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Financial crises are traditionally analyzed as purely economic phenomena. The political economy of financial booms and busts remains both under-emphasized and limited to isolated episodes. This paper examines the political economy of financial policy during ten of the most infamous financial booms and busts since the 18th century, and presents consistent evidence of pro-cyclical regulatory policies by governments. Financial booms, and risk-taking during these episodes, were often amplified by political regulatory stimuli, credit subsidies, and an increasing light-touch approach to financial supervision. The regulatory backlash that ensues from financial crises can only be understood in the context of the deep political ramifications of these crises. Post-crisis regulations do not always survive the following boom. The interplay between politics and financial policy over these cycles deserves further attention. History suggests that politics can be the undoing of macro-prudential regulations.
The federal crop insurance program is considered by many farmers and policy makers as the centerpiece of the farm safety net. The program makes available subsidised insurance policies for about 130 commodities ranging from apples to wheat. These "multiple peril" policies help producers manage financial risks associated with crop yield or revenue losses. Insurable causes of losses include adverse weather (e.g., drought and flood), insects or disease outbreaks, and failure of irrigation water supply. The enacted 2014 farm bill enhances the federal crop insurance program by expanding its scope, covering a greater share of farm losses, and making a variety of other modifications that broaden policy coverage. This book describes in detail changes made to the program as part of the 2014 farm bill. It also discusses the agricultural disaster assistance.
"Brings the business planning process alive to help today's agriculture entrepreneurs transform farm-grown inspiration into profitable enterprises. Sample worksheets illustrate how real farm families set goals, research processing alternatives, determine potential markets, and evaluate financing options. Blank worksheets offer readers the opportunity to develop their own detailed, lender-ready business plan and map out strategies" --back cover.
Liquidity Coverage Ratio - Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards (US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Regulation) (FDIC) (2018 Edition) The Law Library presents the complete text of the Liquidity Coverage Ratio - Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards (US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Regulation) (FDIC) (2018 Edition). Updated as of May 29, 2018 The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board), and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) are adopting a final rule that implements a quantitative liquidity requirement consistent with the liquidity coverage ratio standard established by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The requirement is designed to promote the short-term resilience of the liquidity risk profile of large and internationally active banking organizations, thereby improving the banking sector's ability to absorb shocks arising from financial and economic stress, and to further improve the measurement and management of liquidity risk. The final rule establishes a quantitative minimum liquidity coverage ratio that requires a company subject to the rule to maintain an amount of high-quality liquid assets (the numerator of the ratio) that is no less than 100 percent of its total net cash outflows over a prospective 30 calendar-day period (the denominator of the ratio). The final rule applies to large and internationally active banking organizations, generally, bank holding companies, certain savings and loan holding companies, and depository institutions with $250 billion or more in total assets or $10 billion or more in on-balance sheet foreign exposure and to their consolidated subsidiaries that are depository institutions with $10 billion or more in total consolidated assets. The final rule focuses on these financial institutions because of their complexity, funding profiles, and potential risk to the financial system. Therefore, the agencies do not intend to apply the final rule to community banks. In addition, the Board is separately adopting a modified minimum liquidity coverage ratio requirement for bank holding companies and savings and loan holding companies without significant insurance or commercial operations that, in each case, have $50 billion or more in total consolidated assets but that are not internationally active. The final rule is effective January 1, 2015, with transition periods for compliance with the requirements of the rule. This book contains: - The complete text of the Liquidity Coverage Ratio - Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards (US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Regulation) (FDIC) (2018 Edition) - A table of contents with the page number of each section
Liquidity Coverage Ratio - Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards (US Comptroller of the Currency Regulation) (OCC) (2018 Edition) The Law Library presents the complete text of the Liquidity Coverage Ratio - Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards (US Comptroller of the Currency Regulation) (OCC) (2018 Edition). Updated as of May 29, 2018 The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board), and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) are adopting a final rule that implements a quantitative liquidity requirement consistent with the liquidity coverage ratio standard established by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The requirement is designed to promote the short-term resilience of the liquidity risk profile of large and internationally active banking organizations, thereby improving the banking sector's ability to absorb shocks arising from financial and economic stress, and to further improve the measurement and management of liquidity risk. The final rule establishes a quantitative minimum liquidity coverage ratio that requires a company subject to the rule to maintain an amount of high-quality liquid assets (the numerator of the ratio) that is no less than 100 percent of its total net cash outflows over a prospective 30 calendar-day period (the denominator of the ratio). The final rule applies to large and internationally active banking organizations, generally, bank holding companies, certain savings and loan holding companies, and depository institutions with $250 billion or more in total assets or $10 billion or more in on-balance sheet foreign exposure and to their consolidated subsidiaries that are depository institutions with $10 billion or more in total consolidated assets. The final rule focuses on these financial institutions because of their complexity, funding profiles, and potential risk to the financial system. Therefore, the agencies do not intend to apply the final rule to community banks. In addition, the Board is separately adopting a modified minimum liquidity coverage ratio requirement for bank holding companies and savings and loan holding companies without significant insurance or commercial operations that, in each case, have $50 billion or more in total consolidated assets but that are not internationally active. The final rule is effective January 1, 2015, with transition periods for compliance with the requirements of the rule. This book contains: - The complete text of the Liquidity Coverage Ratio - Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards (US Comptroller of the Currency Regulation) (OCC) (2018 Edition) - A table of contents with the page number of each section
