Coping with Financial Fragility and Systemic Risk identifies and discusses the sources of perceived fragility in financial institutions and markets and its potential consequences throughout the economy. It then examines private sector solutions for dealing with systemic risk and mitigating the consequences. Finally, the book examines regulatory solutions to these problems.
Coping with Financial Fragility and Systemic Risk identifies and discusses the sources of perceived fragility in financial institutions and markets and its potential consequences throughout the economy. It then examines private sector solutions for dealing with systemic risk and mitigating the consequences. Finally, the book examines regulatory solutions to these problems.
Risks and uncertainties?market, financial, operational, social, humanitarian, environmental, and institutional?are the inherent realities of the modern world. Stock market crashes, demonetization of currency, and climate change constitute just a few examples that can adversely impact financial institutions across the globe. To mitigate these risks and avoid a financial crisis, a better understanding of how the economy responds to uncertainties is needed. Maintaining Financial Stability in Times of Risk and Uncertainty is an essential reference source that discusses how risks and uncertainties affect the financial stability and security of individuals and institutions, as well as probable solutions to mitigate risk and achieve financial resilience under uncertainty. Featuring research on topics such as financial fraud, insurance ombudsman, and Knightian uncertainty, this book is developed for researchers, academicians, policymakers, students, and scholars.
This paper reviews the literature on financial crises focusing on three specific aspects. First, what are the main factors explaining financial crises? Since many theories on the sources of financial crises highlight the importance of sharp fluctuations in asset and credit markets, the paper briefly reviews theoretical and empirical studies on developments in these markets around financial crises. Second, what are the major types of financial crises? The paper focuses on the main theoretical and empirical explanations of four types of financial crises—currency crises, sudden stops, debt crises, and banking crises—and presents a survey of the literature that attempts to identify these episodes. Third, what are the real and financial sector implications of crises? The paper briefly reviews the short- and medium-run implications of crises for the real economy and financial sector. It concludes with a summary of the main lessons from the literature and future research directions.
A framework for macroprudential regulation that defines systemic risk and macroprudential policy, describes macroprudential tools, and surveys the effectiveness of existing macroprudential regulation. The recent financial crisis has shattered all standard approaches to banking regulation. Regulators now recognize that banking regulation cannot be simply based on individual financial institutions' risks. Instead, systemic risk and macroprudential regulation have come to the forefront of the new regulatory paradigm. Yet our knowledge of these two core aspects of regulation is still limited and fragmented. This book offers a framework for understanding the reasons for the regulatory shift from a microprudential to a macroprudential approach to financial regulation. It defines systemic risk and macroprudential policy, cutting through the generalized confusion as to their meaning; contrasts macroprudential to microprudential approaches; discusses the interaction of macroprudential policy with macroeconomic policy (monetary policy in particular); and describes macroprudential tools and experiences with macroprudential regulation around the world. The book also considers the remaining challenges for establishing effective macroprudential policy and broader issues in regulatory reform. These include the optimal size and structure of the financial system, the multiplicity of regulatory bodies in the United States, the supervision of cross-border financial institutions, and the need for international cooperation on macroprudential policies.
A remarkable feature of the period since 1970 has been the patterns of rapid and turbulent change in financing behavior and financial structure in many advanced countries. This book explores, in theoretical and empirical terms, the nature of the relationships between the underlying phenomena--levels and changes in debt, vulnerability to default in the corporate and household sectors, and systematic risk in the financial sector. The book focuses on the generality of this phenomena--whether similar patterns are observable in certain countries, as well as in the international capital markets themselves. Emphasis is placed to the importance of the nature and evolution of financial structure to the genesis of instability. Given the international scope of the analysis, the work is germane to the study of the development of financial systems in all advanced countries, as well as the euromarkets.
Central Bank Policy: Theory and Practice analyses various policies, theories and practices adopted by central banks, as well as the institutional arrangements underlying the principles of good governance in policy-making. It is the first book to comprehensively discuss the latest theories and practices of central bank policy.
The potential failure of a large bank presents vexing questions for policymakers. It poses significant risks to other financial institutions, to the financial system as a whole, and possibly to the economic and social order. Because of such fears, policymakers in many countries—developed and less developed, democratic and autocratic—respond by protecting bank creditors from all or some of the losses they otherwise would face. Failing banks are labeled "too big to fail" (or TBTF). This important new book examines the issues surrounding TBTF, explaining why it is a problem and discussing ways of dealing with it more effectively. Gary Stern and Ron Feldman, officers with the Federal Reserve, warn that not enough has been done to reduce creditors' expectations of TBTF protection. Many of the existing pledges and policies meant to convince creditors that they will bear market losses when large banks fail are not credible, resulting in significant net costs to the economy. The authors recommend that policymakers enact a series of reforms to reduce expectations of bailouts when large banks fail.
