First published by the Combat Studies Institute Press. The resulting anthology begins with a general overview of urban operations from ancient times to the midpoint of the twentieth century. It then details ten specific case studies of U.S., German, and Japanese operations in cities during World War II and ends with more recent Russian attempts to subdue Chechen fighters in Grozny and the Serbian siege of Sarajevo. Operations range across the spectrum from combat to humanitarian and disaster relief. Each chapter contains a narrative account of a designated operation, identifying and analyzing the lessons that remain relevant today.
Includes more than 20 maps, diagrams and tables. History instructs that for a variety of reasons, cities have always been targets for attack by adversaries. From the earliest of times, attackers came bearing weapons ranging from knives, arrows, and spears, while in modern times, they have brought weaponry the Industrial Revolution made available: cannon, rocket artillery, and ultimately bombs and rockets delivered from aerial platforms and even thermonuclear warheads, not to mention the potential for chemical and biological payloads. In turn, cities have responded to most of these threats. Early on, for example, they thickened city walls and erected other barriers to entry. But attackers seeking to subdue the cities simply countered with new and better weapons. So the game of measures and countermeasures-the adult, and much more deadly, version of the familiar children’s game of rock, scissors, paper-has continued apace for centuries. The expert authors of this excellent study focus on the following Urban Operations 1) Through the ages - Pre Second World War Urban Combat 2) Bloody Stalingrad 3) The demolition of Aachen 4) Battle of Manila 5) The Siege of Hue 6) Battle for Grozny 7) Fight for Beirut 8) Siege of Sarajevo 9) The capture of Kabul 10) Lightning strike at Panama City 11) Urban Terrorism in Argentina 12) The US Military in the Hurricane Katarina rescue effort 13) The Future of Urban Combat
Illustrated with 30 maps. Few lessons are as prevalent in military history as is the adage that tanks don’t perform well in cities. The notion of deliberately committing tanks to urban combat is anathema to most. In Breaking the Mold: Tanks in the Cities, Mr. Ken Gott disproves that notion with a timely series of five case studies from World War II to the present war in Iraq. This is not a parochial or triumphant study. These cases demonstrate that tanks must do more than merely “arrive” on the battlefield to be successful in urban combat. From Aachen in 1944 to Fallujah in 2004, the absolute need for specialized training and the use of combined arms at the lowest tactical levels are two of the most salient lessons that emerge from this study. When properly employed, well-trained and well-supported units led by tanks are decisive in urban combat. The reverse is also true. Chechen rebels taught the Russian army and the world a brutal lesson in Grozny about what happens when armored units are poorly led, poorly trained, and cavalierly employed in a city. The case studies in this monograph are high-intensity battles in conflicts ranging from limited interventions to major combat operations. It would be wrong to use them to argue for the use of tanks in every urban situation. As the intensity of the operation decreases, the second and third order effects of using tanks in cities can begin to outweigh their utility. The damage to infrastructure caused by their sheer weight and size is just one example of what can make tanks unsuitable for every mission. Even during peace operations, however, the ability to employ tanks and other heavy armored vehicles quickly can be crucial. A study on the utility of tanks in peace operations is warranted, and planned.- Timothy R. Reese Colonel, Armor
Includes 12 maps and 8 tables “My Clan Against the World”: US and Coalition Operations in Somalia, 1992-94 represents another in a series of military case studies published by the Combat Studies Institute (CSI) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The impetus for this project came from the commanding general, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia, who directed CSI to examine the American military’s experience with urban operations in Somalia, particularly in the capital city of Mogadishu...This case study also cautions against the misuse and overuse of “lessons” learned from any given military undertaking. As with the lessons of Vietnam, one of which dictated that conventional units should not engage in unconventional warfare, the US experience in Somalia left many military analysts and policymakers convinced that the U.S. should eschew any undertaking that smacked of nation building. Yet, as this book is published, just ten years after the US exit from Somalia, American forces are engaged in several locations against an unconventional foe and are involved in nation building in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Perhaps the first lesson to be learned about extracting lessons is, in the words of a once-popular motion picture, “Never Say Never Again.” Another principal aim of the authors was to provide an analytical narrative of each phase of the US military involvement in Somalia. For many Americans, the mention of that African country conjures up one memory, that of the fierce firefight between US troops and Somali militia on 3-4 Oct. 1993. As this overview seeks to remind the reader, the U.S. had a military presence in Somalia from Dec. 1992 to the end of March 1994. During that period, much was accomplished of a positive nature. Starving and mistreated Somalis were provided food and a modicum of security, while some progress was made toward peace in the country.
Doctrine provides a military organization with a common philosophy, a language, a purpose, and unity of effort. Rather than establishing a set of hard and fast rules, the objective of doctrine is to foster initiative and creative thinking. To this end, FM 3-06 discusses major Army operations in an urban environment. This environment, consisting of complex terrain, a concentrated population, and an infrastructure of systems, is an operational environment in which Army forces will operate. In the future, it may be the predominant operational environment. Each urban operation is unique and will differ because of the multitude of combinations presented by the threat, the urban area itself, the major operation of which it may be part (or the focus), and the fluidity of societal and geopolitical considerations. Therefore, there will always exist an innate tension between Army doctrine, the actual context of the urban operation, and future realities. Commanders must strike the proper balance between maintaining the capability to respond to current threats and preparing for future challenges.
The Battle of Stalingrad was a disaster. The German Sixth Army consisted of over 300,000 men when it approached Stalingrad in August 1942. On 2 February 1943, 91,000 remained; only some 5,000 survived Soviet captivity. Largely due to the success of previous aerial resupply operations, Luftwaffe leaders assured Hitler they could successfully supply the Sixth Army after it was trapped. However, the Luftwaffe was not up to the challenge. The primary reason was the weather, but organizational and structural flaws, as well as enemy actions, also contributed to their failure. This thesis will address why the Demyansk and Kholm airlifts convinced the Germans that airlift was a panacea for encircled forces; the lessons learned from these airlifts and how they were applied at Stalingrad; why Hitler ordered the Stalingrad airlift despite the logistical impossibility; and seek out lessons for today’s military. The primary reason for the Stalingrad tragedy was that Germany’s strategic leadership did not apply lessons learned from earlier airlifts to the Stalingrad airlift, and the U.S. military is making similar mistakes with respect to the way it is handling its lessons learned from recent military operations.
Few lessons are as prevalent in military history as is the adage that tanks don't perform well in cities. The notion of deliberately committing tanks to urban combat is anathema to most. In "Breaking the Mold: Tanks in the Cities," Ken Gott disproves that notion with a timely series of five case studies from World War II to the present war in Iraq. This is not a parochial or triumphant study. These cases demonstrate that tanks must do more than merely "arrive" on the battlefield to be successful in urban combat. From Aachen in 1944 to Fallujah in 2004, the absolute need for specialized training and the use of combined arms at the lowest tactical levels are two of the most salient lessons that emerge from this study. When properly employed, well-trained and well-supported units led by tanks are decisive in urban combat. The reverse also is true. Chechen rebels taught the Russian army and the world a brutal lesson in Grozny about what happens when armored units are poorly led, poorly trained, and cavalierly employed in a city. The case studies in this monograph are high-intensity battles in conflicts ranging from limited interventions to major combat operations. It would be wrong to use them to argue for the use of tanks in every urban situation. As the intensity of the operation decreases, the 2nd and 3rd order effects of using tanks in cities can begin to outweigh their utility. The damage to infrastructure caused by their sheer weight and size is just one example of what can make tanks unsuitable for every mission. Even during peace operations, however, the ability to employ tanks and other heavy armored vehicles can be crucial. "Breaking the Mold" provides an up-to-date analysis of the utility of tanks and heavy armored forces in urban combat. The U.S. Army will increasingly conduct combat operations in urban terrain, and it will be necessary to understand what it takes to employ tanks to achieve success in that battlefield environment.
This book provides an interdisciplinary analysis of the future of US warfare, including its military practices and the domestic and global challenges it faces. The need to undertake a comprehensive analysis about the future of warfare for the US is more pressing today than ever before. New technologies and adversaries, both old and new, have the potential to revolutionize how wars are fought, and it is imperative that policy makers, military planners, and scholars engage with the latest analyses regarding these new threats and weapon systems. The primary aim of this book is to provide a clear and comprehensive depiction of the types of conflict that the United States is likely to become involved with in the future, as well as the methods of warfare that it may employ within these struggles. While a number of scholarly books have previously considered some of the potential features of US warfare in the future, many of these writings are either outdated or have limited their focus to just one or two of the main types of warfare that may occur and omitted consideration of the others. This book intends to remedy this deficiency in the literature. The volume consists of thematic chapters which address the key issues relevant to the future of US warfare, including cyber warfare, asymmetric conflicts, drone warfare, and nuclear strategy. Through the provision of a series of analyses by leading international academics, the volume provides an important interdisciplinary examination of the different areas of warfare that the United States is expected to use or encounter in the future. This book will be of great interest to students of US foreign policy, military studies, strategic studies and International Relations in general.
