Crisis in Competitive Versus Monopolistic Banking Systems
Crisis in Competitive Versus Monopolistic Banking Systems

Author: Mr.Bruce D. Smith

Publisher: International Monetary Fund

Published: 2003-09-01

Total Pages: 40

ISBN-13: 1451859589

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We study a monetary, general equilibrium economy in which banks exist because they provide intertemporal insurance to risk-averse depositors. A "banking crisis" is defined as a case in which banks exhaust their reserve assets. Under different model specifications, the banking industry is either a monopoly bank or a competitive banking industry. If the nominal rate of interest (rate of inflation) is below (above) some threshold, a monopolistic banking system will always result in a higher (lower) crisis probability. Thus, the relative crisis probabilities under the two banking systems cannot be determined independently of the conduct of monetary policy. We further show that the probability of a "costly banking crisis" is always higher under competition than under monopoly. However, this apparent advantage of the monopoly bank is due strictly to the fact that it provides relatively less valuable intertemporal insurance. These theoretical results suggest that banking system structure may matter for financial stability.

Crises in Competitive Versus Monopolistic Banking Systems
Crises in Competitive Versus Monopolistic Banking Systems

Author: John H. Boyd

Publisher:

Published: 2008

Total Pages: 39

ISBN-13:

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We study a monetary, general equilibrium economy in which banks exist because they provide intertemporal insurance to risk-averse depositors. A quot;banking crisisquot; is defined as a case in which banks exhaust their reserve assets. Under different model specifications, the banking industry is either a monopoly bank or a competitive banking industry. If the nominal rate of interest (rate of inflation) is below (above) some threshold, a monopolistic banking system will always result in a higher (lower) crisis probability. Thus, the relative crisis probabilities under the two banking systems cannot be determined independently of the conduct of monetary policy. We further show that the probability of a quot;costly banking crisisquot; is always higher under competition than under monopoly. However, this apparent advantage of the monopoly bank is due strictly to the fact that it provides relatively less valuable intertemporal insurance. These theoretical results suggest that banking system structure may matter for financial stability.

Thoughts on Entry Regulation, Financial Market Competition and Financial Crisis
Thoughts on Entry Regulation, Financial Market Competition and Financial Crisis

Author: Sven Lilienthal

Publisher: GRIN Verlag

Published: 2009-04

Total Pages: 85

ISBN-13: 3640302184

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Seminar paper from the year 2009 in the subject Business economics - Economic Policy, grade: 1,0, University of Frankfurt (Main), course: Financial Regulation, language: English, abstract: This paper deals with the terms entry regulation, financial market competition and also indicates connections to potential financial crises. Authors in research have been attempting for years to build up a remedy for an optimal set-up.1 So, this is the reason I observe a seemingly never-ending discussion between two unofficial parties: Neither the proponents of the concentration-stability view, neither those of the concentration-fragility view will retreat from how to install proper competition in order to ensure stability. This paper also aims to understand the terms of both parties; their arguments and whether either monopolistic structures or competition are desirable in the financial industry. Therefore, I lay the theoretical foundation. I demonstrate with a model of the authors Boyd & De Nicoló that even economies with monopolistic structure are exposed to risk-taking activities - and not only banks in competitive industries. In chapter 3, I turn to the topic "Entry Regulation". I unveil different yardsticks of entry regulation, reveal some advantages and draw up my own index. I show that mainly countries that suffered devastating crises in recent times have stringent entry regulation. This can be shown by regarding their high capital requirements or their barriers for submitting information of managers, future plans or composition of shareholders. I also show that entry regulation is an appropriate means for governments to control or to curb competition. In the last chapter, it is also shown that high entry capital requirements prevent mainly weak or inefficient banks from entry. In chapter 4, I present two ratios for assessing competition: The concentration ratio (CR) and H-Statistics (H). CR is widely used in literature and defines the market share of the largest banks

Fragile by Design
Fragile by Design

Author: Charles W. Calomiris

Publisher: Princeton University Press

Published: 2014-02-23

Total Pages: 585

ISBN-13: 1400849926

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Why stable banking systems are so rare Why are banking systems unstable in so many countries—but not in others? The United States has had twelve systemic banking crises since 1840, while Canada has had none. The banking systems of Mexico and Brazil have not only been crisis prone but have provided miniscule amounts of credit to business enterprises and households. Analyzing the political and banking history of the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Mexico, and Brazil through several centuries, Fragile by Design demonstrates that chronic banking crises and scarce credit are not accidents. Calomiris and Haber combine political history and economics to examine how coalitions of politicians, bankers, and other interest groups form, why they endure, and how they generate policies that determine who gets to be a banker, who has access to credit, and who pays for bank bailouts and rescues. Fragile by Design is a revealing exploration of the ways that politics inevitably intrudes into bank regulation.

Are More Competitive Banking Systems More Stable?
Are More Competitive Banking Systems More Stable?

Author: Martin Cihák

Publisher: International Monetary Fund

Published: 2006-06

Total Pages: 42

ISBN-13:

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This paper provides the first empirical analysis of the cross-country relationship between a direct measure of competitive conduct of financial institutions and banking system fragility. Using the Panzar and Rosse H-Statistic as a measure for competition in 38 countries during 1980-2003, we present evidence that more competitive banking systems are less prone to systemic crises and that time to crisis is longer in a competitive environment. Our results hold when concentration and the regulatory environment are controlled for and are robust to different methodologies, different sampling periods, and alternative samples.

Consolidation and Market Structure in Emerging Market Banking Systems
Consolidation and Market Structure in Emerging Market Banking Systems

Author: Gaston Gelos

Publisher: International Monetary Fund

Published: 2002-11

Total Pages: 36

ISBN-13:

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This paper examines the evolution of market structure in emerging market banking systems during the 1990s. While significant bank consolidation has been taking place in these countries, reflected in a sharp decline in the number of banks, this process has not systematically been associated with increased concentration as measured by standard indices. Moreover, econometric estimates based on the Panzar-Rosse (1987) methodology suggest that, overall, markets have not become less competitive in a sample of eight European and Latin American countries. Lowering barriers to entry, by doing such things as allowing increased participation of foreign banks, appears to have prevented a decline in competitive pressures associated with consolidation.

Bank Concentration and Crises
Bank Concentration and Crises

Author: Thorsten Beck

Publisher:

Published: 2003

Total Pages: 58

ISBN-13:

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Motivated by public policy debates about bank consolidation and conflicting theoretical predictions about the relationship between the market structure of the banking industry and bank fragility, this paper studies the impact of bank concentration, bank regulations, and national institutions on the likelihood of suffering a systemic banking crisis. Using data on 70 countries from 1980 to 1997, we find that crises are less likely in economies with (i) more concentrated banking systems, (ii) fewer regulatory restrictions on bank competition and activities, and (iii) national institutions that encourage competition.

Bank Monopoly The Cause Of Commercial Crises
Bank Monopoly The Cause Of Commercial Crises

Author: George Guthrie

Publisher: Legare Street Press

Published: 2023-07-18

Total Pages: 0

ISBN-13: 9781020991417

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In this provocative work, economist George Guthrie argues that the monopoly held by banks over the issuance of credit is the root cause of recurring commercial crises. Drawing on case studies from throughout history, Guthrie shows how this monopoly has caused inflation, instability, and social unrest. With its sharp critiques of the banking system and visionary proposals for reform, this book is a must-read for anyone interested in economics and finance. This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the "public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.