This story takes place on the frigid, massive artificial planet known as Aposimz. Eo, Biko and Etherow, residents of the White Diamond Beam, are in the middle of combat training when suddenly a girl appears, Rebedoan Empire soldiers in hot pursuit. The girl asks for their help in keeping safe a “code” and seven mysterious “bullets.” This chance encounter marks a major shift in the fate of the entire planet…
In this final installment, Kyrii, still searching for the Net Terminal Gene, traces the steps of Cibo, reincarnated as a Level 9 Safeguard, and Sanakan, now a representative of the Administration. As Sanakan guides Cibo to a safe place where her sphere can develop in peace, Cibo is captured by the Silicon Life. Sanakan contacts Kyrii requesting his help in rescuing Cibo, because in her current form she may hold the key to saving the city. Sanakan risks everything in the battle against the Silicon Life. Kyrii arrives at a critical moment, and continues his endless journey while carrying the embodiment of hope for a different future beyond the outer limits of the city...
BLAME! Academy and So On is a spin-off series of BLAME! set in the same "City" as BLAME! and is a parody / comedy about various characters in the main BLAME! storyline set in a traditional Japanese school environment. Various elements of the main BLAME! story are parodied, including the relationship between Killy and Cibo, and Dhomochevsky and Iko. Irregularly published in Afternoon and compiled as BLAME! Gakuen and So On September 19, 2008, this is its first official English language release in either digital or print.
From one of the manga world's most intriguing artists comes the manga version of the Netflix movie, BLAME! Steel and rust. The City structure has endlessly propagated itself for so many years that the reason for such growth has long since been forgotten. Even within such a techo-dystopia, humans still exist: The Electrofishers. Driven to the brink of extinction, they are visited by a traveller—a man named Killy. But will his presence bring the Electrofishers ruination or hope..?
What happens when society wants you banged up in prison for a crime your parents committed? That’s the situation in which Ant finds herself – together with her little brother Mattie and their foster-parents, she’s locked up in a new kind of family prison. None of the inmates are themselves criminals, but wider society wants them to do time for the unpunished ‘heritage’ crimes of their parents. Tensions are bubbling inside the London prison network Ant and Mattie call home – and when things finally erupt, they realize they’ve got one chance to break out. Everyone wants to see them punished for the sins of their mum and dad, but it’s time for Ant to show the world that they’re not to blame. A new nail-bitingly taught YA suspense thriller, from author of the bestselling ITCH series, Simon Mayo.
Questions about the causes of events, from terrorist attacks to mass shootings to economic and public health crises dominate conversations across the US. Recent research in social psychology outlines the process we use to identify the causes of such events, reveals how we determine who is responsible or to blame, and documents the far-reaching consequences of these determinations for our emotions, our actions, and our attitudes. Current approaches to political opinions posit a direct path from a person’s worldview (liberal or conservative) to their attitudes toward specific political issues like abortion and welfare. This book argues that blame is the missing link between the two. Gail Sahar demonstrates that the current emphasis on value differences, whether between conservatives and liberals in the U.S. or between religious and secular countries on a global level, ignores commonalities in the way people think about issues. She proposes that focusing on perceived causes of social problems is a much more promising avenue for dialog than trying to reconcile fundamental belief systems. Informed by the latest psychological science, this new take on how to change attitudes has implications for anyone seeking to influence the viewpoints of others, from politicians and activists to ordinary people talking about current events at a dinner party.
What is it to blame someone, and when are would-be blamers in a position to do so? What function does blame serve in our lives, and is it a valuable way of relating to one another? The essays in this volume explore answers to these and related questions.
Epistemic Blame is the first book-length philosophical examination of our practice of criticizing one another for epistemic failings. People clearly evaluate and critique one another for forming unjustified beliefs, harbouring biases, and pursuing faulty methods of inquiry. But what is the nature of this criticism? Does it ever amount to a kind of blame? And should we blame one another for epistemic failings? Through careful analysis of the concept of blame, and the nature of epistemic normativity, this book argues that there are competing sources of pressure inherent in the increasingly prominent notion of "epistemic blame". The more genuinely blame-like a response is, the less fitting in the epistemic domain it seems; but the more fitting in the epistemic domain a response is, the less genuinely blame-like it seems. These competing sources of pressure comprise a puzzle about epistemic blame. The most promising resolution of this puzzle lies in the interpersonal side of epistemic normativity. Drawing on work by T. M. Scanlon, R. J. Wallace, and others, Cameron Boult argues that members of epistemic communities stand in "epistemic relationships", and epistemic blame just is a way of modifying these relationships. By thinking of epistemic blame as a distinctive kind of relationship modification, we locate a response that is both robustly blame-like, and distinctly epistemic. The result is a ground-breaking new theory of epistemic blame, the relationship-based account. With a solution to the puzzle of epistemic blame in hand, a new project for social epistemology comes into view: the ethics of epistemic blame. Boult demonstrates the power of the relationship-based account to contribute to this project, develops a systematic analysis of standing to epistemically blame, and defends the value of epistemic blame in our social and political lives. He shows that epistemic relationships can also be used to illuminate foundational questions about epistemic normativity, responsibility for our beliefs and assertions, and a wide range of epistemic harms, such as epistemic exploitation and gaslighting. Throughout the investigation, a more structured and precise understanding of the parallels and points of interaction between the epistemic and practical domains emerges.
From coping with Covid-19 through to manging climate change, from Brexit through to the barricading of Congress, from democratic disaffection to populist pressures, from historical injustices to contemporary social inequalities, and from scapegoating through to sacrificial lambs... the common thread linking each of these themes and many more is an emphasis on blame. But how do we know who or what is to blame? How do politicians engage in blame-avoidance strategies? How can blaming backfire or boomerang? Are there situations in which politicians might want to be blamed? What is the relationship between avoiding blame and claiming credit? How do developments in relation to machine learning and algorithmic governance affect blame-based assumptions? By focusing on the politics and governance of blame from a range of disciplines, perspectives, and standpoints this volume engages with all these questions and many more. Distinctive contributions include an emphasis on peacekeeping and public diplomacy, on source-credibility and anthropological explanations, on cultural bias and on expert opinions, on polarisation and (de)politicisation, and on trust and post-truth politics. With contributions from the world's leading scholars and emerging research leaders, this volume not only develops the theoretical, disciplinary, empirical, and normative boundaries of blame-based analyses but it also identifies new research agendas and asks distinctive and original questions about the politics and governance of blame.
This book challenges a basic assumption held by many responsibility theorists: that agents must be morally responsible in the retrospective sense for anything in virtue of which they deserve praise or blame (the primacy assumption). Anton sets out to defeat this assumption by showing that accepting it as well as the much more intuitive causality assumption renders us incapable of making sense of cases whereby agents seem to deserve praise and blame. She argues that retrospective moral responsibility is a species of causal responsibility (the causality assumption). Then, she illustrates several examples in which agents are not causally responsible for any morally relevant consequences, but they seem to be deserving of praise or blame nonetheless. Anton concludes that such cases are counterexamples to the primacy assumption, and turns her attention towards discerning what grounds desert of praise and blame if not retrospective moral responsibility. Anton advances the moral attitude account, whereby agents deserve praise and blame in virtue of moral attitudes they have in response to moral reasons. These moral attitudes must be sufficiently sincere, which means they reach a threshold that distinguishes such attitudes as eligible for praise and blame. Anton adds that whether one deserves praise or blame and to what degree is sensitive to the agent’s personal moral progress as well as the status quo of her society. This addition brings with it the welcome consequence that morality may be objective, but we are still justified in judging one another charitably based on personal and societal limitations.
