Drawing on official records and private papers, this book offers insights into Anglo-American reactions to France's development of an independent nuclear capability; France's bid for the political leadership of Europe; Britain's first application to join the EEC; the controversial US multilateral force (MLF) proposal for NATO; Britain's numerous propositions to France for the development of an independent European nuclear force; the tense Anglo-American diplomatic quarrel that was the Skybolt crisis; and the creative diplomacy that produced the Nassau Agreement of December 1962.
Kennedy, Johnson and the Defence of NATO is an incisive reassessment of Anglo-American defence relations, which form a crucial part of international security. Andrew Priest closely examines this key relationship by focusing on the so-called Nassau agreement of December 1962. He clearly places Nassau in its context and shows how multi-level collaboration continued between the US and UK in NATO despite growing tensions over American involvement in Southeast Asia and Britain’s global role. Firstly, he shows how agreements made between Presidents and Prime Ministers shape alliances in by encouraging interaction between politicians, government officials and military personnel at various levels of formality. Secondly, by focusing on the NATO area, he assesses US-UK attitudes to European and North Atlantic defence. Traditionally, studies of US-UK relations at this time have tended to concentrate on developing difficulties between Presidents and Prime Ministers (particularly Harold Wilson and Lyndon B. Johnson), over global issues. This study demonstrates the ‘dynamics of alliance’ through a nuanced approach at high-political, official and ‘working’ levels, across different administrations in the US and UK. Although more recently some authors have successfully integrated such a ‘multi-layered’ approach particularly to studies of nuclear affairs, they have tended to treat the 1962 Nassau agreement as something of a dénouement. This book will be essential reading for students of US foreign policy, British foreign policy, Anglo-American relations, European-American relations and the history of NATO.
The demise of sterling as an international currency was widely predicted after 1945, but the process took thirty years to complete. Why was this demise so prolonged? Traditional explanations emphasize British efforts to prolong sterling's role because it increased the capacity to borrow, enhanced prestige, or supported London as a centre for international finance. This book challenges this view by arguing that sterling's international role was prolonged by the weakness of the international monetary system and by collective global interest in its continuation. Using the archives of Britain's partners in Europe, the USA and the Commonwealth, Catherine Schenk shows how the UK was able to convince other governments that sterling's international role was critical for the stability of the international economy and thereby attract considerable support to manage its retreat. This revised view has important implications for current debates over the future of the US dollar as an international currency.
The greatest threat to the Western alliance in the 1960s did not come from an enemy, but from an ally. France, led by its mercurial leader General Charles de Gaulle, launched a global and comprehensive challenge to the United State’s leadership of the Free World, tackling not only the political but also the military, economic, and monetary spheres. Successive American administrations fretted about de Gaulle, whom they viewed as an irresponsible nationalist at best and a threat to their presence in Europe at worst. Based on extensive international research, this book is an original analysis of France’s ambitious grand strategy during the 1960s and why it eventually failed. De Gaulle’s failed attempt to overcome the Cold War order reveals important insights about why the bipolar international system was able to survive for so long, and why the General’s legacy remains significant to current French foreign policy.
Britain, America and the Special Relationship since 1941 examines the Anglo-American strategic and military relationship that developed during the Second World War and continued until recent years. Forged on a common ground of social, cultural, and ideological values as well as political expediency, this partnership formed the basis of the western alliance throughout the Cold War, playing an essential part in bringing stability to the post-1945 international order. Clearly written and chronologically organized, the book begins by discussing the origins of the ‘Special Relationship’ and its progression from uneasy coexistence in the eighteenth century to collaboration at the start of the Second World War. McKercher explores the continued evolution of this partnership during the conflicts that followed, such as the Suez Crisis, the Vietnam War, and the Falklands War. The book concludes by looking at the developments in British and American politics during the past two decades and analysing the changing dynamics of this alliance over the course of its existence. Illustrated with maps and photographs and supplemented by a chronology of events and list of key figures, this is an essential introductory resource for students of the political history and foreign policies of Britain and the United States in the twentieth century.
Glen O'Hara draws a compelling picture of Second World War Britain by investigating relations between people and government: the electorate's rising expectations and demands for universally-available social services, the increasing complexity of the new solutions to these needs, and mounting frustration with both among both governors and governed.
Volume I of The Official History of the UK Strategic Nuclear Deterrent provides an authoritative and in-depth examination of the British Government’s strategy towards nuclear deterrent from 1945 to 1964. This volume, written with full access to the UK documentary record, examines the strategic nuclear policy of British governments after 1945 as they tried to build and then maintain an independent, nationally controlled strategic capability, while also attempting to forge a close nuclear relationship with the United States. This book will be of much interest to students of British politics, nuclear proliferation and international relations.
The book gives an account of an essential part of Britain’s troubled relationship with the rest of Europe after 1945 – particularly considering the rivalry of France and Britain between 1945 and 2007. The record of Britain’s relations with the rest of Europe, and in particular with France, from 1945 onwards was seen by the politicians and diplomats in charge of foreign policy very much in terms of a diplomatic battle. This is paradoxical given that European integration was supposedly aiming to create a European community. Although Britain has usually been seen as an at-best half-hearted participant in European integration, it nonetheless maintained its ambition to assume the leadership of Europe. This inevitably led to a confrontation with France which shared the same goal. This book begins by looking at the opposing ways in which these two ancient European rivals presented very different models for the sort of Europe they wished to see emerge. It goes on to consider the record of their rivalry between 1945 and 2007. After this, Britain effectively gave up the battle for the political leadership of Europe. This, however, should not obscure the fact that it had succeeded in imposing many of its social and economic models on Europe. This volume will be of interest to both undergraduate students and general readers interested in Britain’s position in Europe.
The greatest threat to Western unity in the 1960s came not from a communist enemy but from an ally: France. De Gaulle challenged the dominance of the US by bringing crises to the EEC and NATO and seeking détente with the Soviet bloc. As this book shows, the US and Britain cooperated successfully to ensure that his plans did not prosper.
“America’s road to disaster in Vietnam has been endlessly chronicled, but Sean L. McLaughlin takes a fresh approach to that familiar story.” —James Hershberg, George Washington University Despite French President Charles de Gaulle’s persistent efforts to constructively share French experience and use his resources to help engineer an American exit from Vietnam, the Kennedy administration responded to de Gaulle’s peace initiatives with bitter silence and inaction.The administration’s response ignited a series of events that dealt a massive blow to American prestige across the globe, resulting in the deaths of over fifty-eight thousand American soldiers and turning hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese citizens into refugees. This history of Franco-American relations during the Kennedy presidency explores how and why France and the US disagreed over the proper western strategy for the Vietnam War. France clearly had more direct political experience in Vietnam, but France’s postwar decolonization cemented Kennedy’s perception that the French were characterized by a toxic mixture of shortsightedness, stubbornness, and indifference to the collective interests of the West. At no point did the Kennedy administration give serious consideration to de Gaulle’s proposals or entertain the notion of using his services as an honest broker in order to disengage from a situation that was rapidly spiraling out of control. Kennedy’s Francophobia, the roots of which appear in a selection of private writings from Kennedy’s undergraduate years at Harvard, biased his decision-making. This book explores how the course of action Kennedy chose in 1963, a rejection of the French peace program, all but handcuffed Lyndon Johnson into formally entering a war he knew the United States had little chance of winning.
