This edited volume covers the challenges currently faced by consumer law in Europe and the United States, ranging from fundamental theoretical questions, such as what goals consumer law should pursue, to practical questions raised by disclosure requirements, the General Data Protection Regulation and technology advancements. With governments around the world enacting powerful new regulations concerning consumers, consumer law has become an important topic in the economic analysis of law. Intended to protect consumers, these regulations typically seek to do so by giving them tools to make better decisions, or by limiting the consequences of their bad decisions. Legal scholars are divided, however, regarding the efficacy and effects of these regulations; some call for certain policies to be abolished, while others support a regulatory expansion.
Seduction by Contract explains how consumer contracts emerge from market forces and consumer psychology. Consumers' predictable mistakes - they are short-sighted, optimistic, and imperfectly rational - compel sellers to compete by hiding the true costs of products in complex, misleading contracts. Only better law can overcome the market's failure.
The Consumer Welfare Hypothesis in Law and Economics is a compelling account of market relations with firm roots in economic theory and legal practice. This incisive book challenges the mainstream view that allocative efficiency is about total welfare maximisation. Instead, it argues for the consumer welfare hypothesis, in which allocating resources efficiently means maximising consumer welfare, and demonstrates that legal structures such as antitrust and consumer law are in reality designed and practised with this goal in mind.
The assumption that competition law and consumer protection are mutually reinforcing is rarely challenged. The theory seems uncontroversial. However, because a positive interaction between the two is presumed to be self-evident, the frequent conflicts that do in fact arise are often dealt with on an ad hoc basis, with no overarching legal authority. There is a clear need for a detailed and coherent understanding of exactly where the complements and tensions between the two policy areas exist. Dr Cseres in-depth analysis provides that understanding. Proceeding from the dual perspective of law and economics that is, of justice, fairness, and reasonableness on the one hand, and of efficiency of the other she fully considers such underlying issues as the following: the role of competition law and consumer law in a free market economy;the notion of consumer welfare;the effect of the modernisation of EC competition law for consumers;economics theories of information, bounded rationality, and transaction costs;the special significance of vertical agreements and merger control; and,how consumers are affected by information asymmetries. The ultimate focus of the book is on current and emerging EC law, in which a rapprochement between the two areas seems to be under way. Dr. Cseres provides a knowledgeable guide to the various strands of theory, policy, and jurisprudence that (she shows) ought to be taken into account in the process, including schools of thought and law and policy experience in both Europe and the United States. A special chapter on Hungary, where post-1989 law and practice reveal a fresh and distinctly forward-looking understanding of the matter, is one of the book's most extraordinary features. Competition Law and Consumer Protection stands alone as a committed contribution to bridging a gap in legal knowledge the significance of which grows daily. It will be of immeasurable value to a wide range of professionals from academics and researchers to officials, policymakers, and practitioners in competition law, consumer protection advocacy, economic theory and planning, business administration, and various pertinent government authorities.
In the internet age, the need for effective consumer law enforcement has arguably never been greater. This timely book is a comparative law and economic analysis of the changing landscape of EU consumer law enforcement policy. EU member states are moving away from purely public or private law enforcement and now appear to be moving towards a more mixed approach, not least due to European legislation. This book reflects on the need for and creation of efficient enforcement designs. It examines the various economic factors according to which the efficiency of different enforcement mechanisms can be assessed. Hypothetical case scenarios within package travel and misleading advertising, dealing with substantial individual harm and trifling and widespread harm are used to illustrate various consumer law problems. Design suggestions on how to optimally mix enforcement mechanisms for these case scenarios are developed. The findings are then used as a benchmark to assess real life situations in countries with different enforcement traditions - the Netherlands, Sweden and England. The book is of value to both researchers and policy-makers working in the area of consumer protection.
It has long been thought that fairness in European Consumer Law would be achieved by relying on information as a remedy and expecting the average consumer to keep businesses in check by voting with their feet. This monograph argues that the way consumer law operates today promises a lot but does not deliver enough. It struggles to avoid harm being caused to consumers and it struggles to repair the harm after the event. To achieve fairness, solutions need to be found elsewhere. Consumer Theories of Harm offers an alternative model to assess where and how consumer detriment may occur and solutions to prevent it. It shows that a more confident use of economic theory will allow practitioners to demonstrate how a poor standard of professional diligence lies at the heart of consumer harm. The book provides both theoretical and practical examples of how to combine existing law with economic theory to improve case outcomes. The book shows how public enforcers can move beyond the dominant transparency paradigm to an approach where firms have a positive duty to treat consumers fairly and shape their commercial offers in a way that prevents consumers from making mistakes. Over time, this 'fairness-by-design' approach will emerge as the only acceptable way to compete.
Consumer Credit and the American Economy examines the economics, behavioral science, sociology, history, institutions, law, and regulation of consumer credit in the United States. After discussing the origins and various kinds of consumer credit available in today's marketplace, this book reviews at some length the long run growth of consumer credit to explore the widely held belief that somehow consumer credit has risen "too fast for too long." It then turns to demand and supply with chapters discussing neoclassical theories of demand, new behavioral economics, and evidence on production costs and why consumer credit might seem expensive compared to some other kinds of credit like government finance. This discussion includes review of the economics of risk management and funding sources, as well discussion of the economic theory of why some people might be limited in their credit search, the phenomenon of credit rationing. This examination includes review of issues of risk management through mathematical methods of borrower screening known as credit scoring and financial market sources of funding for offerings of consumer credit. The book then discusses technological change in credit granting. It examines how modern automated information systems called credit reporting agencies, or more popularly "credit bureaus," reduce the costs of information acquisition and permit greater credit availability at less cost. This discussion is followed by examination of the logical offspring of technology, the ubiquitous credit card that permits consumers access to both payments and credit services worldwide virtually instantly. After a chapter on institutions that have arisen to supply credit to individuals for whom mainstream credit is often unavailable, including "payday loans" and other small dollar sources of loans, discussion turns to legal structure and the regulation of consumer credit. There are separate chapters on the theories behind the two main thrusts of federal regulation to this point, fairness for all and financial disclosure. Following these chapters, there is another on state regulation that has long focused on marketplace access and pricing. Before a final concluding chapter, another chapter focuses on two noncredit marketplace products that are closely related to credit. The first of them, debt protection including credit insurance and other forms of credit protection, is economically a complement. The second product, consumer leasing, is a substitute for credit use in many situations, especially involving acquisition of automobiles. This chapter is followed by a full review of consumer bankruptcy, what happens in the worst of cases when consumers find themselves unable to repay their loans. Because of the importance of consumer credit in consumers' financial affairs, the intended audience includes anyone interested in these issues, not only specialists who spend much of their time focused on them. For this reason, the authors have carefully avoided academic jargon and the mathematics that is the modern language of economics. It also examines the psychological, sociological, historical, and especially legal traditions that go into fully understanding what has led to the demand for consumer credit and to what the markets and institutions that provide these products have become today.
This book explores current issues regarding the regulation of various economic sectors, theoretically and empirically, discussing both neoclassical and behavioural economics approaches to regulation. Regulation has become one of the main determinants of modern economies, and virtually every sector is subject to general laws and regulations as well as specific rules and standards. A traditional argument to justify regulatory interventions is the promotion of public interests. Fixing markets that lack competition, balancing information asymmetries, internalising externalities, mitigating systemic risks, and protecting consumers from irrational behaviour are frequently invoked to complement the invisible hand of the market with the visible hand of the state.However, regulations can lead to unintended consequences, and serve the interests of powerful private interest groups rather than the public interest and social welfare. In addition, new insights from behavioural economics question the traditional regulatory approaches, most prominently in attitudes towards consumers. Furthermore, digitalisation and technological innovation in general present new challenges in terms of both the type of regulation and the regulatory process.Part I of this book discusses various theoretical approaches to the economic analysis of regulations, while Part II looks at specific applications of the law and economics of regulation.
