Center of Military History Publication 91 5 1. United States Army in Vietnam. Focuses on the first 18 months of combat in Vietnam. Describes how the United States Army entered the war and fought its first battles north of Saigon and in the Central Highlands.
Combat Operations: Stemming the Tide describes a critical chapter in the Vietnam conflict, the first eighteen months of combat by the U.S. Army's ground forces. Relying on official American and enemy primary sources, John M. Carland focuses on initial deployments and early combat and takes care to present a well-balanced picture by discussing not only the successes but also the difficulties endemic to the entire effort. This fine work presents the war in all of its detail: the enemy's strategy and tactics, General William C. Westmoreland's search and destroy operations, the helicopters and airmobile warfare, the immense firepower American forces could call upon to counter Communist control of the battlefield, the out-of-country enemy sanctuaries, and the allied efforts to win the allegiance of the South Vietnamese people to the nation's anti-Communist government. Carland's volume demonstrates that U.S. forces succeeded in achieving their initial goals, but unexpected manpower shortages made Westmoreland realize that the transition from stemming the tide to taking the offensive would take longer. Bruising battles with the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese in the Saigon area and in the Central Highlands had halted their drive to conquest in 1965 and, with major base development activities afoot, a series of high-tempo spoiling operations in 1966 kept them off balance until more U.S. fighting units arrived in the fall. Carland credits the improvements in communications and intelligence, the helicopter's capacity to extend the battlefield, and the availability of enormous firepower as the potent ingredients in Westmoreland's optimism for victory, yet realizes that the ultimate issue of how effective the U.S. Army would be and what it would accomplish during the next phase was very much a question mark.
Combat Operations: Stemming the Tide describes a critical chapter in the Vietnam conflict, the first eighteen months of combat by the U.S. Army's ground forces. Relying on official American and enemy primary sources, John M. Carland focuses on initial deployments and early combat and takes care to present a well-balanced picture by discussing not only the successes but also the difficulties endemic to the entire effort. This fine work presents the war in all of its detail: the enemy's strategy and tactics, General William C. Westmoreland's search and destroy operations, the helicopters and airmobile warfare, the immense firepower American forces could call upon to counter Communist control of the battlefield, the out-of-country enemy sanctuaries, and the allied efforts to win the allegiance of the South Vietnamese people to the nation's anti-Communist government. Carland's volume demonstrates that U.S. forces succeeded in achieving their initial goals, but unexpected manpower shortages made Westmoreland realize that the transition from stemming the tide to taking the offensive would take longer. Bruising battles with the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese in the Saigon area and in the Central Highlands had halted their drive to conquest in 1965 and, with major base development activities afoot, a series of high-tempo spoiling operations in 1966 kept them off balance until more U.S. fighting units arrived in the fall. Carland credits the improvements in communications and intelligence, the helicopter's capacity to extend the battlefield, and the availability of enormous firepower as the potent ingredients in Westmoreland's optimism for victory, yet realizes that the ultimate issue of how effective the U.S. Army would be and what it would accomplish during the next phase was very much a question mark.
Center of Military History Publication 91 5 1. United States Army in Vietnam. Focuses on the first 18 months of combat in Vietnam. Describes how the United States Army entered the war and fought its first battles north of Saigon and in the Central Highlands.
Staying the Course describes the twelve-month period when the Viet Cong and their North Vietnamese allies embarked on a new and more aggressive strategy that shook the foundations of the South Vietnamese state and forced the United States to reevaluate its military calculations in Southeast Asia.--Provided by publisher.
When a Communist-led insurgency supported by N. Vietnam threatened to overthrow the S. Vietnamese government in early 1965, the U.S. committed ground troops to hold the line. The decision to intervene represented an admission that 10 years of U.S. advice and support policy had failed. This book focuses on the first 18 months of combat in Vietnam. It describes how the U.S. Army entered the war and fought its first battles north of Saigon and in the Central Highlands. The results of these engagements convinced Gen. Westmoreland that he had stemmed the tide of the Communist offensive. In 1966 he altered tactics, taking the fight to the Viet Cong and N. Vietnamese in a series of high-tempo spoiling attacks throughout the country. Maps and photos.
NOTE: NO FURTHER DISCOUNT FOR THIS PRODUCT -- OVERSTOCK SALE - Significantly reduced list price This book tells the mostly forgotten story of the accelerating mental health problems that arose among the troops sent to fight in South Vietnam, especially the morale, discipline, and heroin crisis that ultimately characterized the second half of the war. This situation was unprecedented in U.S. military history and dangerous, and reflected the fact that during the war America underwent its most divisive period since the Civil War and, as a result, the war became bitterly controversial. The author is a career Army psychiatrist who led a psychiatric unit in Vietnam. In the years following his return, he was dismayed to discover that the Army had conducted no formal review of this alarming situation, including from the standpoint of military psychiatry, and had lost or destroyed all of the pertinent clinical records. In addition to permitting a study of the psychological wounds and their treatment in Vietnam, these records would have been priceless in the treatment of the legions of veterans who presented serious adjustment problems and Post-traumatic Stress Disorder. As a consequence, Dr Camp has been relentless in combing the professional, civilian, and surviving military literature--including unpublished documents--to construct a compelling narrative documenting the successes and failures of Army psychiatry and the Army leadership in Vietnam in responding to these psychiatric and behavioral challenges. The result is a book that is both scholarly and intensely personal, includes vivid case material and anecdotes from colleagues who also served there, and is replete with illustrations and correspondence. It presents the story of Vietnam in a fresh manner--through the psychiatrist's eyes, and sensibilities.