Recently, economists have developed methods for structural estimation of auction models. Many researchers object to these methods because they find the strict rationality assumptions to be implausible. Using bid data from first-price auction experiments, we estimate four alternative structural models:(1) risk-neutral Bayes-Nash, (2) risk-averse Bayes-Nash, (3) a model of learning, and (4) a quantal response model of bidding. For each model, we compare the estimated valuations and the valuations assigned to bidders in the experiments. We find that the risk aversion model is able to generate reasonable estimates of bidder valuations.
Recently, economists have developed methods for structural estimation of auction models. Many researchers object to these methods because they find the rationality assumptions used in these models to be implausible. In this paper, we explore whether structural auction models can generate reasonable estimates of bidders' private information. Using bid data from auction experiments, we estimate four alternative structural models of bidding in first-price sealed-bid auctions: 1) risk neutral Bayes-Nash, 2) risk averse Bayes-Nash, 3) a model of learning and 4) a quantal response model of bidding. For each model, we compare the estimated valuations and the valuations assigned to bidders in the experiments. We find that a slight modification of Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong's (2000) procedure for estimating the risk neutral Bayes-Nash model to allow for bidder asymmetries generates quite reasonable estimates of the structural parameters.
Behavioral economics provides a rich set of explicit models of non-classical preferences and belief formation which can be used to estimate structural models of decision making. At the same time, experimental approaches allow the researcher to exogenously vary components of the decision making environment. The synergies between behavioral and experimental economics provide a natural setting for the estimation of structural models. This Element will cover examples supporting the following arguments 1) Experimental data allows the researcher to estimate structural models under weaker assumptions and can simplify their estimation, 2) many popular models in behavioral economics can be estimated without any programming skills using existing software, 3) experimental methods are useful to validate structural models. This Element aims to facilitate adoption of structural modelling by providing Stata codes to replicate some of the empirical illustrations that are presented. Examples covered include estimation of outcome-based preferences, belief-dependent preferences and risk preferences.
"Within economics a relatively new way of modeling has dominated important subfields: structural modeling. The goal of this book is to give an overview on how the various streams of literatures in empirical industrial organization and quantitative marketing use structural econometric modeling to estimate the model parameters, give the economic-model-based predictions, and conduct the policy counterfactual experiments. The traditional way of modelling, called "reduced-form" builds its models from simple relationships between variables of interests, which are mostly linear. Structural econometric models start by specifying the structure of the economic model, and the variables are calibrated from real-world data. This method enables better predictions and policy counterfactuals, and has other benefits. When considering a hypothetical policy change using the traditional modeling method ("reduced form"), researchers can often only estimate whether an effect would be positive or negative. With a structural econometric model using real-world data, a researcher can obtain the magnitude of the effects resulting from a hypothetical change. But the ability of quantifying the effects associated with a hypothetical policy change comes with its costs: the nonlinearity from explicitly specifying the possible relationships makes the structural econometric approach generally much more difficult to implement than its reduced-form counterpart. Therefore this book will provide a much-needed resource on how to use these methods effectively in the fields in which they been used the most, empirical industrial organization and quantitative marketing"--
This dissertation contributes to the structural auction literature in two different auction models, namely the pure common value model and the affiliated private value model. The goal of structural analysis of auction data is to recover the model primitives and to provide policy guidance for welfare analysis. In Chapter 1, we study identification in the first-price and the second-price sealed-bid auctions within the pure common value framework. In Chapter 2, we apply the identification results and estimation method in Chapter 1 to analyze the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) wildcat auction data and provide policy guidance for welfare analysis. In Chapter 3, we develop identification and partial identification results for the first-price and the second-price sealed-bid auction models with affiliated private values and incomplete sets of bids. Chapter 1: In this chapter, we establish novel identification results for both the first-price and the second-price sealed-bid auction models within the pure common value framework. We show that the policy parameters, including the expected total welfare, the seller's expected revenue, and the bidders' expected surplus under any reserve price are identified for a general nonparametric class of latent joint distributions when the ex-post common value is unobserved. Moreover, we establish that these policy parameters are nonparametric identified without normalization assumption when the ex-post common value is observed. We propose a semiparametric estimation method and establish consistency of the estimator. Results from Monte Carlo experiments reveal good finite sample performance of the estimator. Chapter 2: In this chapter, we employ the identification strategy and estimation method in Chapter 1 to analyze data from the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) wildcat auctions in the pure common value framework. We study the welfare implication of different counterfactual reserve prices, focusing on the cases with two and three bidders. The empirical results suggest that if the U.S. government had set reserve prices optimally using the newly-developed econometric method in Chapter 1, its expected revenue can be increased by around $34\%$ and $30\%$ for these two cases, respectively. Lastly, we compare our results with those estimated under the affiliated private value framework, and find that the estimated welfare curves under the two different frameworks are very different. Chapter 3: In this chapter, we address the identification issue in the first-price sealed-bid affiliated private value model when an incomplete set of bids is observed. In the simple case with symmetric bidders and non-binding reserve price, we establish identification or partial identification results in two scenarios of practical interest. First, when the two highest bids are observed, we achieve identification of the joint distribution function of private values by assuming the copula function of private values to be a nonparametric Archimedean copula with weak requirement. Second, when only the highest bid is observed, we establish partial identification for the quantile function of private value and several policy parameters by parameterizing the copula function. Further, we extend the identification/partial identification results to the cases with asymmetric bidders and/or binding reserve price. We also extend our identification/partial identification results to the second-price sealed-bid auction.
The Second Edition of this book presents the state of the art in this important field. Marketing decision models constitute a core component of the marketing discipline and the area is changing rapidly, not only due to fundamental advances in methodology and model building, but also because of the recent developments in information technology, the Internet and social media. This Handbook contains eighteen chapters that cover the most recent developments of marketing decision models in different domains of marketing. Compared to the previous edition, thirteen chapters are entirely new, while the remaining chapters represent complete updates and extensions of the previous edition. This new edition of the Handbook has chapters on models for substantive marketing problems, such as customer relationship management, customer loyalty management, website design, Internet advertising, social media, and social networks. In addition, it contains chapters on recent methodological developments that are gaining popularity in the area of marketing decision models, such as structural modeling, learning dynamics, choice modeling, eye-tracking and measurement. The introductory chapter discusses the main developments of the last decade and discusses perspectives for future developments.
An indispensable survey of new developments and results in experimental economics When The Handbook of Experimental Economics first came out in 1995, the notion of economists conducting lab experiments to generate data was relatively new. Since then, the field has exploded. This second volume of the Handbook covers some of the most exciting new growth areas in experimental economics, presents the latest results and experimental methods, and identifies promising new directions for future research. Featuring contributions by leading practitioners, the Handbook describes experiments in macroeconomics, charitable giving, neuroeconomics, other-regarding preferences, market design, political economy, subject population effects, gender effects, auctions, and learning and the economics of small decisions. Contributors focus on key developments and report on experiments, highlighting the dialogue between experimenters and theorists. While most of the experiments consist of laboratory studies, the book also includes several chapters that report extensively on field experiments related to the subject area studied. Covers exciting new growth areas in experimental economics Features contributions by leading experts Describes experiments in macroeconomics, charitable giving, neuroeconomics, market design, political economy, gender effects, auctions, and more Highlights the dialogue by experimenters with theorists and each other Includes several chapters covering field experiments related to the subject area studied
The Handbook of Experimental Economic Methodology, edited by Guillaume R. Fréchette and Andrew Schotter, aims to confront and debate the issues faced by the growing field of experimental economics. For example, as experimental work attempts to test theory, it raises questions about the proper relationship between theory and experiments. As experimental results are used to inform policy, the utility of these results outside the lab is questioned, and finally, as experimental economics tries to integrate ideas from other disciplines like psychology and neuroscience, the question of their proper place in the discipline of economics becomes less clear. This book contains papers written by some of the most accomplished scholars working at the intersection of experimental, behavioral, and theoretical economics talking about methodology. It is divided into four sections, each of which features a set of papers and a set of comments on those papers. The intention of the volume is to offer a place where ideas about methodology could be discussed and even argued. Some of the papers are contentious---a healthy sign of a dynamic discipline---while others lay out a vision for how the authors think experimental economics should be pursued. This exciting and illuminating collection of papers brings light to a topic at the core of experimental economics. Researchers from a broad range of fields will benefit from the exploration of these important questions.
