- Incorporates the latest experimental evidence from across economics, psychology and neuroscience to provide cutting-edge introduction for students. - Structured around three key settings – individuals, small groups and larger impersonal groups (e.g. markets) – this text provides a logical framework for the study of economic decision-making. - Includes discussion of emotions including fairness, trust, selfishness and altruism on both a micro and macro level to show how they can influence personal decision making as well as entire economies.
Behavioural Economics and Experiments addresses key topics within behavioural economics, exploring vital questions around decision-making and human nature. Assuming no prior knowledge of economics, the book features wide-ranging examples from literature, film, sport, neuroscience and beyond. Ananish Chaudhuri explores the complex relationships between human behaviour, society and decision-making, introducing readers to the latest work on heuristics, framing and anchoring, as well as ideas around fairness, trust and social norms. The book offers a fresh perspective on issues such as: Decision-making under uncertainty Firms' pricing decisions Employment contracts Coordination failures in organizations Preventing bubbles in financial markets This is an ideal introduction for students of behavioural economics, experimental economics and economic decision-making on economics, public policy, psychology and business-related programmes, and will also be accessible to policymakers and curious laymen.
This book provides an easy to follow guide to economic experiments and specifically those that explore notions of fairness, altruism and trust in economic transactions and how findings in the field can change the way we approach a variety of economic problems.
Game theory, the formalized study of strategy, began in the 1940s by asking how emotionless geniuses should play games, but ignored until recently how average people with emotions and limited foresight actually play games. This book marks the first substantial and authoritative effort to close this gap. Colin Camerer, one of the field's leading figures, uses psychological principles and hundreds of experiments to develop mathematical theories of reciprocity, limited strategizing, and learning, which help predict what real people and companies do in strategic situations. Unifying a wealth of information from ongoing studies in strategic behavior, he takes the experimental science of behavioral economics a major step forward. He does so in lucid, friendly prose. Behavioral game theory has three ingredients that come clearly into focus in this book: mathematical theories of how moral obligation and vengeance affect the way people bargain and trust each other; a theory of how limits in the brain constrain the number of steps of "I think he thinks . . ." reasoning people naturally do; and a theory of how people learn from experience to make better strategic decisions. Strategic interactions that can be explained by behavioral game theory include bargaining, games of bluffing as in sports and poker, strikes, how conventions help coordinate a joint activity, price competition and patent races, and building up reputations for trustworthiness or ruthlessness in business or life. While there are many books on standard game theory that address the way ideally rational actors operate, Behavioral Game Theory stands alone in blending experimental evidence and psychology in a mathematical theory of normal strategic behavior. It is must reading for anyone who seeks a more complete understanding of strategic thinking, from professional economists to scholars and students of economics, management studies, psychology, political science, anthropology, and biology.
Specially selected from The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics 2nd edition, each article within this compendium covers the fundamental themes within the discipline and is written by a leading practitioner in the field. A handy reference tool.
Utilizing extensive research in economics, psychology, political science, neuroscience and evolutionary theory, Ananish Chaudhuri provides a critical perspective on the role of cognitive biases in decision-making during the Covid-19 pandemic. The extensive use of, and support for, stringent social distancing measures in particular is explored in depth.
Written by well-established researchers in behavioural economics, this Research Agenda illustrates the application of incentivised decision-making experiments, highlighting how this can add a new and novel dimension to social science research. Informative and timely, it explores how experiments are being used by pioneers in a diverse range of fields when research questions may not be amenable to field studies, vignettes or surveys.
Dishonesty in Behavioral Economics provides a rigorous and comprehensive overview of dishonesty, presenting state-of-the-art research that adopts a behavioral economics perspective. Throughout the volume, contributors emphasize the effects of psychological, social, and cognitive factors on the decision-making process. In contrast to related titles, Dishonesty in Behavioral Economics emphasizes the importance of empirical research methodologies. Its contributors demonstrate how various methods applied to similar research questions can lead to different results. This characteristic is important because, of course, it is difficult to obtain reliable measures of dishonesty. Reviews many key issues in the literature around lying, cheating, fraudulence, and deception Covers both state-of-the-art methods and data collection mechanisms (e.g., laboratory experiments, field experiments, online surveys) Discusses novel interdisciplinary research findings and from them proposes new avenues of research
This book, which comprises eight chapters, presents a comprehensive critical survey of the results and methods of laboratory experiments in economics. The first chapter provides an introduction to experimental economics as a whole, with the remaining chapters providing surveys by leading practitioners in areas of economics that have seen a concentration of experiments: public goods, coordination problems, bargaining, industrial organization, asset markets, auctions, and individual decision making. The work aims both to help specialists set an agenda for future research and to provide nonspecialists with a critical review of work completed to date. Its focus is on elucidating the role of experimental studies as a progressive research tool so that wherever possible, emphasis is on series of experiments that build on one another. The contributors to the volume--Colin Camerer, Charles A. Holt, John H. Kagel, John O. Ledyard, Jack Ochs, Alvin E. Roth, and Shyam Sunder--adopt a particular methodological point of view: the way to learn how to design and conduct experiments is to consider how good experiments grow organically out of the issues and hypotheses they are designed to investigate.
Twenty years ago, behavioral economics did not exist as a field. Most economists were deeply skeptical--even antagonistic--toward the idea of importing insights from psychology into their field. Today, behavioral economics has become virtually mainstream. It is well represented in prominent journals and top economics departments, and behavioral economists, including several contributors to this volume, have garnered some of the most prestigious awards in the profession. This book assembles the most important papers on behavioral economics published since around 1990. Among the 25 articles are many that update and extend earlier foundational contributions, as well as cutting-edge papers that break new theoretical and empirical ground. Advances in Behavioral Economics will serve as the definitive one-volume resource for those who want to familiarize themselves with the new field or keep up-to-date with the latest developments. It will not only be a core text for students, but will be consulted widely by professional economists, as well as psychologists and social scientists with an interest in how behavioral insights are being applied in economics. The articles, which follow Colin Camerer and George Loewenstein's introduction, are by the editors, George A. Akerlof, Linda Babcock, Shlomo Benartzi, Vincent P. Crawford, Peter Diamond, Ernst Fehr, Robert H. Frank, Shane Frederick, Simon Gächter, David Genesove, Itzhak Gilboa, Uri Gneezy, Robert M. Hutchens, Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, David Laibson, Christopher Mayer, Terrance Odean, Ted O'Donoghue, Aldo Rustichini, David Schmeidler, Klaus M. Schmidt, Eldar Shafir, Hersh M. Shefrin, Chris Starmer, Richard H. Thaler, Amos Tversky, and Janet L. Yellen.
