Characterization, Existence, and Pareto Optimality in Markets with Asymmetric Information and Endogenous and Asymmetric Disclosures
Characterization, Existence, and Pareto Optimality in Markets with Asymmetric Information and Endogenous and Asymmetric Disclosures

Author: Joseph E. Stiglitz

Publisher:

Published: 2019

Total Pages: 40

ISBN-13:

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We study the Rothschild-Stiglitz model of insurance markets, introducing endogenous information disclosure about insurance sales and purchases by firms and consumers. We show that a competitive equilibrium exists under unusually mild conditions, and characterize the unique equilibrium outcome. With two types of consumers the outcome is particularly simple, consisting of a pooling contract which maximizes the well-being of the low risk individual (along the zero profit pooling line) plus a supplemental (undisclosed and nonexclusive) contract that brings the high risk individual to full insurance (at his own odds). We show that this outcome is extremely robust and constrained Pareto efficient. Asymmetric equilibrium information flows with endogenous consumer disclosure are critical in supporting the equilibrium.

Characterization, Existence, and Pareto Optimality in Insurance Markets with Asymmetric Information with Endogenous and Asymmetric Disclosures
Characterization, Existence, and Pareto Optimality in Insurance Markets with Asymmetric Information with Endogenous and Asymmetric Disclosures

Author: Joseph E. Stiglitz

Publisher:

Published: 2018

Total Pages: 0

ISBN-13:

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We study the Rothschild-Stiglitz model of competitive insurance markets with endogenous information disclosure by both firms and consumers. We show that an equilibrium always exists, (even without the single crossing property), and characterize the unique equilibrium allocation. With two types of consumers the outcome is particularly simple, consisting of a pooling allocation which maximizes the well-being of the low risk individual (along the zero profit pooling line) plus a supplemental (undisclosed and nonexclusive) contract that brings the high risk individual to full insurance (at his own odds). We show that this outcome is extremely robust and Pareto efficient.

Public Finance
Public Finance

Author: Richard W. Tresch

Publisher: Academic Press

Published: 2022-01-07

Total Pages: 568

ISBN-13: 0323984150

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Public Finance: A Normative Theory, Fourth Edition provides a classic text on the normative theory of government policy. This valuable and accessible resource covers the welfare aspects of public economics, with considerable coverage of European examples. The work presents detailed and comprehensive coverage of theoretical literature, empirical work, environmental issues, social insurance, behavioral economics and international tax issues. The book is organized logically, written in an engaging manner, and is both sufficiently rigid for use by those with PhDs in math and accessible to students less well trained in math. - Provides a logical progression from normative theory to concise mathematical applications - Covers European examples, welfare economics and tax law updates - Includes pedagogical supplements such as end-of-chapter questions and answers

Market Liquidity
Market Liquidity

Author: Thierry Foucault

Publisher: Oxford University Press

Published: 2023

Total Pages: 531

ISBN-13: 0197542069

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"The process by which securities are traded is very different from the idealized picture of a frictionless and self-equilibrating market offered by the typical finance textbook. This book offers a more accurate and authoritative take on this process. The book starts from the assumption that not everyone is present at all times simultaneously on the market, and that participants have quite diverse information about the security's fundamentals. As a result, the order flow is a complex mix of information and noise, and a consensus price only emerges gradually over time as the trading process evolves and the participants interpret the actions of other traders. Thus, a security's actual transaction price may deviate from its fundamental value, as it would be assessed by a fully informed set of investors. The book takes these deviations seriously, and explains why and how they emerge in the trading process and are eventually eliminated. The authors draw on a vast body of theoretical insights and empirical findings on security price formation that have come to form a well-defined field within financial economics known as "market microstructure." Focusing on liquidity and price discovery, the book analyzes the tension between the two, pointing out that when price-relevant information reaches the market through trading pressure rather than through a public announcement, liquidity may suffer. It also confronts many striking phenomena in securities markets and uses the analytical tools and empirical methods of market microstructure to understand them. These include issues such as why liquidity changes over time and differs across securities, why large trades move prices up or down, and why these price changes are subsequently reversed, and why we observe temporary deviations from asset fair values"--

Information and Learning in Markets
Information and Learning in Markets

Author: Xavier Vives

Publisher: Princeton University Press

Published: 2010-01-25

Total Pages: 422

ISBN-13: 140082950X

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The ways financial analysts, traders, and other specialists use information and learn from each other are of fundamental importance to understanding how markets work and prices are set. This graduate-level textbook analyzes how markets aggregate information and examines the impacts of specific market arrangements--or microstructure--on the aggregation process and overall performance of financial markets. Xavier Vives bridges the gap between the two primary views of markets--informational efficiency and herding--and uses a coherent game-theoretic framework to bring together the latest results from the rational expectations and herding literatures. Vives emphasizes the consequences of market interaction and social learning for informational and economic efficiency. He looks closely at information aggregation mechanisms, progressing from simple to complex environments: from static to dynamic models; from competitive to strategic agents; and from simple market strategies such as noncontingent orders or quantities to complex ones like price contingent orders or demand schedules. Vives finds that contending theories like informational efficiency and herding build on the same principles of Bayesian decision making and that "irrational" agents are not needed to explain herding behavior, booms, and crashes. As this book shows, the microstructure of a market is the crucial factor in the informational efficiency of prices. Provides the most complete analysis of the ways markets aggregate information Bridges the gap between the rational expectations and herding literatures Includes exercises with solutions Serves both as a graduate textbook and a resource for researchers, including financial analysts

Putting Auction Theory to Work
Putting Auction Theory to Work

Author: Paul Milgrom

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Published: 2004-01-12

Total Pages: 378

ISBN-13: 1139449168

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This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.

The Theory of Incentives
The Theory of Incentives

Author: Jean-Jacques Laffont

Publisher: Princeton University Press

Published: 2009-12-27

Total Pages: 436

ISBN-13: 1400829453

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Economics has much to do with incentives--not least, incentives to work hard, to produce quality products, to study, to invest, and to save. Although Adam Smith amply confirmed this more than two hundred years ago in his analysis of sharecropping contracts, only in recent decades has a theory begun to emerge to place the topic at the heart of economic thinking. In this book, Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort present the most thorough yet accessible introduction to incentives theory to date. Central to this theory is a simple question as pivotal to modern-day management as it is to economics research: What makes people act in a particular way in an economic or business situation? In seeking an answer, the authors provide the methodological tools to design institutions that can ensure good incentives for economic agents. This book focuses on the principal-agent model, the "simple" situation where a principal, or company, delegates a task to a single agent through a contract--the essence of management and contract theory. How does the owner or manager of a firm align the objectives of its various members to maximize profits? Following a brief historical overview showing how the problem of incentives has come to the fore in the past two centuries, the authors devote the bulk of their work to exploring principal-agent models and various extensions thereof in light of three types of information problems: adverse selection, moral hazard, and non-verifiability. Offering an unprecedented look at a subject vital to industrial organization, labor economics, and behavioral economics, this book is set to become the definitive resource for students, researchers, and others who might find themselves pondering what contracts, and the incentives they embody, are really all about.

Theories of Liquidity
Theories of Liquidity

Author: Dimitri Vayanos

Publisher: Now Pub

Published: 2012-10

Total Pages: 112

ISBN-13: 9781601985989

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Theories of Liquidity surveys the theoretical literature on market liquidity focusing on six main imperfections studied in that literature: participation costs, transaction costs, asymmetric information, imperfect competition, funding constraints, and search. The authors address three basic questions in the context of each imperfection: (a) how to measure illiquidity, i.e., the lack of liquidity, (b) how illiquidity relates to underlying market imperfections and other asset characteristics, and (c) how illiquidity affects expected asset returns. The theoretical literature on market liquidity often employs different modeling assumptions when studying different imperfections. Instead of surveying this literature in a descriptive manner, Theories of Liquidity uses a common, unified model to study all six imperfections that are considered, and for each imperfection addresses the three basic questions within that model. The model generates many of the key results shown in the literature. It also serves as a point of reference for surveying other results derived in different or more complicated settings, and for describing fruitful areas for future research.This survey is related to both market microstructure and asset pricing. It emphasizes fundamental market imperfections covered in the market microstructure literature, and examines how these relate to empirical measures of illiquidity used in that literature. It also examines how market imperfections affect expected asset returns - an asset-pricing exercise - and, in that sense, connects the two areas of research.