In March 2009, the Fund established a new Framework Administered Account to administer external financial resources for selected Fund activities (the “SFA Instrument”). The financing of activities under the terms of the SFA Instrument is implemented through the establishment and operation of a subaccount within the SFA. This paper requests Executive Board approval to establish the AFRITAC Central subaccount under the terms of the SFA Instrument.
Most recent regulations establish that resolution of global banking groups shall be done according to bail-in procedures and following a Single Point of Entry (SPE) as opposed to a Multiple Point of Entry (MPE) approach. The latter requires parent holding of global groups to put up front the equity capital needed to absorb losses possibly emerging in foreign subsidiaries branches. No model rationalized so far such resolution regime. We build a model of optimal design of resolution regimes and compare three regimes: SPE with cooperative authorities, SPE with non-cooperative authorities and MPE (ring-fencing). We find that the costs for bondholders of bail-inable instruments is generally higher under noncooperative regimes and ring-fencing. We also find that in those cases banks have ex ante incentives to reduce their exposure in foreign assets. We also examine recent case studies that help us rationalize the model results.
Since 2008, many countries across the globe have witnessed the introduction of new recovery and resolution regimes for banks. Whereas much may have been achieved on regional levels, this has not been perfect, and many global challenges remain unsolved. The Research Handbook on Cross-Border Bank Resolution analyses the strengths and weaknesses of the current regulatory framework for cross-border bank crises with contributions from eminent experts from the US, EU, Japan and China. The topic is addressed from both economic, and legal perspectives, with a special section devoted to real-life cases.
Developing an effective framework for cross-border resolution is a key priority in international regulatory reform. Large bank failures during the global financial crisis brought home the lack of adequate tools for resolving “too-big-to-fail” institutions. In cross-border cases, misaligned incentives and lack of robust mechanisms for resolution and cross-border cooperation left some country authorities with little choice but to take unilateral actions, which contributed to the high fiscal costs of the crisis and resulted in disorderly resolution in some cases
Most recent regulations establish that resolution of global banking groups shall be done according to bail-in procedures and following a Single Point of Entry (SPE) as opposed to a Multiple Point of Entry (MPE) approach. The latter requires parent holding of global groups to put up front the equity capital needed to absorb losses possibly emerging in foreign subsidiaries. No model rationalized so far such resolution regime. We build a model of optimal design of resolution regimes and compare three regimes: SPE with cooperative authorities, SPE with non-cooperative authorities and MPE (ring-fencing). We find that the costs for bondholders of bail-inable instruments are generally higher under non cooperative regimes and ring-fencing. We also find that in those cases banks have ex ante incentives to reduce their exposure in foreign assets. We also examine recent case studies that help us rationalize the model results.
Cross-border banking, while having the potential for a more efficient financial sector, also creates potential challenges for bank supervisors and regulators. This volume discusses topics that include: the landscape of cross-border bank activity, the resulting competitive implications, emerging challenges for prudential regulation, and more. Cross-border banking, while having the potential for a more efficient financial sector, also creates potential challenges for bank supervisors and regulators. It requires cooperation by regulatory authorities across jurisdictions and a clear delineation of authority and responsibility. That delineation is typically not present and regulatory authorities often have significantly different incentives to respond when cross-border-active banks encounter difficulties. Most of these issues have only begun to be seriously evaluated. This volume, one of the first attempts to address these issues, brings together experts and regulators from different countries. The wide range of topics discussed include: the current landscape of cross-border bank activity, the resulting competitive implications, emerging challenges for prudential regulation, safety net concerns, failure resolution issues, and the potential future evolution of international banking.
The design of resolution regimes for global groups has been the central theme since the global financial crisis. No model rationalized the optimal design of bail-in regimes and their welfare consequences. We do so in a model with strategically optimizing authorities and banks. We model three regimes: cooperative-SPE (Single Point of Entry), uncooperative-SPE and MPE (Multiple Points of Entry). Welfare losses in each regime depend on the degree of banks' liabilities home bias. SPE cooperative generally minimizes losses since authorities internalize cross-country spillovers, unless groups are highly decentralized. High capital requirements by acting as discipline devise reduce losses and blur the difference between regimes. SPE has however unintended consequences: under cooperation it increases financial re-trenchment in previously segmented markets (by the same token it stimulates integration in well integrated markets), under non-cooperation subsidiarization emerges as an endogenous outcome.
Author: United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. Subcommittee on National Security and International Trade and Finance
This timely book offers a comprehensive study of the mechanism that gives effect to foreign bank resolution actions. In particular, it focuses on how the legal framework for the recognition of foreign bank resolution actions should be structured and proposes detailed legal principles on which effective frameworks should be based.
