Studies a high period of tension in the relations between the two countries, paying special attention to the impact of considerations of security in Australia's foreign policy towards Indonesia. This period saw a concerned Australian Government become deeply involved in the Confrontation conflict between Malaysia and Indonesia. In four chapters entitled 'Patterns of Australian Foreign Policy', 'The Setting of Australian Indonesian Relations During the Period of Confrontations Against Malaysia', 'Australia's Response to Indonesia's Opposition to the Malaysian Proposal', and 'Conclusion'. Contains an Appendix on the Manila Agreements.
For over four years in the Swinging Sixties the armed forces of the UK were engaged in a little publicized but crucial jungle war against communist aggressive on the vast island of Borneo.At any one time up to 50,000 troops (half of the Armys strength today) were deployed along a 1,000 mile front. Their enemy were the communist led Indonesians whose leaders were determined to seize the states of Sarawak, Sabah and the oil rich Brunei, all of whom for their part wished to maintain their Commonwealth links. The catalyst for the war was the 1962 uprising in Brunei which was quickly crushed by the bold intervention of British army units.The arrival of Major General Walter Walker, himself a controversial figure, gave the subsequent campaign a clear direction. Indonesian incursions were rigorously defended and ruthlessly pursued. Top Secret Claret operations took the fight to the enemy with cross border operations initially using Special Forces and later with Chindit-style long range patrols. The outcome was a text book military victory thus avoiding a British Vietnam debacle.
Recent years have seen dramatic shifts in the nature of Australian-Indonesian relations, and this in turn has had a great impact on the strategic partnership that had gradually come into existence between the two regional powers. Against the backdrop of rapid strategic, political, economic, social, and technological changes occurring on a global scale, Australian foreign policy efforts at cooperation with its largest and nearest Asian neighbor have changed as well—largely as a result of domestic political considerations. Reaching a high point under Prime Minister Keating, defense relations soured considerably and suddenly after 1999. Singh provides a non-partisan account of the shift from partnership to cold peace and an examination of how it has affected the bilateral, regional, and global security environment. The Indonesian public and political elite have become hostile toward Australia as a result of her perceived role in the birth of an independent East Timor. Indonesians are also increasingly suspicious of Australian intensions toward their own country, with many believing that Canberra would like to repeat its East Timor success in Papua, thereby leading to the disintegration of Indonesia itself. John Howard's pro-Western policies are also viewed as a return to Australian projection of itself as a Western outpost on the fringes of Asia. As the strategic cooperation between the two nations has faltered, it has had tremendous implications for the defense and security outlook of both powers. The world cannot afford to ignore this possible threat to regional stability.
The confrontation with Indonesia cut to the heart of Britain's desire to retain global power status in the 1960s and was central to decolonisation and British defence policy across South-East Asia. Factors such as the need to maintain a military base in Singapore drove strategy and this confrontation became a major commitment - close at times to escalating into full-scale regional war. However, 'the Confrontation' was not recorded as a conflict of this scale, and Britain was cast into a passive and defensive role. Here, David Easter reveals a radically different view, persuasively making the case that Britain waged a secret and aggressive war against President Sukarno's Indonesia. It was the covert nature of operations and the deliberate decision of British policy-makers to keep the full extent of this conflict away from public scrutiny that has allowed it to be overshadowed in the annals of history.
Australia's engagement with Asia from 1944 until the late 1960s was based on a sense of responsibility to the United Kingdom and its Southeast Asian colonies as they navigated a turbulent independence into the British Commonwealth. The circumstances of the early Cold War decades also provided for a mutual sense of solidarity with the non-communist states of East Asia, with which Australia mostly enjoyed close relationships. From 1967 into the early 1970s, however, Commonwealth Responsibility and Cold War Solidarity demonstrates that the framework for this deep Australian engagement with its region was progressively eroded by a series of compounding, external factors: the 1967 formation of ASEAN and its consolidation by the mid-1970s as the premier regional organisation surpassing the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC); Britain's withdrawal from East of Suez; Washington's de-escalation and gradual withdrawal from Vietnam after March 1968; the 1969 Nixon doctrine that America's Asia-Pacific allies must take up more of the burden of providing for their own security; and US rapprochement with China in 1972. The book shows that these profound changes marked the start of Australia's political distancing from the region during the 1970s despite the intentions, efforts and policies of governments from Whitlam onwards to foster deeper engagement. By 1974, Australia had been pushed to the margins of the region, with its engagement premised on a broadening but shallower transactional basis.
This book examines the role of the international community in the handover of the Dutch colony of West Papua/Irian Jaya to Indonesia in the 1960s and questions whether or not the West Papuan people ever genuinely exercised the right to self-determination guaranteed to them in the UN-brokered Dutch/Indonesian agreement of 1962. Indonesian, Dutch, US, Soviet, Australian and British involvement is discussed, but particular emphasis is given to the central part played by the United Nations in the implementation of this agreement. As guarantor, the UN temporarily took over the territory's administration from the Dutch before transferring control to Indonesia in 1963. After five years of Indonesian rule, a UN team returned to West Papua to monitor and endorse a controversial act of self-determination that resulted in a unanimous vote by 1022 Papuan 'representatives' to reject independence. Despite this, the issue is still very much alive today as a crisis-hit Indonesia faces continued armed rebellion and growing calls for freedom in West Papua.
"Australia's relations with Indonesia are currently at a low ebb. The optimistic prospects of the mid-1990s had collapsed almost completely by the year 2000. Senior Indonesian officials were angered after that by the triumphalist tone of John Howard's public statements after the intervention in East Timor, by the megaphone diplomacy resorted to by some Australian ministers to express their displeasure at Indonesian policies or actions, by Howards acquiescence in the use of the term deputy sheriff to the US in our region, and particularly by his assertion of a right to make pre-emptive strikes against terrorists in neighbouring countries if he deemed it necessary. When demands arose in Papua for a greater degree of autonomy and in some quarters for full independence after East Timor achieved it independence, arousing vocal support from pro-Papuan groups in Australia, suspicions arose in Indonesia that many Australians were seeking to detach Papua from the unitary state of Indonesia and perhaps to bring about the fragmentation (or Balkanisation) of Indonesia. Then the new element of terrorism entered into the picture after the war of terror triggered by the 9/11 attacks in New York and Washington, followed by the October 2002 Bali bombing which thrust Jemaah Islamiyahs (JI) terrorists from Indonesia, some with links to Osama bin Laden, into the limelight. Remarkably successful cooperation by the AFP and Polri were not sufficient to offset the frictions that arose over Australian impatience at Indonesian reluctance to take strong punitive action against terrorist suspects and Indonesian reluctance to do so."--Provided by publisher.
"Emergency and Confrontation is the first sustained and scholarly account of Australia's military involvement in the Malayan Emergency, waged against the armed forces of the Malayan Communist Party between 1948 and 1960, and in Confrontation, an undeclared war initiated by Indonesia to destabilise the emergent Federation of Malaysia and fought largely along the common border in the northern part of Borneo between 1962 and 1966. In each case the conflict was determined by the wider movement for decolonisation in Asia, and by the context of Cold War competition which saw Western forces pitted against Communist, or Communist-backed, movements." "As part of the British Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve, Australian soldiers engaged in protracted operations in northern Malaya and along the Thai border, while Australian airmen flew bombing sorties against suspected enemy concentrations, usually in deep jungle. With the Emergency concluded, Australian forces saw service again in the 1960s as part of a Commonwealth force in Borneo. Operations in both campaigns were gruelling, drawn-out, and often inconclusive, but their overall success helped to protect the emergent democracy of post-colonial Malaysia, while they also provided valuable experience for Australian soldiers in the skills of jungle warfare, counter-insurgency and small unit action." "Australia's involvement in the Emergency and Confrontation forms part of the prologue to the more assertive and self-reliant engagement with its region which has come to characterise Australian policy in Southeast Asia in the 1980s and 1990s. The defence of Malaya/Malaysia from internal subversion and external threat was a success - and an important one in the subsequent development of the ASEAN states."--BOOK JACKET.Title Summary field provided by Blackwell North America, Inc. All Rights Reserved
