Warfare, State and Society in the Byzantine World is the first comprehensive study of warfare and the Byzantine world from the sixth to the twelfth century. The book examines Byzantine attitudes to warfare, the effects of war on society and culture, and the relations between the soldiers, their leaders and society. The communications, logistics, resources and manpower capabilities of the Byzantine Empire are explored to set warfare in its geographical as well as historical context. In addition to the strategic and tactical evolution of the army, this book analyses the army in campaign and in battle, and its attitudes to violence in the context of the Byzantine Orthodox Church. The Byzantine Empire has an enduring fascination for all those who study it, and Warfare, State and Society is a colourful study of the central importance of warfare within it.
Warfare was an integral part of the operations of the medieval eastern Roman, or Byzantine, Empire, both in its organization, as well as in social thinking and political ideology. This volume presents a selection of articles dealing with key aspects of Byzantine attitudes to war and violence, with military administration and organization at tactical and strategic levels, weapons and armaments and war-making itself; discussions which make an important contribution to answering the questions of how and why the empire survived as long as it did.
Warfare was an integral part of the operations of the medieval eastern Roman, or Byzantine, Empire, both in its organization, as well as in social thinking and political ideology. This volume presents a selection of articles dealing with key aspects of Byzantine attitudes to war and violence, with military administration and organization at tactical and strategic levels, weapons and armaments and war-making itself; discussions which make an important contribution to answering the questions of how and why the empire survived as long as it did.
By the middle of the sixth century the Byzantine emperor ruled a mighty empire that straddled Europe, Asia and North Africa. Within 100 years, this powerful empire had been cut in half. Two centuries later the Byzantine empire was once again a power to be reckoned with, and soon recovered its position as the paramount East Mediterranean and Balkan power, whose fabulous wealth attracted Viking mercenaries and central Asian nomad warriors to its armies, whose very appearance on the field of battle was sometimes enough to bring enemies to terms. No book has ever attempted a survey of Byzantine wars, and few accounts of Byzantine battles have ever been translated into a modern language. This book will provide essential support for those interested in Byzantine history in general as well as a useful corrective to the more usual highly romanticised views of Byzantine civilisation.
This book provides an interpretive narrative of the wars fought by Bulgaria against the Byzantine Empire for dominant control of the Balkan Peninsula during the early medieval era. Over a span of two centuries, from the early ninth through the early eleventh, and under the leadership of the Bulgarian rulers Krum, Simeon I, and Samuil, those conflicts evolved from simple confrontations for territorial possession into a life-or-death struggle for imperial precedence within the Orthodox world then emerging in Eastern Europe—a struggle that the Bulgarians ultimately lost. The primary focus is on Bulgaria, rather than Byzantium, and an effort is made to provide a historically reliable chronology of the assorted campaigns. The various belligerents’ military organizations, defensive technologies, armaments, and tactics are surveyed in an introduction to the main narrative. A prelude chapter sets the stage for the hegemonic conflict, which was divided into three distinct phases by interludes of relative peace between the contending parties, during which Bulgaria’s domestic, foreign, and cultural developments shaped the nature and conduct of the fighting in each successive phase.
This book examines Byzantine attitudes towards warfare at a time of crisis when the empire ceased to be a first rate power in the Mediterranean. It investigates the correspondence between official rhetoric and propaganda, on the one hand, and military realities, on the other. It explores the military ethos of the late Byzantine aristocracy and examines Byzantine perceptions of military leadership in comparison to contemporary western European military thinking. The organisation and nature of military operations and the role of the various groups of soldiers are explored to set Byzantine warfare in the wider geographical and cultural context. In addition, this book provides a comprehensive analysis of the influences other medieval cultures exerted on Byzantine military thought, organisation and practice.
War in Eleventh-Century Byzantium presents new insights and critical approaches to warfare between the Byzantine Empire and its neighbours during the eleventh century. Modern historians have identified the eleventh century as a landmark era in Byzantine history. This was a period of invasions, political tumult, financial crisis and social disruption, but it was also a time of cultural and intellectual innovation and achievement. Despite this, the subject of warfare during this period remains underexplored. Addressing an important gap in the historiography of Byzantium, the volume argues that the eleventh century was a period of important geo-political change, when the Byzantine Empire was attacked on all sides, and its frontiers were breached. This book is valuable reading for scholars and students interested in Byzantium history and military history.
The Sylloge Tacticorum is a mid-Byzantine example of the literary genre of military manuals or Taktika which stretches back to antiquity. It was one of a number produced during the tenth century CE, a period when the Byzantine empire enjoyed a large measure of success in its wars against its traditional enemy, the Arabs. Compiled to record and preserve military strategies, know-how, and tactics, the manual discusses a wide variety of matters: battle formations, raids, sieges, ambushes, surprise attacks, the treatment of prisoners of war and defectors, distribution of booty, punishment of military offences, how to mount effective espionage, and how to send and receive envoys. There is even advice on the personal qualities required by generals, on how to neutralize enemy horses, and on how to protect the troops against poisoned food. The work culminates in an account of the stratagems employed by great Greek and Roman military commanders of the past. While, like so much of Byzantine literature, the Sylloge often simply reproduces material found in earlier texts, it also preserves a great deal of information about the military tactics being developed by the Byzantine army during the tenth century. It is the first Byzantine source to record the reappearance of a specialized heavy cavalry (the kataphraktoi) and of a specialized infantry (the menavlatoi) used to repel the attacks of the opposing heavy cavalry. There is also a great deal of information on new infantry and cavalry formations and on the new tactics that required them. This is the first complete translation of the Sylloge into English. It is accompanied by a glossary of the specialised Greek military vocabulary used in the work and by footnotes which explain obscure references and identify the author’s classical and Byzantine sources. An introduction places the work in its historical and literary context and considers some of the questions that have remained unanswered over the centuries, such as its authorship and the date of its composition.
In this book, the distinguished writer Edward N. Luttwak presents the grand strategy of the eastern Roman empire we know as Byzantine, which lasted more than twice as long as the more familiar western Roman empire, eight hundred years by the shortest definition. This extraordinary endurance is all the more remarkable because the Byzantine empire was favored neither by geography nor by military preponderance. Yet it was the western empire that dissolved during the fifth century. The Byzantine empire so greatly outlasted its western counterpart because its rulers were able to adapt strategically to diminished circumstances, by devising new ways of coping with successive enemies. It relied less on military strength and more on persuasion—to recruit allies, dissuade threatening neighbors, and manipulate potential enemies into attacking one another instead. Even when the Byzantines fought—which they often did with great skill—they were less inclined to destroy their enemies than to contain them, for they were aware that today’s enemies could be tomorrow’s allies. Born in the fifth century when the formidable threat of Attila’s Huns were deflected with a minimum of force, Byzantine strategy continued to be refined over the centuries, incidentally leaving for us several fascinating guidebooks to statecraft and war. The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire is a broad, interpretive account of Byzantine strategy, intelligence, and diplomacy over the course of eight centuries that will appeal to scholars, classicists, military history buffs, and professional soldiers.
