"Based on a unique set of interviews and British and American documents, this book examines the motives for the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, examines the decision-making inside the Bush administration, and assesses the reasons for the chaotic, bloody, and costly occupation. The attack on America on 9/11 by al Qaeda terrorists transformed the thinking and actions of Bush and his top advisers. Bush conceived the administration's response. Fear, power, and hubris shaped his approach - fear of another attack; pride in American values; and confidence in America's ability to effectuate change. Worried about another attack on American soil - this time with biological or chemical weapons - Bush turned his attention to Iraq because of Saddam Hussein's history with weapons of mass destruction and because of his record of aggression, brutality, and duplicity. To achieve his goals, the American president embraced a strategy of coercive diplomacy. If Iraq faced a military threat, Bush hoped Hussein would open his country to inspections, relinquish his alleged weapons of mass destruction, flee, or be toppled. When Hussein admitted inspectors yet remained obstructive, Bush denounced the dictator's defiance and believed America's credibility was at stake. Without resolving the ambiguities and inconsistencies in his strategy of coercive diplomacy and failing to assess the consequences of an invasion or to plan effectively for its many contingencies, Bush ordered U.S. troops to invade Iraq. Friction and acrimony within the administration turned the occupation into a tragedy, the consequences of which we are still living with"--
In March 2003, the United States and Great Britain invaded Iraq to put an end to the regime of Saddam Hussein. The war was launched without a United Nations mandate and was based on the erroneous claim that Iraq had retained weapons of mass destruction. France, under President Jacques Chirac and Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin, spectacularly opposed the United States and British invasion, leading a global coalition against the war that also included Germany and Russia. The diplomatic crisis leading up to the war shook both French and American perceptions of each other and revealed cracks in the transatlantic relationship that had been building since the end of the Cold War. Based on exclusive French archival sources and numerous interviews with former officials in both France and the United States, A History of the Iraq Crisis retraces the international exchange that culminated in the 2003 Iraq conflict. It shows how and why the Iraq crisis led to a confrontation between two longtime allies unprecedented since the time of Charles de Gaulle, and it exposes the deep and ongoing divisions within Europe, the Atlantic alliance, and the international community as a whole. The Franco-American narrative offers a unique prism through which the American road to war can be better understood.
In The Cold War from the Margins, Theodora K. Dragostinova reappraises the global 1970s from the perspective of a small socialist state—Bulgaria—and its cultural engagements with the Balkans, the West, and the Third World. During this anxious decade, Bulgaria's communist leadership invested heavily in cultural diplomacy to bolster its legitimacy at home and promote its agendas abroad. Bulgarians traveled the world to open museum exhibitions, show films, perform music, and showcase the cultural heritage and future aspirations of their "ancient yet modern" country. As Dragostinova shows, these encounters transcended the Cold War's bloc mentality: Bulgaria's relations with Greece and Austria warmed, émigrés once considered enemies were embraced, and new cultural ties were forged with India, Mexico, and Nigeria. Pursuing contact with the West and solidarity with the Global South boosted Bulgaria's authoritarian regime by securing new allies and unifying its population. Complicating familiar narratives of both the 1970s and late socialism, The Cold War from the Margins places the history of socialism in an international context and recovers alternative models of global interconnectivity along East-South lines. Thanks to generous funding from The Ohio State University Libraries and its participation in TOME (Toward an Open Monograph Ecosystem), the ebook editions of this book are available as Open Access volumes from Cornell Open (cornellpress.cornell.edu/cornell-open) and other repositories.
One of BookPage's Best Books of 2020 “The detailed, nuanced, gripping account of that strange and complex journey offered in Robert Draper’s To Start a War: How the Bush Administration Took America Into Iraq is essential reading—now, especially now . . . Draper’s account [is] one for the ages . . . A must-read for all who care about presidential power.” —The Washington Post From the author of the New York Times bestseller Dead Certain comes the definitive, revelatory reckoning with arguably the most consequential decision in the history of American foreign policy--the decision to invade Iraq. Even now, after more than fifteen years, it is hard to see the invasion of Iraq through the cool, considered gaze of history. For too many people, the damage is still too palpable, and still unfolding. Most of the major players in that decision are still with us, and few of them are not haunted by it, in one way or another. Perhaps it's that combination, the passage of the years and the still unresolved trauma, that explains why so many protagonists opened up so fully for the first time to Robert Draper. Draper's prodigious reporting has yielded scores of consequential new revelations, from the important to the merely absurd. As a whole, the book paints a vivid and indelible picture of a decision-making process that was fatally compromised by a combination of post-9/11 fear and paranoia, rank naïveté, craven groupthink, and a set of actors with idées fixes who gamed the process relentlessly. Everything was believed; nothing was true. The intelligence failure was comprehensive. Draper's fair-mindedness and deep understanding of the principal actors suffuse his account, as does a storytelling genius that is close to sorcery. There are no cheap shots here, which makes the ultimate conclusion all the more damning. In the spirit of Barbara Tuchman's The Guns of August and Marc Bloch's Strange Defeat, To Start A War will stand as the definitive account of a collective process that arrived at evidence that would prove to be not just dubious but entirely false, driven by imagination rather than a quest for truth--evidence that was then used to justify a verdict that led to hundreds of thousands of deaths and a flood tide of chaos in the Middle East that shows no signs of ebbing.
Based on in-depth interviews with tribal Sheiks involved in the Awakening and their American military counterparts, Confronting al Qaeda is a study of decision-making processes and the political psychology of the Sunni Awakening in al Anbar. It traces the change in American military strategy that made the Awakening collaboration between the Sunni tribes and the U.S. forces possible. It explains how the evolution of the tribal leaders’ perspective and of the American military strategy led to defeat al Qaeda in al Anbar. The process of these changing mutual images is detailed as well as how the cooperation between groups led to further evolution of perceptions. Political and military realities urgently forced these perceptual and social identity shifts initially, but the process of cooperation and engagement accelerated these shifts through increasingly mutually beneficial cooperation and interaction during the battle with al Qaeda in Iraq.
"The United States is in the midst of a bruising debate about its role in the world. Not since the interwar era have Americans been so divided over the scope and nature of their engagement abroad. President Donald Trump's America First approach to foreign policy certainly amplified the controversy. His isolationist, unilateralist, protectionist, and anti-immigrant proclivities marked a sharp break with the brand of internationalism that the country had embraced since World War II. But Trump's election was a symptom as much as a cause of the nation's rethink of its approach to the world. Decades of war in the Middle East with little to show for it, rising inequality and the hollowing out of the nation's manufacturing sector, political paralysis over how to fix a dysfunctional immigration policy--these and other trends have been causing Americans to ask legitimate questions about whether U.S. grand strategy has been working to their benefit. Adding to the urgent and passionate nature of this conversation is China's rise and the threat it poses to the liberal international order that took shape during the era of the West's material and ideological dominance. Isolationism speaks directly to this unfolding debate over the future of the nation's engagement with the world. It does so primarily by looking back, by probing America's isolationist past. Although most Americans know little about it, the United States in fact has an impressive isolationist pedigree. In his Farewell Address of 1796, President George Washington set the young nation on a clear course: "It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world." The isolationist impulse embraced by Washington and the other Founders guided the nation for much of its history prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941"--
Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism gathers together decades of writing by Melvyn Leffler, one of the most respected historians of American foreign policy, to address important questions about U.S. national security policy from the end of World War I to the global war on terror. Why did the United States withdraw strategically from Europe after World War I and not after World War II? How did World War II reshape Americans’ understanding of their vital interests? What caused the United States to achieve victory in the long Cold War? To what extent did 9/11 transform U.S. national security policy? Is budgetary austerity a fundamental threat to U.S. national interests? Leffler’s wide-ranging essays explain how foreign policy evolved into national security policy. He stresses the competing priorities that forced policymakers to make agonizing trade-offs and illuminates the travails of the policymaking process itself. While assessing the course of U.S. national security policy, he also interrogates the evolution of his own scholarship. Over time, slowly and almost unconsciously, Leffler’s work has married elements of revisionism with realism to form a unique synthesis that uses threat perception as a lens to understand how and why policymakers reconcile the pressures emanating from external dangers and internal priorities. An account of the development of U.S. national security policy by one of its most influential thinkers, Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism includes a substantial new introduction from the author.
In the United States the Cold War shaped our political culture, our institutions, and our national priorities. Abroad, it influenced the destinies of people everywhere. It divided Europe, split Germany, and engulfed the Third World. It led to a feverish arms race and massive sales of military equipment to poor nations. For at least four decades it left the world in a chronic state of tension where a miscalculation could trigger nuclear holocaust. Documents, oral histories, and memoirs illuminating the goals, motives, and fears of contemporary U.S. officials were already widely circulated and studied during the Cold War, but in the 1970s a massive declassification of documents from the Army, Navy, Air Force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of Defense, and some intelligence agencies reinvigorated historical study of this war which became the definitive conflict of its time. While many historians used these records to explore specialized topics, Melvyn Leffler marshals in this book the considerable available evidence to offer an overall analysis of national security policy during the Truman years and a comprehensive history of that administration’s progressive embroilment in the Cold War. A Preponderance of Power won the 1992 Robert H. Ferrell Book Prize sponsored by The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR), the 1992 Herbert Hoover Book Award sponsored by The Herbert Hoover Presidential Library Association and the 1993 Bancroft Prize sponsored by the Friends of the Columbia Libraries. “Each generation, if it is lucky, is given a book that becomes standard for one of the turning-point eras in American history. The immediate post-1945 years certainly were such an era, and Leffler’s work is such a book. Having exhausted the U.S. records, taken the globe as his province, and exploited the perspective of Communism’s recent collapse, he has written the account from which others must move if they are to contribute to our further understanding of these origins of the cold war.” — Walter LaFeber, Noll Professor of History, Cornell University “This is a magnificent book. It transcends forty years of historical writing about the origins of the cold war and the evolution of the Truman administration’s policies. Scrupulously documented, it will inevitably become the intellectual fulcrum around which all discussions, arguments, and revisions of cold war historiography henceforth will turn.” — Martin J. Sherwin, Dickson Professor of History, Director of the Nuclear Age History and Humanities Center, Tufts University “This bold, persuasive book puts the self-conscious expansion of U.S. power where it belongs — at the center of cold war tensions. Leffler effectively establishes that the ‘wise men’ had a coherent world view, devised a grand strategy to satisfy it, and extended U.S. power abroad to meet threats they exaggerated. A gem of a book.” —Thomas G. Paterson, Professor of History, University of Connecticut “Leffler’s panoramic survey of global developments offers an important reassessment of American policy in the early cold war — one that sees American policy driven as much by an expansive definition of national security as by the threat of Soviet imperialism. As the cold war comes to an end, Leffler presents a fresh appraisal of its origins.” — Michael J. Hogan, Professor of History, Ohio State University, Editor, Diplomatic History “Magisterial... This book is without question a major achievement. It is a masterly work of synthesis, weaving together in a single coherent study the various and often contradictory trends in previous historical writing on the Cold War’s origins. It is indefatigably researched... and most important, it is an intellectually honest work... A fine book.” — The Atlantic “A brilliant new book... An invaluable contribution.” — The Nation “[A Preponderance of Power] remains today [November 2013] the (so-far) definitive history of US behavior in the Cold War” — Eric Alterman, The Nation “The best book to date on the Truman administration and the origins of the Cold War.” — Detroit Free Press “A Preponderance of Power will be of immense value to scholars interested in the grand strategy of the Truman administration. Leffler has combined a solid grasp of secondary material with a comprehensive and very carefully documented analysis of primary sources, including a vast array of previously classified documents. The result is not only a more complete record of U.S. policymakers’ thinking about national security but also a more nuanced and sophisticated reconstruction of their concerns and objectives” — Alan C. Lamborn, American Political Science Review “A monumental work, rich in information and insights.” — R.C. Grogin, Canadian Journal of History “This massive distillation of the perceptions and policy prescriptions of the national security establishment of the Truman years... is policy history based on years of exhaustive research in government archives and private papers... Leffler’s judgment on Truman’s men and their work is favorable: they were sometimes very wise, nearly always prudent... and foolish primarily in overvaluing the strategic importance of peripheral areas.” — Gaddis Smith, Foreign Affairs “A good, indeed excellent, narrative history, straightforward and chronological... As a comprehensive and well-documented narrative of the Truman administration’s response to historic challenges beyond our shores, this book will prove indispensable as an up-to-date guide to further research.” — George Botjer, History “Leffler’s magisterial history of U.S. security policy in the Truman administration... will be widely appealing to political scientists and others grappling with issues in U.S. postwar security and foreign economic policy... Leffler has achieved a powerful synthesis of competing explanations of U.S. Cold War policy and has strongly elucidated U.S. grand strategy... A Preponderance of Power is a highly ambitious, thoughtful, and important work of scholarship, indisputably the outstanding historical synthesis of U.S. foreign policy in the early Cold War era.” — Lynn Eden,International Security “A remarkable piece of work. The book’s sweep is encyclopedic: it covers both military and foreign policy for the entire period from 1945 to January 1953, and deals systematically with American policy in all the important areas of the world--eastern and western Europe, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and the Far East as well. The book is based on a vast amount of archival research...” — Marc Trachtenhexg, Orbis “What sets Leffler’s work apart from that of most of his predecessors is not only its comprehensive coverage of Cold War issues, its exhaustive — at least in American sources — research, and incisive prose, but also the effective integration of political, ideological, economic and strategic analysis.” — Stephen J. Randall, International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis “Massive, brilliant post-glasnost analysis of early cold-war realities... This study of how Truman dealt with a world sealed off to him by FDR is a book and a half.” — Kirkus “Offering a new slant on the early years of the Cold War, this major reassessment traces the development of national security policy during the Truman administration. Based on a rich vein of recently declassified material, Leffler’s majestic study describes how Harry Truman and his advisers sought to mobilize America’s power in order to deal with the dangers of the postwar world and create a global environment hospitable to U.S. interests and values.” — Publishers Weekly “In examining the formulation of policy during the Truman administration, Leffler concentrates on the small group of (now unfashionably elite, white, and male) individuals who exercised decision-making responsibility in the late 1940s and early 1950s... We get to know Leffler’s main characters—Harry Truman, Dean Acheson, Nitze, James Forrestal, John McCloy, and half a dozen others—very well. We learn how they saw the world and what they aimed to accomplish... Leffler’s book, [...] is by far the best on its subject.” — H. W. Brands, American Historical Review “Leffler’s timely book is the product of more than a dozen years of prodigious research and patient investigations into many recently available collections of documents. The result is a valuable assessment of prudent policymakers who formulated the blueprints for US Cold War strategies... Leffler’s interpretation will remain a standard resource for years to come.” — S. Prisco III, Choice Review
Few historians of the Vietnam War have covered the post-1975 era or engaged comprehensively with refugee politics, humanitarianism, and human rights as defining issues of the period. After Saigon's Fall is the first major work to uncover this history. Amanda C. Demmer offers a new account of the post-War normalization of US–Vietnam relations by centering three major transformations of the late twentieth century: the reassertion of the US Congress in American foreign policy; the Indochinese diaspora and changing domestic and international refugee norms; and the intertwining of humanitarianism and the human rights movement. By tracing these domestic, regional, and global phenomena, After Saigon's Fall captures the contingencies and contradictions inherent in US-Vietnamese normalization. Using previously untapped archives to recover a riveting narrative with both policymakers and nonstate advocates at its center, Demmer's book also reveals much about US politics and society in the last quarter of the twentieth century.
