The Allied campaign for Northwest Europe as seen from a British and Canadian perspective A reinterpretation of the British Army's conduct in the crucial 1944-45 Northwest Europe campaign, this work examines the "Colossal Cracks" operational technique employed by Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery's Anglo-Canadian 21st Army Group. Rooted in concerns about morale and casualties, "Colossal Cracks" was a cautious, firepower-laden approach that involved the concentration of massive force at points of German weakness. Hart argues that Montgomery and his two senior subordinates handled this formation more effectively than some scholars have suggested and that "Colossal Cracks" represented the most appropriate weapon the British Army could develop under the circumstances.
A reinterpretation of the British Army's conduct in the crucial 1944-45 Northwest Europe campaign, this work examines systematically the Colossal Cracks operational technique employed by Montgomery's Anglo-Canadian 21st Army Group and demonstrates the key significance that morale and casualty concerns exerted on this technique. To ensure a full understanding of the campaign, one needs to look not only at Montgomery's methods but at those of his army commanders, Dempsey and Crerar; thus, this study addresses the scant attention to date paid to these two figures. Hart suggests that Montgomery and his two senior subordinates handled this formation more effectively than some scholars have suggested. In fact, Colossal Cracks, the concentration of massive force at a point of German weakness, represented the most appropriate weapon the 1944 British Army could develop under the circumstances. Previous studies have been characterized by an overemphasis on Montgomery's role in the campaign, rather than a systematic examination of overall British methods. They have ignored the difficulties that the 1944 British Army faced given its manpower shortage, and they have underestimated the appropriateness of Monty's methods to the campaign war aims that Britain pursued: namely, the desire that Britain's modest military forces secure a high profile within a larger Allied effort. The cautious, firepower-laden approach used by the 21st Army Group was both crude and a double-edged sword; however, despite these weaknesses, Colossal Cracks represented an appropriate technique given the nature of British war aims and the relative capabilities of the forces involved. It proved to be just enough to defeat the Germans and keep alive British hopes that her war aims might be achieved.
This user-friendly reference systematically covers the entire intellectual history of strategy and war, in all cultures and all times. Each culture has had its Machiavelli, its Sun Tzu; its own Mohammed-like or Napoleonic figure. This encyclopedia ranges across the world to provide entries on every significant military and strategic thinker in human history as well as a number of military cultures, covering Chinese, Western, Indian, Islamic, and other cultures. Each entry supplies a brief biography, a synopsis of the writer's theories, their success or failure, and their impact on other thinkers and military practitioners. The unique coverage allows readers to cross cultural barriers and gain access to sources in languages as diverse as Arabic and German, and to note key similarities and contrasts. The relative importance and contribution of each individual to intellectual progress is noted, as is the greater significance of specific schools of thought and debates.
Operation Market Garden – the Allied airborne invasion of German-occupied Holland in September 1944 – is one of the most famous and controversial Allied failures of the Second World War. Many books have been written on the subject seeking to explain the defeat. Historians have generally focused on the mistakes made by senior commanders as they organized the operation. The choice of landing zones has been criticized, as has the structure of the airlift plan. But little attention has been paid to the influence that combat doctrine and training had upon the relative performance of the forces involved. And it is this aspect that Aaron Bates emphasizes in this perceptive, closely argued and absorbing re-evaluation of the battle. As he describes each phase of the fighting he shows how German training, which gave their units a high degree of independence of action, better equipped them to cope with the confusion created by the surprise Allied attack. In contrast, the British forces were hampered by their rigid and centralized approach which made it more difficult for them to adapt to the chaotic situation. Aaron Bates’s thought-provoking study sheds fresh light on the course of the fighting around Arnhem and should lead to a deeper understanding of one of the most remarkable episodes in the final stage of the Second World War in western Europe.
The contributors here consider the multifarious aspects of the Anglo-American approach to war. All the contributors are concerned to base their work on the overall historical context. They explore the relationship between theory and practice in military operations.
This book is an innovative study of the Normandy campaign and the perceived failure of British forces there. It is essential reading for all students of military history and general readers with an interest in the subject.
In late 1943, the British army ordered the veteran 7th Armored, 51st (Highland), and 50th (Northumbrian) Divisions to return to the Great Britain to provide combat experienced troops for the invasion of northwest Europe. On D-Day, the 50th Division achieved nearly all of its objectives. By mid-June, however, the 50th held positions only a few miles beyond its final D-Day positions. The apparent failures of the veteran divisions in later operations led many senior leaders to believe that these divisions had become a liability. This thesis will evaluate the performance of the 50th Division in Normandy by first examining the period before the invasion to determine the 50th’s readiness for war, British army doctrine, and weapons. The 50th’s prior combat experiences and pre-invasion training will be analyzed to determine the effect that prior combat had on the division. Finally, this thesis will evaluate the performance of the 50th Division in specific combat engagements in Normandy.
This book examines the experience of two British Infantry Divisions, the 43rd (Wessex) and 53rd (Welsh), during the Overlord campaign in Northwest Europe. To understand the way the British fought during Operation Overlord, the book considers the political and military factors between 1918 and 1943 before addressing the major battles and many of the minor engagements and day-to-day experiences of the campaign. Through detailed exploration of unit war diaries and first-hand accounts, Louis Devine demonstrates how Montgomery's way of war translated to the divisions and their sub units. While previous literature has suggested that the British Army fought a cautious war in order to avoid the heavy casualties of the First World War, Devine challenges this concept by showing that the Overlord Campaign fought at sub-divisional levels was characterised by command pressure to achieve results quickly, hasty planning and a reliance on massive artillery and mortar contributions to compensate for deficiencies in anti-tank and armoured support. By following two British infantry divisions over a continuous period and focusing on soldiers' experience to offer a perspective 'from below', as well as challenging the consensus of a 'cautious' British campaign, this book provides a much-needed re-examination of the Overlord campaign which will be of great interest to students and scholars of the Second World War and modern military history in general.
Historian John Buckley offers a radical reappraisal of Great Britain’s fighting forces during World War Two, challenging the common belief that the British Army was no match for the forces of Hitler’s Germany. Following Britain’s military commanders and troops across the battlefields of Europe, from D-Day to VE-Day, from the Normandy beaches to Arnhem and the Rhine, and, ultimately, to the Baltic, Buckley’s provocative history demonstrates that the British Army was more than a match for the vaunted Nazi war machine. This fascinating revisionist study of the campaign to liberate Northern Europe in the war’s final years features a large cast of colorful unknowns and grand historical personages alike, including Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery and the prime minister, Sir Winston Churchill. By integrating detailed military history with personal accounts, it evokes the vivid reality of men at war while putting long-held misconceptions finally to rest.
