (chapters 1 - 5) describes how compromises of computers and networks permit unauthorized parties to extract information from such systems (cyber-espionage), and/or to force these systems to misbehave in ways that disrupt their operations or corrupt their workings. The section examines notable hacks of systems, fundamental challenges to cybersecurity (e.g., the lack of forced entry, the measure-countermeasure relationship) including the role of malware, and various broad approaches to cybersecurity. The second (chapters 6 - 9) describes what government policies can, and, as importantly, cannot be expected to do to improve a nation’s cybersecurity thereby leaving leave countries less susceptible to cyberattack by others. Among its focus areas are approaches to countering nation-scale attacks, the cost to victims of broad-scale cyberespionage, and how to balance intelligence and cybersecurity needs. The third (chapters 10 - 15) looks at cyberwar in the context of military operations. Describing cyberspace as the 5th domain of warfare feeds the notion that lessons learned from other domains (e.g., land, sea) apply to cyberspace. In reality, cyberwar (a campaign of disrupting/corrupting computers/networks) is quite different: it rarely breaks things, can only be useful against a sophisticated adversary, competes against cyber-espionage, and has many first-strike characteristics. The fourth (chapters 16 – 35) examines strategic cyberwar within the context of state-on-state relations. It examines what strategic cyberwar (and threats thereof) can do against whom – and how countries can respond. It then considers the possibility and limitations of a deterrence strategy to modulate such threats, covering credibility, attribution, thresholds, and punishment (as well as whether denial can deter). It continues by examining sub rosa attacks (where neither the effects nor the attacker are obvious to the public); the role of proxy cyberwar; the scope for brandishing cyberattack capabilities (including in a nuclear context); the role of narrative and signals in a conflict in cyberspace; questions of strategic stability; and norms for conduct in cyberspace (particularly in the context of Sino-U.S. relations) and the role played by international law. The last chapter considers the future of cyberwar.
Is it possible for two combatants who possess equally strong air forces to conduct limited warfare by restraining air operations? In Restraining Air Power, Robert C. Owen and contributing authors aim to answer this question by providing theoretical and empirical assessments of restrained air warfare through five historical case studies since 1945. Through an objective analysis of the past, this collection evaluates the principles of escalation and escalation management in conventional warfare scenarios to better understand when, why, and how peer opponents in past conflicts have expanded or restrained air operations. The surge in cyber warfare, the development of artificially intelligent weaponry, and the founding of the United States Space Force in 2019 mean that analysts and military planners must be prepared to think about escalation management and peer conflict in increasingly complicated and arduous ways. This comprehensive study provides readers with refined theoretical visions of the possibilities and challenges of managing escalation as a powerful mode of warfare between opponents who believe they must choose between sacrificing their own national interests or risking escalated destruction of their economies, military forces, and governing authority. The analysis within the pages of this volume updates our understanding of air warfare within a world of unprecedented military complexity and, as such, will hold immense value for specialists in advanced military studies as well as those studying international relations and history.
To what extent do cyberspace operations increase the risks of escalation between nation-state rivals? Scholars and practitioners have been concerned about cyber escalation for decades, but the question remains hotly debated. The issue is increasingly important for international politics as more states develop and employ offensive cyber capabilities, and as the international system is increasingly characterized by emergent multipolarity. In Escalation Dynamics in Cyberspace, Erica D. Lonergan and Shawn W. Lonergan tackle this question head-on, presenting a comprehensive theory that explains the conditions under which cyber operations may lead to escalation. In doing so, they challenge long-held assumptions about strategic interactions in cyberspace, arguing that cyberspace is not as dangerous as the conventional wisdom might suggest. In some cases, cyber operations could even facilitate the de-escalation of international crises. To support their claims, Lonergan and Lonergan test their theory against a range of in-depth case studies, including strategic interactions between the United States and key rivals; a series of case studies of the role of cyber operations in international crises; and plausible future scenarios involving cyber operations during conflict. They then apply their analytical insights to policymaking, making the case that skepticism is warranted about the overall efficacy of employing cyber power for strategic ends. By exploring the role of cyber operations in routine competition, crises, and warfighting, Escalation Dynamics in Cyberspace presents nuanced insights about how cyberspace affects international politics.
In the past decade, tensions in Asia have risen as Beijing has become more assertive in maritime disputes with its neighbors and the United States. Although taking place below the threshold of direct military confrontation, China’s assertiveness frequently involves coercive elements that put at risk existing rules and norms; physical control of disputed waters and territory; and the credibility of U.S. security commitments. Regional leaders have expressed increasing alarm that such “gray zone” coercion threatens to destabilize the region by increasing the risk of conflict and undermining the rules-based order. Yet, the United States and its allies and partners have struggled to develop effective counters to China’s maritime coercion. This study reviews deterrence literature and nine case studies of coercion to develop recommendations for how the United States and its allies and partners could counter gray zone activity.
This book offers a timely and compelling explanation for the deterioration of U.S.-China security relations during the Obama Presidency. The U.S.-China relationship has become one of (if not the most) vital features of contemporary world politics, and with arrival the Donald Trump to the White House in 2017, this vital geopolitical relationship sits at a precarious and dangerous crossroads. This book assesses a wide array of sources to systematically unpack the policy rhythms, drivers, and dynamics that defined the course of Sino-American security relations during the Obama-era. It fills several gaps in the literature on international security and conflict and offers a nuanced and innovative comparative approach to examine individual military domains. The case study chapters draw on recent Chinese and English sources - on military doctrine, capabilities, and defense strategy - to build a clear understanding the main sources of U.S.-China misperceptions, and highlight the problems these assessments can create for the conduct of statecraft across strategically competitive geopolitical dyads. The book builds a sobering picture of U.S.-China relations that will appeal to specialists and generalists alike with an interest in future warfare, emerging military-technologies, military studies, arms control, and foreign policy issues in the Asia-Pacific region more broadly.
