This volume examines Lebanon’s post-2011 security dilemmas and the tenuous civil-military relations. The Syrian civil war has strained the Lebanese Armed Forces’ (LAF) cohesion and threatens its neutrality – its most valued assets in a divided society. The spill-over from the Syrian civil war and Hezbollah’s military engagement has magnified the security challenges facing the Army, making it a target. Massive foreign grants have sought to strengthen its military capability, stabilize the country and contain the Syria crisis. However, as this volume demonstrates, the real weakness of the LAF is not its lack of sophisticated armoury, but the fragile civil–military relations that compromise its fighting power, cripple its neutrality and expose it to accusations of partisanship and political bias. This testifies to both the importance of and the challenges facing multi-confessional armies in deeply divided countries.
This book addresses the challenge of reforming defense and military policy-making in newly democratized nations. By tracing the development of civil-military relations in various new democracies from a comparative perspective, it links two bodies of scholarship that thus far have remained largely separate: the study of emerging (or failed) civilian control over armed forces on the one hand; and work on the roots and causes of military effectiveness to guarantee the protection and security of citizens on the other. The empirical and theoretical findings presented here will appeal to scholars of civil-military relations, democratization and security issues, as well as to defense policy-makers.
The Arab Uprisings have brought renewed attention to the role of the military in the MENA region, where they are either the backbone of regime power or a crucial part of patronage networks in political systems. This collection of essays from international experts examines the economic interests of armed actors ranging from military businesses in Egypt, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Jordan, Sudan, and Yemen to retired military officers’ economic endeavors and the web of funding of non-state armed groups in Syria and Libya. Due to the combined power of business and arms, the military often manages to incorporate or quell competing groups and thus, to revert achievements of revolutionary movements.
How do civilians control the military? In the wake of September 11, the renewed presence of national security in everyday life has made this question all the more pressing. In this book, Peter Feaver proposes an ambitious new theory that treats civil-military relations as a principal-agent relationship, with the civilian executive monitoring the actions of military agents, the armed servants of the nation-state. Military obedience is not automatic but depends on strategic calculations of whether civilians will catch and punish misbehavior. This model challenges Samuel Huntington's professionalism-based model of civil-military relations, and provides an innovative way of making sense of the U.S. Cold War and post-Cold War experience--especially the distinctively stormy civil-military relations of the Clinton era. In the decade after the Cold War ended, civilians and the military had a variety of run-ins over whether and how to use military force. These episodes, as interpreted by agency theory, contradict the conventional wisdom that civil-military relations matter only if there is risk of a coup. On the contrary, military professionalism does not by itself ensure unchallenged civilian authority. As Feaver argues, agency theory offers the best foundation for thinking about relations between military and civilian leaders, now and in the future.
Find out about the 1958 U.S. intervention that succeeded and apply those lessons to today's conflicts in the Middle East In July 1958, U.S. Marines stormed the beach in Beirut, Lebanon, ready for combat. They were greeted by vendors and sunbathers. Fortunately, the rest of their mission—helping to end Lebanon's first civil war—went nearly as smoothly and successfully, thanks in large part to the skillful work of American diplomats who helped arrange a compromise solution. Future American interventions in the region would not work out quite as well. Bruce Riedel's new book tells the now-forgotten story (forgotten, that is, in the United States) of the first U.S. combat operation in the Middle East. President Eisenhower sent the Marines in the wake of a bloody coup in Iraq, a seismic event that altered politics not only of that country but eventually of the entire region. Eisenhower feared that the coup, along with other conspiracies and events that seemed mysterious back in Washington, threatened American interests in the Middle East. His action, and those of others, were driven in large part by a cast of fascinating characters whose espionage and covert actions could be grist for a movie. Although Eisenhower's intervention in Lebanon was unique, certainly in its relatively benign outcome, it does hold important lessons for today's policymakers as they seek to deal with the always unexpected challenges in the Middle East. Veteran analyst Bruce Reidel describes the scene as it emerged six decades ago, and he suggests that some of the lessons learned then are still valid today. A key lesson? Not to rush to judgment when surprised by the unexpected. And don't assume the worst.
This book examines military operations other than war (MOOTW) of the Indonesian military in the post-Suharto period and argues that the twin development of democratic consolidation, marked by ‘stable’ civil–military relations from 2004 to 2014 under Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s presidency, and internationalization of the military have not yet entirely de-politicized the armed forces. This book shows how peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and counter-terror missions have been reinvented by the Indonesian military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI) to adhere to its politico-institutional interests rather than to divert military attention from politics. In contrast with conventional arguments about the rationale of MOOTW in promoting military professionalism, this book provides the first critical analysis of the development of these missions and correlates them with TNI’s concerted effort to preserve territorial command structure – a military network that parallels the civilian bureaucracy down to the village level. The book argues that the military in Indonesia remains domestically political amidst high intensity of international activism. A detailed investigation of civil–military relations in Indonesia, this book will be of interest to scholars in the fields of Southeast Asian studies and Asian politics, and more generally to those interested in civil–military relations, military politics, and MOOTW.
The response of an autocratic nation's armed forces is crucial to the outcome of democratization movements throughout the world. But what exact internal conditions have led to real-world democratic transitions, and have external forces helped or hurt? Here, experts with military and policy backgrounds, some of whom have played a role in democratic transitions, present instructive case studies of democratic movements. Focusing on the specific domestic context and the many influences that have contributed to successful transitions, the authors write about democratic civil-military relations in fourteen countries and five world regions. The cases include Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, Egypt, Hungary, Indonesia, Lebanon, Nigeria, Philippines, Senegal, South Africa, Spain, Syria, and Thailand, augmented by regional overviews of Asia, Europe, Latin America, North Africa and the Middle East, and sub-Saharan Africa. Contributors: Richard Akum (Council for the Development of Social Sciences in Africa), Ecoma Alaga (African Security Sector Network), Muthiah Alagappa (Institute of Security and International Studies, Malaysia), Suchit Bunbongkarn (Institute of Security and International Studies, Thailand), Juan Emilio Cheyre (Center for International Studies, Catholic University of Chile), Biram Diop (Partners for Democratic Change--African Institute for Security Sector Transformation, Dakar), Raymundo B. Ferrer (Nickel Asia Corporation), Humberto Corado Figueroa (Ministry of Defense, El Salvador), Vilmos Hamikus (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hungary), Julio Hang (Argentine Council for International Relations), Marton Harsanyi (Stockholm University), Carolina G. Hernandez (University of the Philippines; Institute for Strategic and Development Studies), Raymond Maalouf (Defense expert, Lebanon), Tannous Mouawad (Middle East Studies, Lebanon), Matthew Rhodes (George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies), Martin Rupiya (African Public Policy and Research Institute), Juan C. Salgado Brocal (Academic and Consultant Council for Military Research and Studies, Chile), Narcis Serra (Barcelona Institute of International Studies), Rizal Sukma (Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta).
The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations not only fills this important lacuna, but offers an up-to-date comparative analysis which identifies three essential components in civil-military relations: (1) democratic civilian control; (2) operational effectiveness; and (3) the efficiency of the security institutions. This Handbook will be essential reading for students and practitioners in the fields of civil-military relations.
President Camille Chamoun of Lebanon made an urgent plea on 14 July 1958 to the governments of France, Great Britain, and the United States to deploy military forces to Lebanon. Received in Washington at 0600 on 14 July, this message became the first test of the Eisenhower Doctrine, which had been announced in January 1957. The JCS activated a Specified Command, Middle East (SPECOMME), and designated Adm. James L. Holloway, Commander in Chief, North Atlantic and Mediterranean, as the Commander in Chief, SPECOMME (CINCSPECOMME). According to a JCS memorandum, These actions marked the beginning of operation 'Blue Bat, ' the first United States airborne-amphibious operation to occur in peacetime. Contents: Doctrine, Planning, Background, Problems, Deployment, Organization, Resupply, Procurement, Civil affairs, Medical support, Security, Plans, Task force 201, On-hand supplies, 31 August 1958.
