This unique and innovative book is more than a price and identification guide to Michigan's early banking system; it demonstrates the state's evolution from pioneer settlements for prosperous communities. &break;&break;This one-of-a-kind is filled with more than 2,200 rarely seen images from the foremost Michigan bank note collection. In addition, this reference gives collectors: &break;&break;Detailed listings organized alphabetically by name of the issuing institution, for easier identification and thorough regional research &break;&break;Additional historical information about early banking processes in Michigan, development of the state, and detailed guidelines for accurately identifying Michigan's obsolete and national bank notes &break;&break;Thoroughly researched value estimates for each listing
Recounts the former Michigan governor's struggles to solve the problems of unemployment and budget deficits with the auto industry collapse and global financial crisis.
"Rosas's compelling theory and wide-ranging empirical evidence yield a persuasive but surprising conclusion in light of the financial meltdown of 2008–9. In the event of banking crises, not only do elected governments treat taxpayers better and force bankers and their creditors to pay more for their mistakes, but bankers in democracies are more prudent as a consequence . . . essential reading for all interested in the political economy of crisis and in the future of banking regulation." ---Philip Keefer, Lead Economist, Development Research Group, The World Bank "Rosas convincingly demonstrates how democratic accountability affects the incidence and resolution of banking crises. Combining formal models, case studies, and cutting-edge quantitative methods, Rosas's book represents a model for political economy research." ---William Bernhard, Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Illinois "When the financial crises of the 1990s hit Asia, Russia, and Latin America, the U.S. scolded them about the moral hazard problems of bailing out the banks. Now, the shoe is on the other foot, with the U.S. struggling to manage an imploding financial sector. Rosas's study of bank bailouts could not be more timely, providing us with both a framework for thinking about the issue and some sobering history of how things go both right and badly wrong. Democratic accountability proves the crucial factor in making sure bailouts are fair, a point that is as relevant for U.S. policy as for an understanding of the emerging markets." ---Stephan Haggard, Krause Professor, Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego Banking crises threaten the stability and growth of economies around the world. In response, politicians restore banks to solvency by redistributing losses from bank shareholders and depositors to taxpayers, and the burden the citizenry must bear varies from case to case. Whereas some governments stay close to the prescriptions espoused by Sir Walter Bagehot in the nineteenth century that limit the costs shouldered by taxpayers, others engage in generous bank bailouts at great cost to society. What factors determine a government's response? In this comparative analysis of late-twentieth-century banking crises, Guillermo Rosas identifies political regime type as the determining factor. During a crisis, powerful financial players demand protection of their assets. Rosas maintains that in authoritarian regimes, government officials have little to shield them from such demands and little incentive for rebuffing them, while in democratic regimes, elected officials must weigh these demands against the interests of the voters---that is, the taxpayers. As a result, compared with authoritarian regimes, democratic regimes show a lower propensity toward dramatic, costly bailouts. Guillermo Rosas is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and Fellow at the Center in Political Economy at Washington University in St. Louis.
As the financial services industry becomes increasingly international, the more narrowly defined and historically protected national financial markets become less significant. Consequently, financial institutions must achieve a critical size in order to compete. Bank Mergers & Acquisitions analyses the major issues associated with the large wave of bank mergers and acquisitions in the 1990's. While the effects of these changes have been most pronounced in the commercial banking industry, they also have a profound impact on other financial institutions: insurance firms, investment banks, and institutional investors. Bank Mergers & Acquisitions is divided into three major sections: A general and theoretical background to the topic of bank mergers and acquisitions; the effect of bank mergers on efficiency and shareholders' wealth; and regulatory and legal issues associated with mergers of financial institutions. It brings together contributions from leading scholars and high-level practitioners in economics, finance and law.
Banking on Reform examines the political determinants of recent reforms to monetary policy institutions in the industrial democracies. With these reforms, political parties have sought to draw on the political credibility of an independent central bank to cope with electoral consequences of economic internalization and deindustrialization. New Zealand and Italy made the initial efforts to grant their central banks independence. More recently, France, Spain, Britain, and Sweden have reformed their central banks' independence. Additionally, members of the European Union have implemented a single currency, with an independent European central bank to administer monetary policy. Banking on Reform stresses the politics surrounding the choice of these institutions, specifically the motivations of political parties. Where intraparty conflicts have threatened the party's ability to hold office, politicians have adopted an independent central bank. Where political parties have been secluded from the political consequences of economic change, reform has been thwarted or delayed. The drive toward a single currency also reflects these political concerns. By delegating monetary policy to the European level, politicians in the member states removed a potentially divisive issue from the domestic political agenda, allowing parties to rebuild their support constructed on the basis of other issues. William T. Bernhard provides a variety of evidence to support his argument, such as in-depth case accounts of recent central bank reforms in Italy and Britain, the role of the German Bundesbank in the policy process, and the adoption of the single currency in Europe. Additionally, he utilizes quantitative and statistical tests to enhance his argument. This book will appeal to political scientists, economists, and other social scientists interested in the political and institutional consequences of economic globalization. William T. Bernhard is Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign.
"The Revolution Will Not Be Financed takes the perspective that the financial system needs a revolution-and not the impending revolution driven by technology. Studying various ways the financial system advantages whites by exploiting and marginalizing Black and Brown communities, Terri Friedline challenges the optimistic belief that fintech can expand access to banking and finance. Friedline applies the lens of financialized racial neoliberal capitalism to demonstrate the financial system's inherent racism, and explores examples from student loan debt, corporate landlords, community benefits agreements, and banking and payday lending. She makes the case that the financial system needs a people-led revolution that centers the needs, experiences, and perspectives of those that it has historically excluded, marginalized, and exploited"--
