After the end of World War I, international pressures prevented the Allies from implementing direct colonial rule over the former Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Instead, the Allies created a system of mandates for the governance of the Middle East. France was assigned Lebanon and Syria, and Britain was assigned Iraq, Palestine, and Transjordan. First published in 1976, Britain in Iraq has long been recognized as the definitive history of the mandate period, providing a meticulous and engaging account of Britain's political involvement in Iraq as well as rare insights into the motives behind the founding of the Iraqi state. Peter Sluglett presents a historical narrative of the development and implementation of the mandate in the face of considerable opposition in both Iraq and Britain and shows how the British maintained a "reliable" group of Iraqi clients in power to protect imperial interests. Sluglett explores the changing relationship between Britain and Iraq over the eighteen years of occupation and mandate, the interactions between Shi'ite and Sunni populations, the position of the Kurds, the boundary between Turkey and northern Iraq, and policies relating to defense, land tenure and the tribes, and education. A new conclusion attempts to analyze the legacy of the mandate and to offer some explanation for Iraq's continuing weakness as a state and the structural obstacles preventing the emergence of a plural political system.
This book is the first in-depth history of Britain's decision to invade Iraq since the Chilcot Inquiry released its report. The volume controversially argues that it was a blunder, or a careless failure of judgement.
Drawing primarily from US State Department archives and the four volumes of the official British history of World War I in Mesopotamia (published during 1923-1927), Majd reconstructs the political and military history of Iraq in World War I, a period that began with fierce Iraqi resistance against the British and ended with the consolidation of British control under the mandate system. In addition to documenting the military ebb and flow of Britain's colonial project in Iraq, Majd also presents two chapters considering the aftermath of the war in terms of Iraq's commercial decline and the impact of disease.
Leading scholars consider Iraq's history and strategic importance from the vantage point of its residents, neighbors (Iran, Turkey, and Kurdistan), and the Great Powers.
All the key findings of the public inquiry into the handling of the 2003 Iraq war by the British government led by Tony Blair. Chaired by Sir John Chilcot, the Iraq Inquiry (known as the 'Chilcot Report') tackled: Saddam Hussein's threat to Britainthe legal advice for the invasionintelligence about weapons of mass destruction andplanning for a post-conflict Iraq. This 60,000-word executive summary was published in July 2016. Philippe Sands QC wrote in the London Review of Books: 'It offers a long and painful account of an episode that may come to be seen as marking the moment when the UK fell off its global perch, trust in government collapsed and the country turned inward and began to disintegrate.' Published under an Open Government Licence, this book aims to make better known the findings of the Iraq Inquiry, which took seven years to complete at a cost of £10 million. The text, headings, footnotes and any emphasis are exactly those of the original document. Contents Introduction Pre-conflict strategy and planning The UK decision to support US military action Why Iraq? Why now? The UK's relationship with the US Decision-making Advice on the legal basis for military action Weapons of mass destruction Planning for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq The post-conflict period Occupation Transition Planning for withdrawal Did the UK achieve its objectives in Iraq? Key findings Lessons Timeline of events REVIEWS The Iraq Inquiry, chaired by Sir John Chilcot and composed of five privy councillors, finally published its report on the morning of 6 July, seven years and 21 days after it was established by Gordon Brown with a remit to look at the run-up to the conflict, the conflict itself and the reconstruction, so that we can learn lessons. It offers a long and painful account of an episode that may come to be seen as marking the moment when the UK fell off its global perch, trust in government collapsed and the country turned inward and began to disintegrate. — Philippe Sands, London Review of Books A more productive way to think of the Chilcot report is as a tool to help us set agendas for renewed best efforts in creating more effective and accountable statecraft. Chilcot has confirmed that... we still do not have intelligent long-range planning by the armed forces in close and active cooperation with other government agencies, nor an adequate and integrated system for the collection and evaluation of intelligence information, nor do we have the highest possible quality and stature of personnel to lead us through these challenging times. — Derek B. Miller, The Guardian Although sceptics wondered how much more the very-long-awaited Report of the Iraq Inquiry by a committee chaired by Sir John Chilcot could tell us when it appeared at last in July, it proves to contain a wealth of evidence and acute criticism, the more weighty for its sober tone and for having the imprimatur of the official government publisher. In all, it is a further and devastating indictment not only of Tony Blair personally but of a whole apparatus of state and government, Cabinet, Parliament, armed forces, and, far from least, intelligence agencies. Among its conclusions the report says that there was no imminent threat from Saddam Hussein; that the British chose to join the invasion of Iraq before the peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted; that military action was not a last resort... — Geoffrey Wheatcroft, The New York Review of Books Ideal for any student of politics, diplomacy, or conflict.
This new edition of Frank Ledwidge’s eye-opening analysis of British involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan unpicks the causes and enormous costs of military failure. Updated throughout, and with fresh chapters assessing and enumerating the overall military performance since 2011—including Libya, ISIS, and the Chilcot findings—Ledwidge shows how lessons continue to go unlearned. “A brave and important book; essential reading for anyone wanting insights into the dysfunction within the British military today, and the consequences this has on the lives of innocent civilians caught up in war.”—Times Literary Supplement
An original exploration of the 2003 Iraq war and geopolitics more broadly through the prism of art. Offers a reappraisal of one of the most contentious and consequential events of the early twenty-first century Advances an original perspective on Britain’s role in the 2003 invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq Maps out new ways of thinking about geopolitical events through art Examines the work of artists, curators and activists in light of Britain’s role as a colonial power in Iraq and the importance of oil Reflects on the significance, limits and dilemmas of art as a form of critical intervention Questions the implications of art in colonialism and modernity
This is a penetrating account of Anglo-Iraqi relations from 1929, when Britain decided to grant independence to Iraq, to 1941, when hostilities between the two nations came to an end. Showing how Britain tried--and failed--to maintain its political influence, economic ascendancy, and strategic position in Iraq after independence, Silverfarb presents a suggestive analysis of the possibilities and limitations of indirect rule by imperial powers in the Third World. The book also tells of the rapid disintegration of Britain's dominance in the Middle East after World War I and portrays the struggle of a recently independent Arab nation to free itself from the lingering grip of a major European power.
In March 2003, the United States and Great Britain invaded Iraq to put an end to the regime of Saddam Hussein. The war was launched without a United Nations mandate and was based on the erroneous claim that Iraq had retained weapons of mass destruction. France, under President Jacques Chirac and Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin, spectacularly opposed the United States and British invasion, leading a global coalition against the war that also included Germany and Russia. The diplomatic crisis leading up to the war shook both French and American perceptions of each other and revealed cracks in the transatlantic relationship that had been building since the end of the Cold War. Based on exclusive French archival sources and numerous interviews with former officials in both France and the United States, A History of the Iraq Crisis retraces the international exchange that culminated in the 2003 Iraq conflict. It shows how and why the Iraq crisis led to a confrontation between two longtime allies unprecedented since the time of Charles de Gaulle, and it exposes the deep and ongoing divisions within Europe, the Atlantic alliance, and the international community as a whole. The Franco-American narrative offers a unique prism through which the American road to war can be better understood.
