It perhaps not realized that Australia has a very long history of strategic interest and engagement in the Middle East. It is a record of sustained involvement and considerable commitment. Australia comes as a friend and peacemaker, and with no local ambitions. Australia has much to offer the Gulf states in the field of military cooperation. Coupled with Australia's growing trade with the region, it seems likely that Australia's strategic interest and engagement with the region will expand over the following years.
What is the history behind Australia's relations with the Muslim world, and the Middle East in particular, which led Australia to be described as a frontline of the so-called 'War on Terror'? Australia's encounters with the Middle East have historically been defined through the British Empire, the Commonwealth and, more recently, through its close strategic ties with the US. This book traces the nature of the Australia-Middle East relationship, from an insular 'White Australia' ideology through to the ongoing global impact of September 11 and the decision to send troops to Iraq and Afghanistan. Comprehensive analysis of these complex ties provides an essential basis for understanding past encounters, evaluating present policies and developing a framework for future interactions. Australia and the Middle East draws together the various dimensions and themes of this relationship from trade and migration, to increasing strategic interest and military involvement in the region.
Australia invoked the ANZUS Alliance following the Al Qaeda attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001. But unlike the calls to arms at the onset of the world wars, Australia decided to make only carefully calibrated force contributions in support of the US-led coalition campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. Why is this so? Niche Wars examines Australia’s experience on military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq from 2001 to 2014. These operations saw over 40 Australian soldiers killed and hundreds wounded. But the toll since has been greater. For Afghanistan and Iraq the costs are hard to measure. Why were these forces deployed? What role did Australia play in shaping the strategy and determining the outcome? How effective were they? Why is so little known about Australia’s involvement in these campaigns? What lessons can be learned from this experience? Niche Wars commences with a scene-setting overview of Australia’s military involvement in the Middle East over more than a century. It then draws on unique insights from many angles, across a spectrum of men and women, ranging from key Australian decision makers, practitioners and observers. The book includes a wide range of perspectives in chapters written by federal government ministers, departmental secretaries, service commanders, task force commanders, sailors, soldiers, airmen and women, international aid workers, diplomats, police, journalists, coalition observers and academics. Niche Wars makes for compelling reading but also stands as a reference work on how and why Australia became entangled in these conflicts that had devastating consequences. If lessons can be learned from history about how Australia uses its military forces, this book is where to find them.
In August 1995, NATO intervened militarily for the first time in Bosnia. At the time, few could have envisaged that a decade later NATO would be deploying over 10,000 troops to Afghanistan, training Iraqi military forces in Baghdad and increasing its political and military cooperation with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). As a region, the Greater Middle East is viewed by the West as an area of concern in terms of issues such as WMD proliferation; terrorism; interstate conflict; failed states; immigration; and civil war. Therefore, European and North American leaders and populations have a strong strategic self-interest in promoting security in the Greater Middle East. NATO’s largest and most important mission in the Greater Middle East is in Afghanistan—the first mission of its kind outside Europe. NATO’s involvement there began when it took over command of the UN-mandated International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF). In Iraq, NATO has now taken on its first formal role—a military training mission outside Baghdad, while the Alliance has also taken on missions providing relief and assistance in earthquake-effected Pakistan and in the troubled Darfur region of Sudan. NATO has launched the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), to expand dialogue and provide a forum for practical cooperation between NATO and the countries of the Gulf region. NATO began by offering ICI membership to the countries of the GCC. The offer was initially accepted by Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait, while the UAE followed in June 2005. The story of NATO’s involvement in the Greater Middle East over the past decade is one of increasing activity, which points to a potentially significant future role in the region. It would be naïve, however, to conclude that NATO’s growing involvement in the region is a linear or irreversible trend. Many of the missions undertaken so far are quite limited in scope and have all led to serious controversy among NATO members. There is still no consensus within the Alliance on the precise role it should play in the Greater Middle East and on major challenges that must be met if NATO’s role is to continue to grow.
Seminar paper from the year 2002 in the subject Politics - International Politics - Region: Other States, grade: 1, Macquarie University, language: English, abstract: When the Australian Labor government announced the deployment of a naval contingent to the Persian Gulf on the 10th August 1990, Prime Minister Bob Hawke described the commitment as being "proportionate to the interests we have at stake" . What Hawke refers to in his statement is the importance of national interests in the formulation of foreign policy and a country's reaction to world events such as Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. This paper will analyse to which extent the Prime Minister's claim to have acted in and proportionate to the national interest is true. In order to be in a position to answer this question, one has to agree on a definition of the term "national interest".
The physical remoteness of the Australian continent is no longer a barrier to the development of important strategic and trade links with friendly states in the Middle East. Australia’s increasingly prominent role in world peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, many of which have involved the Middle East, has also added a new dynamism to the development of areas of cooperation that reflect the changing relationship between Canberra and Arab governments as issues of energy supply, national security and growing opportunities for trade and tourism gain momentum. In order to provide an in-depth overview of the history of this relationship, as well as an exploration of current political developments and the economic opportunities to be gained from Australia–Middle East relations, the Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research (ECSSR) held a Symposium under the title “Australia and the Arab World,” on December 17–18, 2008 in Abu Dhabi, hosting a group of distinguished experts from various academic, political and business backgrounds. This book comprises a valuable collection of the papers presented at the Symposium. It identifies how relations between Australia and the Arab world have developed; where mutual interests meet and diverge; the growing industry in cultural exchange through education and tourism; the integration of Muslims into Australian society and their contribution to its multiculturalism; the new security apparatus developing both strategically and militarily between Australia, New Zealand and various Arab states; and Australia’s historical involvement and approach to the contentious issue of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
For decades, dealing with the Middle East has proved to be a very divisive issue for the United States and Europe. During the Cold War, heated transatlantic disputes emerged over a host of issues including the Suez Canal, the Palestine–Israel conflict and the containment of Iran. Nonetheless, these differences did not significantly impair transatlantic relations due to the solidarity engendered by the Soviet threat in Europe. With the demise of the Soviet Union, common tasks in Europe no longer overshadow differences in other regions. The United States and Europe follow different approaches on the question of democratization in the Middle East. This difference is rooted in the respective political cultures on each side of the Atlantic. The United States’ appetite for democratization may be awakened by powerful strains of idealism, but it is also limited by powerful strains of isolationism—on one level, the US would prefer to stand aloof from the world, avoiding the dangers and compromises that come with engagement. American politics is not suited to the slow pace of incremental change, the sullying tasks of nation-building and the ambiguities of governing foreign cultures and understanding their practices. No such isolationism pushes Europe toward quick solutions. Indeed, Europe generally prefers slow and incremental movement toward democracy. Europeans favor engaging target states rather than isolating them, bringing about a gradual political transition rather than an abrupt change of regime. Just as it took generations for liberal democracy to take firm root in Western Europe, the EU is patient in its goal of exporting its model to the south and east. Despite the long history of transatlantic tension over the Middle East, some signs of potential convergence have recently emerged. Although the situation in Iraq remains unstable and uncertain, both sides of the Atlantic seem ready to put behind them the open acrimony that surrounded the war; and on Iran, the EU-3 (the United Kingdom, France and Germany) and Washington have been working in unison since early 2005. However, despite recent examples of convergence, considerable transatlantic differences over the Middle East promise to persist, becoming more and less pronounced in step with adverse and positive developments in the region. That these differences are rooted in contrasting historical experiences, political cultures and political systems makes it likely that disagreements over Middle East policy, as in the past, will remain a key source of transatlantic tension in the future.
