Author: Richard E. Killblane

Publisher:

Published: 2018-04-29

Total Pages: 403

ISBN-13: 9781980966401

This is the second edition of a superb report on convoy ambushes in the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars. Following the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, the US Army found itself fighting two wars without any established front lines again turning logistics convoys into combat operations. A new generation of young men and women, with little formal training in or preparation for these operations, battled daily with the enemy to get their cargo through. In doing so the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan saw the rebirth of gun trucks and convoy security doctrine that went beyond the lessons of the Vietnam War. Against an enemy that used the desert and mountains to their tactical advantage, convoy tactics, techniques and procedures quickly evolved to counter the most violent opposition encountered by US forces. Each ambush recounts in vivid detail incredible acts of heroism by both military and civilian truck drivers as they struggled to survive under harrowing conditions and knowing they would go back out on the road again the next day. The last chapter sums up lessons that have remained consistent through three wars and reveals valuable insights from units that either managed to avoid ambushes or defeated their ambushers. The study of both volumes will arm the reader for future conflicts and teach how to conduct convoy security in multiple combat environments. From the book: "Another problem that hindered development of any convoy security doctrine was that Americans saw the insurgency of the Vietnam War as an anomaly in history and incorrectly assumed that its wars would continue be broad front wars like World War II. Oddly, the broad front concept of war that began during World War I and ended with Desert Storm was the anomaly, and armies advancing into enemy territory bypassing enemy resistance had been the norm before and would be again in Iraq. Even the convoy ambushes during military operations in Somalia did not inspire anyone to develop convoy security doctrine. In fact support troops only fired the minimum 40 rounds per year on weapons qualification with no cross training in other weapons. They were not seen as needing any additional weapons training as a cost cutting measure. The death of four MPs due to a mine explosion did result in the development of the up-armored HMMWV M1114, but it was initially just issued to MPs and Cavalry units, or-not transportation units for convoy security. Surprisingly, the ambush of the 507th Maintenance Company in An Nasiriyah still did not inspire any changes. The last element of a 600-vehicle column, the 507th had missed its turn and drove into a town controlled by militia as the 3rd Infantry Division advanced to Baghdad. The ambush unfortunately was interpreted as an accident and not a precursor of things to come."