This book provides an in-depth study of coalition governmentexperiments in India, with particular reference to the coalition politics at theCentre as well as in the states of Kerala and West Bengal.
Divided We Govern investigates the rise and fall of the broader parliamentary left in modern Indian democracy, and the dynamics of national coalition governments. Since the 1970s, socialist, communist and regional parties in India have sought to forge a progressive 'third force'. Most scholars typically dismiss its principal manifestations -- the Janata Party, National Front and United Front -- as inherently opportunistic coalitions of power-seeking politicians. Sanjay Ruparelia provides a fine-grained analytic narrative to challenge this prevailing wisdom. Employing a variety of methods and resources, including the rare confidential testimonies of key political actors, Ruparelia demonstrates how the politics of each governing coalition, despite their self-evident flaws and short-lived tenures, revealed the outlines of a distinctive national vision. His fresh analysis of the politics of coalition in India also yields wider theoretical insights. Most studies fail to question or explain how these multiparty governments actually functioned. Hence they overstate the stability of and polarity between multiple political motivations, Ruparelia contends, discounting internal party debates over whether to share power, with whom and to what extent, and how. In such circumstances, the strategies, tactics and choices of actors become especially significant. The pursuit of power in a highly regionalized federal parliamentary democracy such as India creates incentives to forge national coalition governments, yet paradoxically decreases their chances of surviving. Ultimately, the failure of socialists and communists to judge their real historical possibilities at key junctures led to the decline of the broader Indian left.
This new collection examines the emergence of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India and the ways in which its Hindu nationalist agenda has been affected by the constraints of being a dominant member of a coalition government. Religious influence in contemporary politics offers a fertile ground for political-sociological analysis, especially in societies where religion is a very important source of collective identity. In South Asian societies religion can, and often has, provided legitimacy to both governments and those who oppose them. This book examines the emergence of the BJP and the ways in which its Hindu nationalist agenda has been affected by the constraints of being a dominant member of a coalition government. The collected authors take stock of the party's first full term in power, presiding over the diverse forces of the governing NDA coalition, and the 2004 elections. They assess the BJP's performance in relation to its stated goals, and more specifically how it has fared in a range of policy fields - centre-state relations, foreign policy, defence policies, the 'second generation' of economic reforms, initiatives to curb corruption and the fate of minorities. Explicitly linking the volume to literature on coalition politics, this book will be of great importance to students and researchers in the fields of South Asian studies and politics.
'This starkly lucid and timely book absorbs the nuances of the largest festival – the elections – of the world's largest democracy. Hailing from a political family, the author conveys his passion and knowledge on the intricacies, as well as the heat and dust of his national fête. All data and events have been methodically examined in this absorbing analytical work which is an indispensable and scholarly book on the Indian elections.'– Thankom Arun, Professor at the University of Essex, UK This book provides a quantitative analysis of eight elections and an insight into voting patterns, detailing the election result for each candidate, for all the constituencies, in every Lok Sabha (the lower house of India's Bicameral-Parliament) general election from 1962 to 2014. The central purpose of this interrogation of data is to give shape to the notion of 'electoral efficiency', or the capacity of a party to convert votes into parliamentary seats. Parliamentary elections in India – and also elections to its state assemblies – are conducted under the First Past the Post (FPTP) system whereby a single representative for each of the 543 constituencies is elected as a Member of the Lok Sabha, on the basis of obtaining the largest number of all the candidates contesting that constituency. In brief, Votes, Parties, and Seats provides an in-depth study of the results of parliamentary general elections in India, and sheds light on why some parties are more efficient than others.
India is in an era of coalition politics in which state politics plays a major role. This compact book breaks new ground in empirical discoveries about the basis of stable coalitions in Indian states, and also theorizes the viability of multiparty coalition governments at the national level in comparative perspective, and examines the dynamics of competition and coalition formation. It consists of chapters on national-level coalitions and on states that have had significant experience of coalition politics--West Bengal, Kerala, Punjab, Maharashtra, and Bihar. All of the writings are based on extensive data collection and interview-based fieldwork with political actors. The key findings are summarized and discuss how there is a clear pattern across states to the stability of coalitions at the state level over time, and consists of two central factors--stable pre-electoral seat-sharing and portfolio-sharing arrangements.
Coalition Politics and Economic Development challenges the conventional wisdom that coalition government hinders necessary policy reform in developing countries. Irfan Nooruddin presents a fresh theory that institutionalized gridlock, by reducing policy volatility and stabilizing investor expectations, is actually good for economic growth. Successful national economic performance, he argues, is the consequence of having the right configuration of national political institutions. Countries in which leaders must compromise to form policy are better able to commit credibly to investors and therefore enjoy higher and more stable rates of economic development. Quantitative analysis of business surveys and national economic data together with historical case studies of five countries provide evidence for these claims. This is an original analysis of the relationship between political institutions and national economic performance in the developing world and will appeal to scholars and advanced students of political economy, economic development and comparative politics.
"This volume is a history of the growth and evolution of coalition governments in India both at the national and provincial levels. The phenomenon of political parties of diverse ideologies and affirmations coming together to share power has been highlighted as a prominent feature of Indian politics in the last few decades." "The study argues that contrary to popular explanations, coalitions have always been an inevitable necessity of Indian politics. Even in the era of apparent one-party dominance, not only was the Congress party a social as well as an ideological coalition, even the cabinet government in the initial post-independence years was constituted on coalition principles. It claims that rather than being seen as inherently unstable formations, coalitions may be the need in a socio-culturally diverse country like India, strengthening the democratic impulse, representing otherwise marginalized groups."--BOOK JACKET.
Today, regional parties in India win nearly as many votes as national parties. In Why Regional Parties?, Professor Adam Ziegfeld questions the conventional wisdom that regional parties in India are electorally successful because they harness popular grievances and benefit from strong regional identities. He draws on a wide range of quantitative and qualitative evidence from over eighteen months of field research to demonstrate that regional parties are, in actuality, successful because they represent expedient options for office-seeking politicians. By focusing on clientelism, coalition government, and state-level factional alignments, Ziegfeld explains why politicians in India find membership in a regional party appealing. He therefore accounts for the remarkable success of India's regional parties and, in doing so, outlines how party systems take root and evolve in democracies where patronage, vote buying, and machine politics are common.