The field of psychoanalytically oriented psychotherapy has tended to fragment into disparate theoretical orientations that often find little in common with each other, though each sheds light on important aspects of the psyche. This book addresses the question, how can these disparate orientations best be brought together in the service of interpretation? Starting from the conviction that treatment becomes more effective and comprehensive if as many aspects of the psyche as possible are addressed, Robert Hooberman proposes that character structure - an aspect of psychic functioning traditionally given short shrift in psychoanalytic discourse - can provide a framework in which multiple theoretical perspectives can have their say. Numerous case examples are used for illustration.
Part I. The Role of Consent: 1. Transatlantic perspectives: fundamental themes and debates Larry A. DiMatteo, Qi Zhou and Séverine Saintier 2. Competing theories of contract: an emerging consensus? Martin A. Hogg 3. Contracts, courts and the construction of consent Tom W. Joo 4. Are mortgage contracts promises? Curtis Bridgeman Part II. Normative Views of Contract: 5. Naturalistic contract Peter A. Alces 6. Contract in a networked world Roger Brownsword 7. Contract, transactions, and equity T.T. Arvind Part III. Contract Design and Good Faith: 8. Reasonability in contract design Nancy S. Kim 9. Managing change in uncertain times: relational view of good faith Zoe Ollerenshaw Part IV. Implied Terms and Interpretation: 10. Implied terms in English contract law Richard Austen-Baker 11. Contract interpretation: judicial rule, not party choice Juliet Kostritsky Part V. Policing Contracting Behavior: 12. The paradox of the French method of calculating the compensation of commercial agents and the importance of conceptualising the remedial scheme under Directive 86/653 Séverine Saintier 13. Unconscionability in American contract law Chuck Knapp 14. Unfair terms in comparative perspective: software contracts Jean Braucher 15. (D)CFR initiative and consumer unfair terms Mel Kenny Part VI. Misrepresentation, Breach and Remedies: 16. Remedies for misrepresentation: an integrated system David Capper 17. Re-examining damages for fraudulent misrepresentation James Devenney 18. Remedies for documentary breaches: English law and the CISG Djakhongir Saidov Part VII. Harmonizing Contract Law: 19. Harmonisation European contract law: default and mandatory rules Qi Zhou 20. Harmonization and its discontents: a critique of the transaction cost argument for a European contract law David Campbell and Roger Halson 21. Europeanisation of contract law and the proposed common European sales law Hector MacQueen 22. Harmonization of international sales law Larry A. DiMatteo.
In this book, Adrian Vermeule shows that any approach to legal interpretation rests on institutional and empirical premises about the capacities of judges and the systemic effects of their rulings. He argues that legal interpretation is above all an exercise in decisionmaking under severe empirical uncertainty.
Gustaf Aulen's classic work, 'Christus Victor', has long been a standard text on the atonement. Aulen applies history of ideas' methodology to historical theology in tracing the development of three views of the atonement. Aulen asserts that in traditional histories of the doctrine of the atonement only two views have usually been presented, the objective/Anselmian and the subjective/Aberlardian views. According to Aulen, however, there is another type of atonement doctrine in which Christ overcomes the hostile powers that hold humanity in subjection, at the same time that God in Christ reconciles the world to Himself. This view he calls the "classic" idea of the atonement. Because of its predominance in the New Testament, in patristic writings, and in the theology of Luther, Aulen holds that the classic type may be called the distinctively Christian idea of the atonement.
At the heart of constitutional interpretation is the struggle between, on the one hand, fidelity to founding meanings, and, on the other hand, creative interpretation to suit the context and needs of an evolving society. This book considers the recent growth of constitutional cases in Singapore in the last ten years. It examines the underpinnings of Singapore’s constitutional system, explores how Singapore courts have dealt with issues related to rights and power, and sets developments in Singapore in the wider context of new thinking and constitutional developments worldwide. It argues that Singapore is witnessing a shift in legal and political culture as both judges and citizens display an increasing willingness to engage with constitutional ideas and norms.
In an ideal world, the laws of Congress--known as federal statutes--would always be clearly worded and easily understood by the judges tasked with interpreting them. But many laws feature ambiguous or even contradictory wording. How, then, should judges divine their meaning? Should they stick only to the text? To what degree, if any, should they consult aids beyond the statutes themselves? Are the purposes of lawmakers in writing law relevant? Some judges, such as Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, believe courts should look to the language of the statute and virtually nothing else. Chief Judge Robert A. Katzmann of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit respectfully disagrees. In Judging Statutes, Katzmann, who is a trained political scientist as well as a judge, argues that our constitutional system charges Congress with enacting laws; therefore, how Congress makes its purposes known through both the laws themselves and reliable accompanying materials should be respected. He looks at how the American government works, including how laws come to be and how various agencies construe legislation. He then explains the judicial process of interpreting and applying these laws through the demonstration of two interpretative approaches, purposivism (focusing on the purpose of a law) and textualism (focusing solely on the text of the written law). Katzmann draws from his experience to show how this process plays out in the real world, and concludes with some suggestions to promote understanding between the courts and Congress. When courts interpret the laws of Congress, they should be mindful of how Congress actually functions, how lawmakers signal the meaning of statutes, and what those legislators expect of courts construing their laws. The legislative record behind a law is in truth part of its foundation, and therefore merits consideration.
