The U. S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual

The U. S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual

Author: David H. Petraeus

Publisher: Silver Rock Publishing

Published: 2015-12-31

Total Pages: 244

ISBN-13: 9781626544567

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This field manual establishes doctrine for military operations in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment. It is based on lessons learned from previous counterinsurgencies and contemporary operations. It is also based on existing interim doctrine and doctrine recently developed. Counterinsurgency operations generally have been neglected in broader American military doctrine and national security policies since the end of the Vietnam War over 40 years ago. This manual is designed to reverse that trend. It is also designed to merge traditional approaches to COIN with the realities of a new international arena shaped by technological advances, globalization, and the spread of extremist ideologies--some of them claiming the authority of a religious faith. This is a comprehensive manual that details every aspect of a successful COIN operation from intelligence to leadership to diplomacy. It also includes several useful appendices that provide important supplementary material.


Counterinsurgency

Counterinsurgency

Author:

Publisher:

Published: 2006

Total Pages: 282

ISBN-13: 9781422316108

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A counterinsurgency (CI) campaign is a mix of offensive, defensive, & stability operations conducted along multiple lines of operations. It requires Soldiers & Marines to employ a mix of familiar combat tasks & skills more often associated with nonmilitary agencies. Achieving the balance between them is not easy & depends on the local situation. Contents: Insurgency & CI; Integrating Civilian & Military Activities; Intelligence in CI; Designing CI Campaigns & Operations; Executing CI Operations; Developing Host-Nation Security Forces: Leadership & Ethics for CI; Sustainment; A Guide for Action; Social Network Analysis & Other Analytical Tools; Linguist Support; Legal Considerations; & Airpower in CI. Glossary. Charts & tables.


Counterinsurgency

Counterinsurgency

Author: Douglas Porch

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Published: 2013-07-11

Total Pages: 449

ISBN-13: 1107027381

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Controversial new history of counterinsurgency which challenges its claims as an effective strategy of waging war.


Tactics in Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24. 2

Tactics in Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24. 2

Author: U. S. Army Staff

Publisher: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform

Published: 2009-04-30

Total Pages: 0

ISBN-13: 9781456480660

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This field manual establishes doctrine (fundamental principles) for tactical counterinsurgency (COIN) operations at the company, battalion, and brigade level. It is based on lessons learned from historic counterinsurgencies and current operations. This manual continues the efforts of FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, in combining the historic approaches to COIN with the realities of today's operational environment (OE)-an environment modified by a population explosion, urbanization, globalization, technology, the spread of religious fundamentalism, resource demand, climate change and natural disasters, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This manual is generic in its geographic focus and should be used with other doctrinal sources.


The New Counterinsurgency Era

The New Counterinsurgency Era

Author: David H. Ucko

Publisher: Georgetown University Press

Published: 2009-07-02

Total Pages: 270

ISBN-13: 1589017285

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Confronting insurgent violence in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military has recognized the need to “re-learn” counterinsurgency. But how has the Department of Defense with its mixed efforts responded to this new strategic environment? Has it learned anything from past failures? In The New Counterinsurgency Era, David Ucko examines DoD’s institutional obstacles and initially slow response to a changing strategic reality. Ucko also suggests how the military can better prepare for the unique challenges of modern warfare, where it is charged with everything from providing security to supporting reconstruction to establishing basic governance—all while stabilizing conquered territory and engaging with local populations. After briefly surveying the history of American counterinsurgency operations, Ucko focuses on measures the military has taken since 2001 to relearn old lessons about counterinsurgency, to improve its ability to conduct stability operations, to change the institutional bias against counterinsurgency, and to account for successes gained from the learning process. Given the effectiveness of insurgent tactics, the frequency of operations aimed at building local capacity, and the danger of ungoverned spaces acting as havens for hostile groups, the military must acquire new skills to confront irregular threats in future wars. Ucko clearly shows that the opportunity to come to grips with counterinsurgency is matched in magnitude only by the cost of failing to do so.


Field Manual Fm 3-24 Mcwp 3-33.5 Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies Change 1 - June 2014

Field Manual Fm 3-24 Mcwp 3-33.5 Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies Change 1 - June 2014

Author: Us Army, United States Government

Publisher: CreateSpace

Published: 2014-06-26

Total Pages: 192

ISBN-13: 9781500323035

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This is Change 1 to the May 2014 version of FM 3-24 MCWP 3-33.5 Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies. This version, that was released in late June 2014, has changes in chapters 1, 2, 4, and 7. Overall, FM 3-24 MCWP 3-33.5 is divided into three parts. Part one provides strategic and operational context, part two provides the doctrine for understanding insurgencies, and part three provides doctrine for defeating an insurgency. In short, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 is organized to provide the context of a problem, the problem, and possible solutions.Part one, the “Strategic and Operational Context,” provides a framework for understanding the environment where a counterinsurgency exists. Part one consists of chapters one through three.Part two, “Insurgencies,” provides a doctrinal framework for understanding an insurgency. Part two consists of chapters four and five.Part three, “Counterinsurgencies,” describes how to plan and execute operations to enable a host nation to defeat an insurgency.Chapter 1, “Understanding the Strategic Context” Chapter 2, “Understanding an Operational Environment” Chapter 3, “Culture” Chapter 4, “Insurgency Prerequisites and Fundamentals” Chapter 5, “Insurgency Threat Characteristics” Chapter 6, “Command and Control and Mission Command” Chapter 7, “Planning and Operational Considerations” Chapter 8, “Intelligence” Chapter 9, “Direct Approaches to Counter an Insurgency” Chapter 10, “Indirect Methods for Countering Insurgencies” Chapter 11, “Working with Host-Nation Forces” Chapter 12, “Assessments” Chapter 13, “Legal Considerations”


Military Anthropology

Military Anthropology

Author: Montgomery McFate

Publisher: Oxford University Press

Published: 2018-05-01

Total Pages: 503

ISBN-13: 0190934727

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In almost every military intervention in its history, the US has made cultural mistakes that hindered attainment of its policy goals. From the strategic bombing of Vietnam to the accidental burning of the Koran in Afghanistan, it has blundered around with little consideration of local cultural beliefs and for the long-term effects on the host nation's society. Cultural anthropology--the so-called "handmaiden of colonialism"--has historically served as an intellectual bridge between Western powers and local nationals. What light can it shed on the intersection of the US military and foreign societies today? This book tells the story of anthropologists who worked directly for the military, such as Ursula Graham Bower, the only woman to hold a British combat command during WWII. Each faced challenges including the negative outcomes of exporting Western political models and errors of perception. Ranging from the British colonial era in Africa to the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Military Anthropology illustrates the conceptual, cultural and practical barriers encountered by military organisations operating in societies vastly different from their own.


The Insurgents

The Insurgents

Author: Fred Kaplan

Publisher: Simon and Schuster

Published: 2013-01-02

Total Pages: 432

ISBN-13: 1451642660

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A finalist for the Pulitzer Prize The inside story of the small group of soldier-scholars who—against fierce resistance from within their own ranks—changed the way the Pentagon does business and the American military fights wars. The Insurgents is the inside story of the small group of soldier-scholars, led by General David Petraeus, who plotted to revolutionize one of the largest, oldest, and most hidebound institutions—the United States military. Their aim was to build a new Army that could fight the new kind of war in the post–Cold War age: not massive wars on vast battlefields, but “small wars” in cities and villages, against insurgents and terrorists. These would be wars not only of fighting but of “nation building,” often not of necessity but of choice. Based on secret documents, private emails, and interviews with more than one hundred key characters, including Petraeus, the tale unfolds against the backdrop of the wars against insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan. But the main insurgency is the one mounted at home by ambitious, self-consciously intellectual officers—Petraeus, John Nagl, H. R. McMaster, and others—many of them classmates or colleagues in West Point’s Social Science Department who rose through the ranks, seized with an idea of how to fight these wars better. Amid the crisis, they forged a community (some of them called it a cabal or mafia) and adapted their enemies’ techniques to overhaul the culture and institutions of their own Army. Fred Kaplan describes how these men and women maneuvered the idea through the bureaucracy and made it official policy. This is a story of power, politics, ideas, and personalities—and how they converged to reshape the twenty-first-century American military. But it is also a cautionary tale about how creative doctrine can harden into dogma, how smart strategists—today’s “best and brightest”—can win the battles at home but not the wars abroad. Petraeus and his fellow insurgents made the US military more adaptive to the conflicts of the modern era, but they also created the tools—and made it more tempting—for political leaders to wade into wars that they would be wise to avoid.


Counterinsurgency

Counterinsurgency

Author: David Kilcullen

Publisher: Oxford University Press

Published: 2010-05-19

Total Pages: 265

ISBN-13: 0199746257

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David Kilcullen is one of the world's most influential experts on counterinsurgency and modern warfare, a ground-breaking theorist whose ideas "are revolutionizing military thinking throughout the west" (Washington Post). Indeed, his vision of modern warfare powerfully influenced the United States' decision to rethink its military strategy in Iraq and implement "the Surge," now recognized as a dramatic success. In Counterinsurgency, Kilcullen brings together his most salient writings on this vitally important topic. Here is a picture of modern warfare by someone who has had his boots on the ground in some of today's worst trouble spots-including Iraq and Afghanistan-and who has been studying counterinsurgency since 1985. Filled with down-to-earth, common-sense insights, this book is the definitive account of counterinsurgency, indispensable for all those interested in making sense of our world in an age of terror.


Cassandra in Oz

Cassandra in Oz

Author: Conrad Charles Crane

Publisher: Naval Institute Press

Published: 2016-09-15

Total Pages: 329

ISBN-13: 1682470202

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When Conrad Crane retired from active duty to become a research professor, he never expected to become a modern Cassandra, fated to tell truth to power without being heeded. After the world transformed on 9/11, he warned the Army that it was not prepared to execute stability operations, counterinsurgency, and the eventual reconstruction of Iraq. Crane’s work attracted the attention of Generals David Petraeus and James Mattis, and he soon found himself in charge of a team tasked with creating the groundbreaking Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency, the very counterinsurgency doctrine he had pleaded for. A unique blend of traditional and modern theory, this manual would prove to be essential to the success of the Surge in Iraq that changed the course of the war. Crane’s account of the creation and implementation of the manual addresses its many criticisms, details what went wrong in Iraq, and explains how the new doctrine was never properly applied in Afghanistan. From the debates over the content to the ways it was used in the field, Cassandra in Oz covers lessons that should be gleaned from years of global war and displays the American military as a learning organization at its best.