The end of the Cold War, the Revolution in Military Affairs, 9/11 and the War on Terror have radically altered the nature of conflict and security in the Twenty-first Century. This book considers how developments in technology effect the prosecution of war and what the changing nature of warfare means for human rights and civil society.
Throughout recorded history there have been a number of major changes in the way wars are fought that have been related in some degree to changes in technology. Looking back on these changes, and at the changes that are being caused by the rapid advances in today's technology, many people assert that we are in the midst of a revolution in military affairs (RMA). The Department of Defense's Office of Net Assessment defines an RMA as "a major change in the nature of warfare brought about by the innovative application of technologies which, combined with dramatic changes in military doctrine, and operational concepts, fundamentally alters the character and conduct of operations. A study of history reveals, however, that technology does not, in and of itself, change the way armies conduct the business of waging war. Sudden alterations in the way armies conduct operations, introduced without testing and proof of their efficacy, can render an army incapable of fulfilling its basic purpose. When new battlefield technology is introduced, militaries typically approach it warily, retaining much of the old way of doing things to ensure a capability of meeting known or expected threats, or until the old way is shown to be incapable of coping with threats. This is not to argue against adopting new technologies, for armies must still prepare to cope with peer adversaries. But the modern army must keep a foot in both camps -- retaining the ability to deal with the known threat of technologically less advanced foes while preparing for the unknown. This paper discusses advances in the weapons and tactics of war made by Philip of Macedon, the Roman Empire, Charlemagne, Louis XIV, and Napoleon. Specific tactics/weapons discussed include the phalanx, legion, stirrup, crossbow, longbow, gunpowder, rifle, breechloader, levee en masse, telegraph, underwater cables, airplane, tank, railroads, atomic weapons, guided missiles, and information technology.
Netwar is the lower-intensity, societal-level counterpart to our earlier, mostly military concept of cyberwar. Netwar has a dual nature, like the two-faced Roman god Janus, in that it is composed of conflicts waged, on the one hand, by terrorists, criminals, and ethnonationalist extremists; and by civil-society activists on the other. What distinguishes netwar as a form of conflict is the networked organizational structure of its practitioners-with many groups actually being leaderless-and the suppleness in their ability to come together quickly in swarming attacks. The concepts of cyberwar and netwar encompass a new spectrum of conflict that is emerging in the wake of the information revolution. This volume studies major instances of netwar that have occurred over the past several years and finds, among other things, that netwar works very well. Whether the protagonists are civil-society activists or "uncivil-society" criminals and terrorists, their netwars have generally been successful. In part, the success of netwar may be explained by its very novelty-much as earlier periods of innovation in military affairs have seen new practices triumphant until an appropriate response is discovered. But there is more at work here: The network form of organization has reenlivened old forms of licit and illicit activity, posing serious challenges to those-mainly the militaries, constabularies, and governing officials of nation states-whose duty is to cope with the threats this new generation of largely nonstate actors poses.
Introduction to Cyber-Warfare: A Multidisciplinary Approach, written by experts on the front lines, gives you an insider's look into the world of cyber-warfare through the use of recent case studies. The book examines the issues related to cyber warfare not only from a computer science perspective but from military, sociological, and scientific perspectives as well. You'll learn how cyber-warfare has been performed in the past as well as why various actors rely on this new means of warfare and what steps can be taken to prevent it. - Provides a multi-disciplinary approach to cyber-warfare, analyzing the information technology, military, policy, social, and scientific issues that are in play - Presents detailed case studies of cyber-attack including inter-state cyber-conflict (Russia-Estonia), cyber-attack as an element of an information operations strategy (Israel-Hezbollah,) and cyber-attack as a tool against dissidents within a state (Russia, Iran) - Explores cyber-attack conducted by large, powerful, non-state hacking organizations such as Anonymous and LulzSec - Covers cyber-attacks directed against infrastructure, such as water treatment plants and power-grids, with a detailed account of Stuxent
Previous studies have looked at the contribution of information technology and network theory to the art of warfare as understood in the broader sense. This book, however, focuses on an area particularly important in understanding the significance of the information revolution; its impact on strategic theory. The purpose of the book is to critically analyze the contributions and challenges that the spread of information technologies can bring to categories of classic strategic theory. In the first two chapters, the author establishes the context of the book, coming back to the epistemology of revolution in military affairs and its terminology. The third chapter examines the political bases of strategic action and operational strategy, before the next two chapters focus on historical construction of the process of getting to know your opponents and the way in which we consider information collection. Chapter 6 returns to the process of “informationalization” in the doctrine of armed forces, especially in Western countries, and methods of conducting network-centric warfare. The final chapter looks at the attempts of Western countries to adapt to the emergence of techno-guerrillas and new forms of hybrid warfare, and the resulting socio-strategic outcomes.
The information revolution--which is as much an organizational as a technological revolution--is transforming the nature of conflict across the spectrum: from open warfare, to terrorism, crime, and even radical social activism. The era of massed field armies is passing, because the new information and communications systems are increasing the lethality of quite small units that can call in deadly, precise missile fire almost anywhere, anytime. In social conflicts, the Internet and other media are greatly empowering individuals and small groups to influence the behavior of states. Whether in military or social conflicts, all protagonists will soon be developing new doctrines, strategies, and tactics for swarming their opponents--with weapons or words, as circumstances require. Preparing for conflict in such a world will require shifting to new forms of organization, particularly the versatile, hardy, all-channel network. This shift will prove difficult for states and professional militaries that remain bastions of hierarchy, bound to resist institutional redesign. They will make the shift as they realize that information and knowledge are becoming the key elements of power. This implies, among other things, that Mars, the old brute-force god of war, must give way to Athena, the well-armed goddess of wisdom. Accepting Athena as the patroness of this information age represents a first step not only for preparing for future conflicts, but also for preventing them.
This is a book about strategy and war fighting in the midst of a revolution in military affairs as the world moves into the twenty-first century. Its 11 essays examine topics such as military operations against a well-armed rogue state or NASTT (NBC-arming sponsor of terrorism and intervention) state; the potential of parallel warfare strategy for different kinds of states; the revolutionary potential of information warfare; the lethal possibilities of biological warfare; and the elements of an ongoing revolution in military affairs (RMA). The book's purpose is to focus attention on the operational problems, enemy strategies, and threats that will confront US national security decision makers in the twenty-first century. The participating authors are either professional military officers or civilian professionals who specialize in national security issues. Two of the architects of the US air campaign in the 1991 Gulf War have contributed essays that discuss the evolving utility of airpower to achieve decisive results and the lessons that might portend for the future of warfare. In "Principles of War on the Battlefield of the Future," which sets the tone for the book, Dr. Barry Schneider examines how traditional principles of war may have to be reassessed in light of a proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) among third world states. Regarding the principle of "mass," traditional theory dictated that forces be massed for an offensive breakthrough. But Schneider argues that, against an enemy armed with WMD, dispersed of one's forces may, in fact, be more prudent, and fighting by means of "disengaged combat" prior to a decisive strike may be necessary. This requires high coordination and "superior targeting and damage assessment intelligence, combined with superior high-tech weapons." Still, the United States and its allies would not likely be able to dominate a future battlefield even with advanced conventional arms if they did not have close-in air bases to operate from and thereby to achieve air dominance over the battle space. Therefore, while it sounds good, striking from outside the enemy's range is not a real option for long if the enemy is mounting a ground campaign that is closing in on vital areas. Local air, sea, and ground power will be needed to contain the adversary forces and roll them back. This means local air bases and seaports must be available and protected. Contents * Introduction * 1 Principles of War for the Battlefield of the Future * Barry R. Schneider * Overview: New Era Warfare? A Revolution In Military Affairs? * 2 New-Era Warfare * Gen Charles A. Horner, USAF, (Ret.) * 3 The Revolution in Military Affairs * Jeffrey McKitrick, James Blackwell, Fred Littlepage, George Kraus, Richard Blanchfield and Dale Hill * Overview: Future Airpower and Strategy Issues * 4 Air Theory for the Twenty-First Century * Col John A. Warden III, USAF * 5 Parallel War and Hyperwar: Is Every Want a Weakness? * Col Richard Szafranski, USAF * Overview: Information Warfare Issues * 6 Information War - Cyberwar - Netwar * George Stein * 7 Information Warfare: Impacts and Concerns * Col James W. McLendon, USAF * Overview: Biological Warfare Issues * 8 The Biological Weapon: A Poor Nation's Weapon of Mass Destruction * Lt Col Terry N. Mayer, USAF * 9 Twenty-First Century Germ Warfare * Lt Col Robert P. Kadlec, MD, USAF * 10 Biological Weapons for Waging Economic Warfare * Lt Col Robert P. Kadlec, MD, USAF * 11 On Twenty-First Century Warfare * Lawrence E. Grinter and Dr. Barry R. Schneider
Future U.S. national security strategy is likely to be profoundly affected by the ongoing, rapid evolution of cyberspace--the global information infrastructure--and in particular by the growing dependence of the U.S. military and other national institutions and infrastructures on potentially vulnerable elements of the U.S. national information infrastructure. To examine these effects, the authors conducted a series of exercises employing a methodology known as the Day After ... in which participants are presented with an information warfare crisis scenario and asked to advise the president on possible responses. Participants included senior national security community members and representatives from security-related telecommunications and information-systems industries. The report synthesizes the exercise results and presents the instructions from the exercise materials in their entirety.
The information revolution is leading to the rise of network forms of organization, with unusual implications for how societies are organized and conflicts are conducted. "Netwar" is an emerging consequence. The term refers to societal conflict and crime, short of war, in which the antagonists are organized more as sprawling "leaderless" networks than as tight-knit hierarchies. Many terrorists, criminals, fundamentalists, and ethno-nationalists are developing netwar capabilities. A new generation of revolutionaries and militant radicals is also emerging, with new doctrines, strategies, and technologies that support their reliance on network forms of organization. Netwar may be the dominant mode of societal conflict in the 21st century. These conclusions are implied by the evolution of societies, according to a framework presented in this RAND study. The emergence of netwar raises the need to rethink strategy and doctrine to conduct counternetwar. Traditional notions of war and low-intensity conflict as a sequential process based on massing, maneuvering, and fighting will likely prove inadequate to cope with nonlinear, swarm-like, information-age conflicts in which societal and military elements are closely intermingled.
This is a book about strategy and war fighting. It contains 11 essays which examine topics such as military operations against a well-armed rogue state, the potential of parallel warfare strategy for different kinds of states, the revolutionary potential of information warfare, the lethal possibilities of biological warfare and the elements of an ongoing revolution in military affairs. The purpose of the book is to focus attention on the operational problems, enemy strategies and threat that will confront U.S. national security decision makers in the twenty-first century.
