Author, radio commentator, and sometime US government agent, Cordesman (Center for Strategic and International Studies) argues that the US must construct Iraqi military, security, and police forces as an essential element of nation-building and stability, and presents a program for doing so. Most of the book is analysis of the planning and execution of the 2003 US invasion of Iraq and the subsequent occupation and resistance to it. Then he looks at The Iraqi View, the evolving nature of the conflict and the risk of sectarian and ethnic conflict, before laying out his own ideas in the final chapter.
Building Iraqi security forces : hearing before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations of the Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, One Hundred Ninth Congress, first session, March 14, 2005.
Building Iraqi security forces: hearing before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations of the Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, One Hundred Ninth Congress, first session, March 14, 2005.
From May 2003 to June 28, 2004 (when it handed over authority to the Iraqi Interim Government), the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) worked to field Iraqi security forces and to develop security sector institutions. This book-all of whose authors were advisors to the CPA-breaks out the various elements of Iraq's security sector, including the defense, interior, and justice sectors, and assesses the CPA's successes and failures.
Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on Government Reform. Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations
Why did the United States fail to efficiently establish Iraqi security capability in post-Saddam Iraq, and what lessons can be learned from this failure? The U.S. administration in Iraq was admonished for the planning and execution of the reconstruction portion of Phase IV (post conflict) because it did not establish indigenous forces that could effectively secure Iraq so that the nation could be rebuilt. Initially, the effort to rebuild the Iraqi Army fell to an ad hoc organization consisting of General Eaton, four other soldiers, and a contractor. The effort to rebuild the police and other security forces fell under the Coalition Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT). Neither organization was given any time for planning prior to March 2003, nor were they manned to accomplish the task. Policy mistakes that adversely affected the building of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) included disbanding the Iraqi Army, using contractors to train the new Iraq Army, a lack of unity of effort, and insufficient funds for the Coalition Military Assistance Team (CMATT). The building of the ISF evolved through several task adjustments, including increasing the resources allocated to CMATT to allow the training of 1,500 officers in Jordan, the deployment of Army Reserve Institutional Training Divisions (DIV(IT)), and the use of military Advisor Support Teams (AST). In June 2004, CMATT and CPATT were combined under the Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I). Coalition units are now integrating Iraqi forces within their brigades. The author concludes that the DoD should never use ad hoc organizations for missions as important as the building of a nation's security structure. JFCOM Standing Joint Forces Headquarters and DIV(IT)s are resources that should be used. The security effort should be allocated sufficient planning time, weighted appropriately, and have unity of effort. The paper also reviews efforts by Britain to build indigenous forces in Iraq after WWI.
Soon after the coalition's occupation of Iraq began in April 2003, it became evident that prewar assumptions about the security situation that would follow the ouster of Saddam Hussein had been unduly optimistic. The environment was not benign -- it was deteriorating. Iraqi security forces had largely disintegrated, and those that remained were incapable of responding to rising criminality and political violence. In this environment, the coalition confronted three security imperatives: (1) to restore order and neutralize insurgents and terrorists; (2) to rebuild Iraqi security forces, which could eventually take on responsibility for Iraq's security; and (3) to build security sector institutions, such as national security management institutions, the interior and defense ministries, and the justice sector, to ensure that the Iraqi security sector could be an effective bulwark for a democratic Iraq in the future. At the time that the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) handed over authority to the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) on June 28, 2004, it was clear that the coalition had made little progress in the first task. Insurgent and terrorist violence was escalating, organized crime was flourishing, and the security situation was threatening both the political transition and the reconstruction program. The coalition's record on the second and third tasks, however, is somewhat less simply categorized. From April 2003, the coalition embarked on efforts to rapidly field Iraqi security forces and to build security sector institutions. This effort was broad in scope, but its implementation was patchy, its results were varying, and its ultimate success or failure remains difficult to determine. This report focuses on efforts to build both forces and institutions in Iraq. It provides a historical record of the coalition's experience and seeks, insofar as is possible at this early stage, to draw lessons from the successes and failures of that experience.
This is a study of Iraqi Army will to fight. It applies the RAND military will-to-fight model and assessment tool to three cases and recommends changes to U.S. security force assistance.
Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on Government Reform. Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations
