When recipients cannot absorb the aid and attention they are offered, the common response is “capacity building”—as if the source of the problem is the recipient’s implementation capacity. In this report, Robert D. Lamb and Kathryn Mixon present the results of their research on the sources of absorptive capacity. They find that this sort of “blaming the victim” mentality, while common, is not always justified. While it is true that many aid recipients do not have adequate capacity for implementation, it is equally true that many aid programs are designed and implemented without an adequate appreciation of local desires, resources, capabilities, and challenges. Absorptive capacity, in other words, is a byproduct of the donor-recipient relationship. The authors present a new framework for measuring absorptive capacity. This framework is intended to supplement existing planning, monitoring, and evaluation processes, offering a new way to test whether an existing approach is compatible with local conditions and a method for improving the fit.
Contents: (1) Background; (2) Managing Contractors during Contingency Contracting; (3) Number and Roles of Contractors in CENTCOM, in Iraq, in Afghanistan; (4) Efforts to Improve Contractor Management and Oversight; (5) Contractors in DoD Strategy and Doctrines: (a) Can Contractors Undermine U.S. Efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan?; (b) DoD Strategy and Doctrine: The National Defense Strategy and Quadrennial Defense Review; Field Manual on Operations; Field Manual on Counterinsurgency; New Doctrine, DoD Instructions, and Other Efforts; (6) Selected Congressional Hearings and Legislation; (7) Contract Management, Oversight, and Coordination: Training Contractors and the Military in Contingency Contracting. Illus.
Over the past decade, America's military and federal-civilian employees, as well as contractors, have performed vital and dangerous tasks in Iraq and Afghanistan. Contractors' support however, has been unnecessarily costly, and has been plagued by high levels of waste and fraud. The United States will not be able to conduct large or sustained contingency operations without heavy contractor support. Avoiding a repetition of the waste, fraud, and abuse seen in Iraq and Afghanistan requires either a great increase in agencies' ability to perform core tasks and to manage contracts effectively, or a disciplined reconsideration of plans and commitments that would require intense use of contractors. Failure by Congress and the Executive Branch to heed a decade's lessons on contingency contracting from Iraq and Afghanistan will not avert new contingencies. It will only ensure that additional billions of dollars of waste will occur and that U.S. objectives and standing in the world will suffer. Worse still, lives will be lost because of waste and mismanagement.