In February 1920 the civil war that had ravaged Russia in the wake of the Bolshevik seizure of power was all but over, and with it the attempt of foreign governments to intervene on behlf of the anti-Communist forces. The government most deeply involved in this intervention was that of Great Britain. Yet scarcely a year later Britain was the first major power to come to terms with the new leadership in Moscow. Richard H. Ullman's account of that cautious coming to terms offers a perspective on the processes by which British foreign policy adjusted to the drastically changed circumstances of the aftermath of World War I. Another important theme is the way in which British policy, and the conceptions of peace and security that underlay it, diverged from that of Britain's closest ally, France. The book is, as well, a contribution of the growing literature on bureaucractic politics and the politics of foreign-policy making, and is a protracted essay on the statecraft and political style of David Lloyd George. It draws on many new sources, among them the interecepted and deciphered telegrams of the Soviet mission in London. Richard H. Ullman is Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University. The Anglo-Soviet Accord is the third and final volume of his Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917-1921. Originally published in 1973. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
In an intriguing work based largely on new sources, Richard H. Ullman shows how the British government--the politicians, civil servants, military and naval officers--dealt with the problem of Russia during the critical period bewtween the Bolshevik Revolution in November 1917 and Britain's de facto recognition of the Soviet government in March 1921. Volume 1 describes the tragic misunderstandings and desperate hopes of the British in the troubled year before the Armistice, which stands as a watershed in the history of Anglo-Soviet policy. As diplomacy failed, British forces found themselves fighting not only in North Russia but in the Caucasus and on the frontiers of India. The second volume, to be published later, will cover the story to 1921. Dr. Ullman's exciting portrayal of these evetns is a companion work to George Kennan's several-volume study of the same period, "Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920." Originally published in 1961. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
At the end of World War I the British government found itself deeply mired in a Russian civil war aimed at destroying the infant Bolshevik regime. A year later this effort was in shambles despite massive assistance from abroad. Anti-Bolshevik forces were in retreat and soon were completely annihilated. During 1919 the British government concluded that the costs of bringing down Bolshevism in Russia were prohibitively high. This book is an account of how this conclusion was reached, and of the conflict over Russian policy between David Lloyd George and Winston Churchill. Richard H. Ullman is Associate Professor of Politics and International Affairs, Princeton University. Published for the Center of International Studies, Princeton University. Originally published in 1968. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
This work explores the reasons for the Allied intervention into Russia at the end of the Great War and examines the military, diplomatic and political chaos that resulted in the failure of the Allies and White Russians to defeat the Bolshevik Revolution.
During the revolutionary period the Soviets came into political and cultural conflict with Russia's Muslims. Despite indications that the majority of Muslims desired political unification based on their Islamic heritage, the Party divided them into separate "nationalities" along narrow ethnic lines, incorporated most into the RSFSR, and attempted to uproot traditional Islamic institutions and customs under the aegis of class war. Resistance took the form of pan-Muslim nationalism, a reformist political conception with roots in the Near East. This conflict not only aborted the export of revolution to the Islamic world, contributing to the passing of the revolutionary era in Russia, but aided Stalin's rise to power. Soviet policy succeeded politically, defining the terms of interaction between Russians and Soviet Muslims for the next 70 years, but failed culturally in 1921-22, when the Party was forced to suspend its "war on Islam" as the price of political control.
A wide-ranging and authoritative study of British foreign policy in the critical years after the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. Policy towards Western and Eastern Europe, Russia, Turkey, the Middle East, United States and Far East is examined alongside such themes as the role of Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary and Cabinet in policy formulation. The evolution and execution of policy is set alongside the limitations imposed on British statesmen by the dominions, armed forces, economic weakness and domestic politics.
Volodarsky (Russian and East European studies, Tel Aviv U.) argues that the new Soviet Union continued Imperial Russia's policy of controlling its southern neighbors through promises and threats.