Like the Battle of Verdun, the Battle of the Frontiers has often been ignored by military historians, who assumed that the French lost the first battles of the World War I because they launched suicidal bayonet charges against German machine guns. Therefore, for nearly a century, these battles have been considered uninteresting. In reality, these were some of the most important, hard-fought and instructive battles of the First World War. The Battle of the Frontiers is the first history of this battle in English and is based on ground-breaking research conducted in French and German army archives. It also makes use of neglected French and German books and articles, as well as German regimental histories, and includes personal accounts by participants such as Manfred von Richthofen (when he was still a cavalry lieutenant) and the young Erwin Rommel. Terence Zuber here presents a dramatic new perspective on combat in 1914.
On 22 August 1914, on a battlefield one hundred kilometers wide, stretching from Luxembourg to the River Meuse, two French and two German armies clashed in a series of encounters known collectively as the Battle of the Ardennes. On that day 27,000 young French soldiers died, the bloodiest day in the military history of France, most of them in the Ardennes, and yet it is almost unknown to English-speaking readers. There has never been an operational study of the Battle of the Ardennes, in any language, at best a single chapter in a history of greater scope, at least a monograph of an individual tactical encounter within the overall battle. This book fills a glaring gap in the study of the opening phase of the First World War the Battles of the Frontiers and provides fresh insight into both French and German plans for the prosecution of what was supposed to be a short war. At the center of this book lies a mystery. In a key encounter battle one French army corps led by a future Minister of War, General Pierre Roques, outnumbered its immediate opposition by nearly six-to-one and yet dismally failed to capitalize on that superiority. The question is how, and why. Intriguingly there is a six-hour gap in the war diaries of all General Roques' units, it smacks of a cover-up. By a thorough investigation of German sources, and through the discovery of three vital messages buried in the French archives, it is now possible to piece together what happened during those missing hours and show how Roques threw away an opportunity to break the German line and advance unopposed deep into the hinterland beyond. The chimera of a clean break and exploitation, that was to haunt the Allied High Command for the next four years in the trenches of the Western Front, was a brief and tantalizing opportunity for General Roques. The final part of this book seeks to answer the question "why?" The history of both French and German pre-war preparation reveals the political, economic and cultural differences that shaped the two opposing national armies. Those differences, in turn, predicated the behavior of General Roques and his men as well as that of his German opponent. With a clear understanding of those differences, the reader may now understand how the French lost their best opportunity not only to stymie the Schlieffen Plan, but to change the course of the rest of the war. The author's text is supported by a separate map book containing 60 newly-commissioned color maps.
Like the Battle of Verdun, the Battle of the Frontiers has often been ignored by military historians, who assumed that the French lost the first battles of the World War I because they launched suicidal bayonet charges against German machine guns. Therefore, for nearly a century, these battles have been considered uninteresting. In reality, these were some of the most important, hard-fought and instructive battles of the First World War.The Battle of the Frontiers is the first history of this battle in English and is based on ground-breaking research conducted in French and German army archives. It also makes use of neglected French and German books and articles, as well as German regimental histories, and includes personal accounts by participants such as Manfred von Richthofen (when he was still a cavalry lieutenant) and the young Erwin Rommel. Terence Zuber here presents a dramatic new perspective on combat in 1914.
This war was one of the greatest known gruesome battles in the world's history, which occurred from 1914 to 1918. From August 14 to the 25th of 1914, the main clashes of the Battle of the Frontiers took place. The complete time covered goes from August 7 to September 13. While the seven Imperial German units moved westwards, from the timetables that historians provide us, it can be shown that the German planned a very methodical attack on France which was known as The Schlieffen Plan. If there were to be an invasion from the Imperial Germany, the commander of France's army organized a defensive plan, known as Plan XVII. This plan was the French army's safety net in order to create an offensive movement on the perimeter of the eastern and the northeast Belgian and French border, which was in the province of Ardennes. On the affirmation of war breaking out between France and Germany, the French military organized an advancement east and north-eastward in order to counter the German threat. The Battle of the Frontiers had four principal battles in 1914: The Battle of Lorraine - also called Morhange - from August 14 to 25. The Battle of the Ardennes, which took place from the 21 to 23 August. The Battle of Charleroi on 21 to 23 August, and lastly the Battle of the Mons which lasted only for one day, August 23. Germany's military prepared to engage in a somewhat altered rendition of the Schlieffen Plan, which was developed in 1905 by Count Alfred von Schlieffen.
The purpose of this thesis is threefold: to present the first operational study of the August 1914 Ardennes campaign; to demonstrate that in two particular encounter battles the French had the opportunity to inflict a tactical, possibly operational defeat upon their opponents but in both cases failed to do so; and to explore the reasons for that French failure, by relating events on the battlefield to each side's pre-war preparations.
Twice in the 20th century, a British Expeditionary Force has taken the field in Northern France to fight beside the French Army. Twice, the Expeditionary Force has survived threat of complete destruction. But the differences between the Retreat to Dunkirk in 1940 and the first encounter with the enemy at Mons in 1914 are significant.
On 7 August 1914 a French corps attacked towards Mulhouse in Alsace and was immediately thrown back by the Germans. On 14 August, two weeks before Tannenberg and three weeks before the Battle of the Marne, the French 1st and 2nd Armies attacked into Lorraine, and on 20 August the German 6th and 7th Armies counterattacked. After forty-three years of peace, this was the first test of strength between France and Germany. In 1929, Karl Deuringer wrote the official history of the battle for the Bavarian Army, an immensely detailed work of 890 pages, chronicling the battle to 15 September. Here, First World War expert and former army officer Terence Zuber has translated and edited this study to a more accessible length, while retaining over thirty highly detailed maps, to bring us the first account in English of the first major battle of the Great War.
With the creation of the Franco-Russian Alliance and the failure of the Reinsurance Treaty in the late nineteenth century, Germany needed a strategy for fighting a two-front war. In response, Field Marshal Count Alfred von Schlieffen produced a study that represented the apex of modern military planning. His Memorandum for a War against France, which incorporated a mechanized cavalry as well as new technologies in weaponry, advocated that Germany concentrate its field army to the west and annihilate the French army within a few weeks. For generations, historians have considered Schlieffen's writings to be the foundation of Germany's military strategy in World War I and have hotly debated the reasons why the plan, as executed, failed. In this important volume, international scholars reassess Schlieffen's work for the first time in decades, offering new insights into the renowned general's impact not only on World War I but also on nearly a century of military historiography. The contributors draw on newly available source materials from European and Russian archives to demonstrate both the significance of the Schlieffen Plan and its deficiencies. They examine the operational planning of relevant European states and provide a broad, comparative historical context that other studies lack. Featuring fold-out maps and abstracts of the original German deployment plans as they evolved from 1893 to 1914, this rigorous reassessment vividly illustrates how failures in statecraft as well as military planning led to the tragedy of the First World War.
