Noise-proof Equilibria in Signaling Games
Author: Hans Carlsson
Publisher:
Published: 1993
Total Pages: 60
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKRead and Download eBook Full
Author: Hans Carlsson
Publisher:
Published: 1993
Total Pages: 60
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: Bibliothèque centrale (Fonds Quetelet)
Publisher:
Published: 1993
Total Pages: 850
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: Joseph Greenberg
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Published: 1990-10-26
Total Pages: 204
ISBN-13: 9780521376891
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThis book, first published in 1991, offers an integrative approach to the study of formal models in the social and behavioural sciences. The theory presented here unifies both the representation of the social environment and the equilibrium concept. The theory requires that all alternatives that are available to the players be specified in an explicit and detailed manner, and this specification is defined as a social 'situation'. A situation, therefore, not only consists of the alternatives currently available to the players, but also includes the set of opportunities that might be induced by the players from their current environment. The theory requires that all recommended alternatives be both internally and externally stable; the recommendation cannot be self-defeating and, at the same time, should account for alternatives that were not recommended. In addition to unifying the representation and the solution concept, the theory also extends the social environments accommodated by current game theory.
Author: Annamaria Lusardi
Publisher:
Published: 1993
Total Pages: 68
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: Arij Lans BOVENBERG
Publisher:
Published: 1993
Total Pages: 72
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: Guido Imbens
Publisher:
Published: 1993
Total Pages: 62
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor:
Publisher:
Published: 1993
Total Pages: 618
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: Centre d'études de recherche operationnelle (Belgium)
Publisher:
Published: 1992
Total Pages: 580
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: Dionysius Glycopantis
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Published: 2005-12-28
Total Pages: 656
ISBN-13: 3540269797
DOWNLOAD EBOOKOne of the main problems in current economic theory is to write contracts which are Pareto optimal, incentive compatible, and also implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a dynamic, noncooperative game. The question arises whether it is possible to provide Walrasian type or cooperative equilibrium concepts which have these properties. This volume contains original contributions on noncooperative and cooperative equilibrium notions in economies with differential information and provides answers to the above questions. Moreover, issues of stability, learning and continuity of alternative equilibria are also examined.