High quality reprint of 1945 publication. The Army Air Forces Statistical Digest (World War II) published by the Office of the Statistical Control, Headquarters, Army Air Forces, makes available in one voltume and on a uniform basis summary statistics on AAF personnel, aircraft, equipment, combat operations and other activities during World War II.
U.S. AIR FORCES STATISTICAL DIGEST SUMMARIZES THE GREAT VOLUME OR STATISTICAL INFORMATION COLLECTED AND PUBLISHED BY THE VARIOUS OFFICES IN HEADQUARTERS USAF, THE AIR FORCES AND CERTAIN AIR FORCE COMMANDS. THE MORE IMPORTANT DATA ON THE MANY ACTIVITIES AND OPERATIONS OF THE USAF ARE BROUGHT TOGETHER ON A UNIFORM BASIS TO SERVE AS AN OFFICIAL AND BASIC REFERENCE MANUAL. THC 1947 STATISTICAL DIGEST IS THE SECOND EDITION IN AN ANNUAL SERIES. PREVIOUS EDITIONS - ARMY AIR FORCES STATISTICAL DIGEST (WORLD WAR II) AND SUPPLEMENT NUMBER 1 THERE TO AND AAF STATISTICAL DIGEST, 1946 - MADE AVAILABLE SUMMARY STATISTICS ON WORLD WAR II AND ON SELECTED SUBJECTS THROUGH THE YEAR 1946. THE PRESENT ISSUE INCLUDES THE MAJORITY OF THE TABLES CARRIED IN THE 1946 EDITION. HISTORICAL CONTINUITY HAS BEEN PRESERVED AND EACH SERIES HAS BEEN BROUGHT FORWARD THROUGH 1947. IN ADDITION, SEVERAL NEW TABLES HAVE BEEN ADDED ON DATA WHICH HAS BECOME AVAILABLE DURING THE PREPARATION OF THIS ISSUE.
Includes the Aerial Warfare In Europe During World War II illustrations pack with over 180 maps, plans, and photos. Gen Henry H. “Hap.” Arnold, US Army Air Forces (AAF) Chief of Staff during World War II, maintained diaries for his several journeys to various meetings and conferences throughout the conflict. Volume 1 introduces Hap Arnold, the setting for five of his journeys, the diaries he kept, and evaluations of those journeys and their consequences. General Arnold’s travels brought him into strategy meetings and personal conversations with virtually all leaders of Allied forces as well as many AAF troops around the world. He recorded his impressions, feelings, and expectations in his diaries. Maj Gen John W. Huston, USAF, retired, has captured the essence of Henry H. Hap Arnold—the man, the officer, the AAF chief, and his mission. Volume 2 encompasses General Arnold’s final seven journeys and the diaries he kept therein.
From the foreword: WHEN JAPAN ATTACKED PEARL HARBOR on December 7, 1941, and Germany and Italy joined Japan four days later in declaring war against the United States, intelligence essential for the Army Air Forces to conduct effective warfare in the European and Pacific theaters did not exist. Piercing the Fog tells the intriguing story of how airmen built intelligence organizations to collect and process information about the enemy and to produce and disseminate intelligence to decisionmakers and warfighters in the bloody, horrific crucible of war. Because the problems confronting and confounding air intelligence officers, planners, and operators fifty years ago still resonate, Piercing the Fog is particularly valuable for intelligence officers, planners, and operators today and for anyone concerned with acquiring and exploiting intelligence for successful air warfare. More than organizational history, this book reveals the indispensable and necessarily secret role intelligence plays in effectively waging war. It examines how World War II was a watershed period for Air Force Intelligence and for the acquisition and use of signals intelligence, photo reconnaissance intelligence, human resources intelligence, and scientific and technical intelligence. Piercing the Fog discusses the development of new sources and methods of intelligence collection; requirements for intelligence at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of warfare; intelligence to support missions for air superiority, interdiction, strategic bombardment, and air defense; the sharing of intelligence in a coalition and joint service environment; the acquisition of intelligence to assess bomb damage on a target-by-target basis and to measure progress in achieving campaign and war objecti ves; and the ability of military leaders to understand the intentions and capabilities of the enemy and to appreciate the pressures on intelligence officers to sometimes tell commanders what they think the commanders want to hear instead of what the intelligence discloses. The complex problems associated with intelligence to support strategic bombardment in the 1940s will strike some readers as uncannily prescient to global Air Force operations in the 1990s.," Illustrated.
