Penned by a recently-retired senior bureaucrat who is well versed in the administrative machinery of the Government of India and who possesses the ease and flair of a natural writer, these anecdotes of governmental corruption are at times so humourous that one forgets the gravity of the problem under discussion, while at other moments the magnitude of the problem is laid bare.
Comparativist scholarship conventionally gives unbridled primacy to external, material interests–chiefly votes and rents–as proximately shaping political behaviour. These logics tend to explicate elite decision-making around elections and pork barrel politics but fall short in explaining political conduct during credibility crises, such as democratic governments facing anti-corruption movements. In these instances, Baloch shows, elite ideas, for example concepts of the nation or technical diagnoses of socioeconomic development, dominate policymaking. Scholars leverage these arguments in the fields of international relations, American politics, and the political economy of development. But an account of ideas activating or constraining executive action in developing democracies, where material pressures are high, is found wanting. Resting on fresh archival research and over 120 original elite interviews, When Ideas Matter traces where ideas come from, how they are chosen, and when they are most salient for explaining political behaviour in India and similar contexts.
The malaise of corruption has become deeply embedded in the political and social fabric of the Indian society. The increased frequency and scale of corruption have had deleterious effects on a wide range of issues. Corruption, therefore, must be viewed not just as an issue of law and order or of the criminal justice system; instead it has larger and adverse implications for development initiatives, transparency in administration, economic growth, access to justice, and human rights. This important and timely work adopts a new approach for analysing corruption—corruption as a violation of human rights. Highlighting the inherent deficiencies in the existing institutions, mechanisms, laws, and law enforcement agencies, the book strongly proposes the adoption of a multi-pronged strategy for eliminating corruption. This includes the creation of a new legislative framework, an effective institutional mechanism, a new independent and empowered commission against corruption, and greater participation of the civil society. It also compares India's experiences of combating corruption with many societies in Asia including Singapore and Hong Kong.
As corruption continues to be a persistent problem in India, concerned citizens believe empowered police agencies independent of political control are effective ways to deal with corrupt officials and politicians. What is corruption and how is it facilitated? What are the appropriate agencies to combat corruption professionally in India? Why are these not effective in deterring corrupt practices? Are the alternative solutions to tackle corruption successful? This book seeks to engage with these questions, discuss and analyze them, and conduct a thorough analysis of law, bureaucratic organizations, official data, case studies and comparative international institutions. It analyzes vast data to argue that a corrupt state only maintains the façade of rule of law but will not permit any inquiry beyond that of individual deviance. Using criminological perspectives, it presents a novel mechanism, the 'Doctrine of Good Housekeeping', for public officials to combat and prevent corruption within their own institutions.
India is the only living ancient civilization which will soon be the most populous country in the World. Corruption remains India's biggest problem. In last about 72 years since India's independence, numerous laws and authorities have been created by India to deal with the menace of corruption. Even though several Chief Ministers, Ministers, Officials etc. are serving sentences of imprisonment in different prisons, the menace of corruption has not subsided. Since 2014 the India may have improved it's transparency rating but this does not change the ground realities of laws and enforcement authorities which are placed in a precarious flip flop course. This book starts with the historical aspects corruption in India and creation of various laws and Institutions and then proceeds to discuss various institutions created a watchdogs to reign in corruption. Thereafter it goes into actual problems of prosecution, conviction and sentencing etc. There is a special Chapter on the recently amended Money Laundering and Benami Laws which discusses both and analyses its provisions and implication on anti-corruption efforts in India. In the end the book deals with the politics around corruption which entangles in so any myriad way that it hinders eradication of corruption as also the problem of Elections which require huge funds which charts the cycle of corruption. In the last chapter there are few suggestions as well.
Crony Capitalism in India provides a comprehensive and scholarly examination of the important topic of crony capitalism, filling an important gap in the market. Bringing together experts from various backgrounds, it addresses the key underpinnings of this complex and multifarious issue. Given the emergent nature of the Indian economy, this book provides important information for decision makers in both government and business to help establish a robust institutional framework that is so desperately needed both in India and globally.
The book examines how corruption is viewed in theoretical and empirical literature and how various macro- and micro-level approaches have been followed to study the issue. It offers an inter-country comparison of corruption, indicating the role of governance in the context of growth. The volume attempts to work out the extent of understatement of personal income, resulting in the loss of government revenue from personal income tax. It also examines the impact of corruption on performance, and studies determinants of bribery in an attempt to understand why some firms pay bribes while others do not, despite being subject to the same macroeconomic environment, policy and regulations.
Why do some governments improve public services more effectively than others? Through the investigation of a new era of administrative reform, in which digital technologies may be used to facilitate citizens' access to the state, Jennifer Bussell's analysis provides unanticipated insights into this fundamental question. In contrast to factors such as economic development or electoral competition, this study highlights the importance of access to rents, which can dramatically shape the opportunities and threats of reform to political elites. Drawing on a sub-national analysis of twenty Indian states, a field experiment, statistical modeling, case studies, interviews of citizens, bureaucrats and politicians, and comparative data from South Africa and Brazil, Bussell shows that the extent to which politicians rely on income from petty and grand corruption is closely linked to variation in the timing, management and comprehensiveness of reforms.
